Budget sensitive

Office of the Minister for Children

Cabinet Expenditure and Regulatory Review Committee

Tranche 1-2 Frontline Technology Systems Upgrade – Detailed Business Case

Proposal

1 This paper seeks Cabinet's agreement to a revised detailed business case for an investment to upgrade the frontline case management systems of Oranga Tamariki to improve outcomes for children and families. The investment objectives and benefits in the detailed business case previously approved by Cabinet remain unchanged; approval is being sought to revise the delivery approach, providing improved value for money and alignment with the Digital Government Target State (the Target State) whilst reducing investment, implementation and service-delivery risks.

Relation to government priorities

2 The proposals in this paper support the Government's overarching goal to deliver more efficient, effective and responsive public services to all who need and use them. It advances specific priorities including addressing serious and persistent youth offending, giving effect to the Dame Karen Poutasi recommendations and responding to Whanaketia – the Abuse in Care inquiry. It also provides an early opportunity to align the delivery of a new child protection and youth justice case management system with the objectives of the Target State.

Executive Summary

3 Cabinet previously agreed to invest in upgrading the Oranga Tamariki child protection and youth justice case management system and committed $74.50 million[1] in Budget 2024 to complete the first tranche of this work. Since the previous Detailed Business Case (DBC) was endorsed, Oranga Tamariki has progressed a comprehensive procurement and due diligence process. This has informed the recommended revised approach to implementation set out in an updated DBC *Tranche 1-2 Frontline Technology Systems Upgrade (DBC)* in Appendix One.

4 The strategic case for investing in the Oranga Tamariki Frontline Technology System Upgrade (FTSU) remains strong and is well supported. Legacy case management systems, including the Care and Protection, Youth Justice, Residential and Adoption Services System (CYRAS), are more than 25 years old and are no longer fit for purpose. They increasingly constrain the organisation's ability to meet its statutory obligations, support contemporary social work practice, and collaborate effectively across the wider children's system. Growing demand, increasing workforce pressures, and upcoming child protection reforms (such as the response to the Poutasi review) are further testing the limitations of these systems.

5 Investment in FTSU is a necessary and time-critical response that will provide a modern, scalable platform to improve child protection and youth justice responses across government and non-government. Without it, the ability for Oranga Tamariki to

[1] Includes $68.50 million core funding and $6.00 million in outyears funding

deliver safe, effective and timely services is expected to come under increasing strain, with consequential risks for service performance, statutory compliance and child safety.

6 The investment context for large scale technology cases has changed since Cabinet last considered this programme and the Target State was adopted. There is now a clear mandate to modernise the digital landscape across government, reduce costs through consolidation, reuse core systems where possible and ensure strong oversight and assurance of delivery in line with investment. It is my expectation that Oranga Tamariki will continue to work closely with the Government Digital Delivery Agency (GDDA) to ensure the FTSU programme is aligned with the Target State whilst maintaining a focus on delivering solutions which promote the safety of children.

7 The Government's expectations of Oranga Tamariki and the return on this proposed investment in a modern case management system are clear. FTSU must:

7.1 improve Oranga Tamariki performance by reducing administrative burden to maximise the capacity of the frontline workforce, enabling social workers to spend more time with children, families, caregivers and victims of youth offending, contributing to increased child safety and reduced youth offending

7.2 strengthen multi-agency responses by connecting information, people, and services across government and community partners, enabling earlier intervention, better coordinated support, improved visibility of risk, and more effective responses for children and young people

7.3 support the Target State by contributing to a modern, secure, and interconnected government technology ecosystem, in order to improve service delivery, strengthen interoperability, realise efficiencies, and deliver better experiences and outcomes for New Zealanders.

8 s9(2)(b)(ii), s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted]

9 As part of their procurement due diligence, Oranga Tamariki engaged with child protection agencies in Australia and the United Kingdom who have implemented similar transitions from legacy to new platforms. Lessons learned from these experiences have informed the revised approach to implementation:

9.1 Oranga Tamariki proposes combining Tranches 1 and 2 into a single implementation, enabling earlier realisation of benefits through retirement of legacy systems. This will reduce costs, lower service delivery risk, and improve the user experience as compared to operating old and new systems side-by-side for an extended period. Any remaining scope would be delivered in a third tranche, subject to a future DBC

[2] s9(2)(b)(ii), s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted]

9.2 Oranga Tamariki will deliver targeted practice enhancements focused on priority areas under greatest demand, including responses to reports of concern. These enhancements can be implemented now and transitioned to the new platform.

10 The revised approach strengthens delivery confidence and actively manages known implementation and service delivery risks. It provides significantly better value for money than the whole of life costs estimated within the Programme Business Case (PBC) [endorsed in July 2023; CAB-23-MIN-0291 refers], while requiring a rephased investment profile and earlier upfront funding. s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

11 I am seeking Cabinet approval of the revised DBC. I am also seeking delegation of platform selection and implementation decisions to the Minister of Finance, Minister for Public Service and Digital Government and Minister for Children. No immediate commitment to new Crown funding is required as a consequence of these decisions. s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted]

12 Strong governance, independent quality assurance and regular reporting to Ministers will provide robust and ongoing oversight for existing and future investment.

Background (strategic case)

The case for change is well established, remains strong and is increasingly urgent

13 Oranga Tamariki social workers use technology to plan, manage, record and evidence information about children, families, caregivers, young people who offend, and victims. This enables Oranga Tamariki to accurately and effectively respond to, assess and plan for the safety and wellbeing of children who come to its attention. The main Oranga Tamariki legacy case and care management system is CYRAS.

14 Previously approved business cases have demonstrated that CYRAS and other case management systems are over 25 years old and no longer fit for purpose. Current systems increase administrative burden, limit information sharing and collaboration and do not adequately support contemporary social work practice. This constrains the ability for Oranga Tamariki to deliver high-quality services, respond to legislative change, and work effectively with partners, creating risks to service quality, child safety, and cross-agency outcomes.

15 These limitations pose a material risk to the ability of Oranga Tamariki to meet its statutory obligations consistently, enable its agreed practice approach, act as an effective system leader, and support partnership-led responses, including the transfer of responsibility and decision-making over time.

16 Demand for Oranga Tamariki services has increased[4] placing more pressure on existing systems. Further increases in volumes are anticipated with pending substantive reform of the child protection system signalled through the Government's response to the Dame Karen Poutasi review [CAB-25-MIN-0330 refers].

17 I believe this investment is not discretionary for Oranga Tamariki. It is a necessary and time-critical investment that will deliver stronger value for money by enabling better outcomes, reducing long-term costs, and mitigating risks to service delivery and child safety. FTSU will provide a modern, safe, scalable platform to better support frontline social work, improve outcomes for children and families and drive integration across the Oranga Tamariki system.

18 The investment delivers significant public value beyond financial considerations. It will:

18.1 improve decision-making to better support child safety

18.2 increase frontline capacity by reducing administrative burden

18.3 strengthen information sharing and collaboration across the wider children's system (government and non-government)

18.4 enhance transparency, accountability, and public confidence in the system.

19 Without this investment, Oranga Tamariki is likely to face ongoing challenges in responding to reports of concern, improving performance, supporting iwi, Māori and community-led approaches, addressing workforce pressures, and demonstrating compliance and service effectiveness. These risks are expected to increase as demand grows and change programmes progress.

Previous Cabinet decisions have confirmed that investment to modernise Oranga Tamariki case management systems is needed

20 In July 2023, Cabinet endorsed a PBC to modernise Oranga Tamariki frontline technology systems, including the replacement of its main case management system CYRAS [CAB-23-MIN-0291 refers].

21 In April 2024, Cabinet agreed to establish a tagged contingency of up to $62.50 million in Vote Oranga Tamariki to fund the upgrade of CYRAS, as well as other smaller technology systems [CAB-24-MIN-0148.54 refers].

22 In December 2024, Cabinet approved a detailed business case for Tranche 1 DBC ($68.50 million, and ongoing annual operating impact of $6.00 million) and approved drawdown of the full amount of the tagged contingency to commence procurement of a modern platform and delivery of Tranche 1 [CAB-24-MIN-0495 refers].

A revised approach to implementation will reduce investment risks

23 From February 2025 Oranga Tamariki progressed a comprehensive two-phase multi-stage procurement process to source a technology platform (Platform) and an implementation and support Partner (I&S Partner).

24 This two-stage approach was identified as being the most effective and lowest-risk procurement strategy for Oranga Tamariki. It enabled Oranga Tamariki to objectively

[4] In 2023/24 Oranga Tamariki received 74,941 Reports of Concern (ROCs) for 53,638 children, compared to 108,032 ROCs for 63,103 children in 2024/25.

test and evaluate the range of Platform options available in the market as a standalone exercise. It then ensured that only I&S Partners with demonstrable accreditation and experience on the selected Platform were considered. Throughout this procurement, Oranga Tamariki has engaged with New Zealand Government Procurement (NZGP) to ensure that appropriate government procurement processes are followed. Additionally, independent probity assurance has been provided throughout the process.

25 Procurement has progressed to assessing combined Platform and I&S Partner offerings which has resulted in two shortlisted technology platforms being extensively assessed[5].

26 During the procurement and due diligence process, risks inherent with similar systems in international child protection jurisdictions were identified, including that:

26.1 child protection and youth justice case management systems must support statutory decision-making in high-risk situations with significant consequences for children. They must also enable effective collaboration across social work, legal, health, education, police and court services. Periods of technology change can increase service delivery risk and must be carefully managed

26.2 to ensure full visibility of child and family histories, significant historic data must be carried forward from legacy to new platforms. Managing data migration is complicated and getting it right takes time

26.3 extended system co-existence between new and legacy platforms as a result of phased delivery inevitably creates additional operational complexity, fragmented frontline workflows, and increased risk of data integrity failures.

27 Based on these insights, Oranga Tamariki has concluded that an incremental tranche by tranche approach would create significant delivery risk, increase costs, extend timeframes and could compromise decision-making and child safety. s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted] This significantly exceeds the existing funding approved to deliver Tranche 1. This is an investment risk which can be avoided by revising the original delivery approach.

28 Oranga Tamariki recommends adopting a revised delivery approach, as set out in the DBC, combining Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 into a single delivery, with Tranche 3 to follow (if required) subject to a future business case.

29 Delivering Tranches 1 and 2 together enables primary legacy systems - CYRAS [redacted] s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] - to be retired at the same time, removing the need for system co-existence. This avoids the integration complexity and dual-maintenance burden that would otherwise arise from operating new and legacy systems in parallel, delivering a larger set of benefits earlier. The revised approach:

29.1 provides the best whole-of-life value for money

29.2 minimises delivery and operational risk

29.3 enables earlier and more effective realisation of benefits.

[5] s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] This involved site visits to child protection jurisdictions in Australia and the United Kingdom where the platforms were in use. Referee, business and background checks and an independent financial risk assessment were also completed on both platforms.

30 There is no material change to the strategic case, investment objectives, benefits, or overall implementation timeframes outlined in the PBC. The preferred option of prioritising child and young person focused benefits is maintained and strengthened. The procurement approach also remains unchanged.

31 The key risks for the revised delivery approach are set out in detail in the DBC, and I have included more detail on the key programme level risks for Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 in **Appendix Two**.

The investment offers opportunities to align FTSU with the Target State

32 The Target State envisages a technology ecosystem across government which includes a smaller number of interoperable platforms where common patterns and processes are reused, limiting the need for costly redesign and duplication. FTSU will actively seek to draw from and contribute to reuse opportunities across the social sector, reducing duplication and enabling more connected service delivery. Oranga Tamariki has begun and will continue to explore alignment with major government programmes, including Te Pae Tawhiti (Ministry of Social Development) and Te Au Reka (Ministry of Justice) to identify potential reuse opportunities such as identity verification, payments and some aspects of case planning. This will continue into the design phase.

33 The technology platforms considered through the procurement process have embedded modern integration capabilities which enable information to be shared safely between authorised systems and agencies. These capabilities will support interoperability, reduce manual data entry, improve information quality, and enable more coordinated responses for children, young people and families. Subject to detailed design and privacy requirements, the new platform may also provide opportunities to support wider system integration across the sector including both government and non-government partners.

34 s9(2)(b)(ii), s9(2)(g)(i)

[redacted]

35

36

Financial Implications (financial case)

Earlier upfront investment is required but whole of life costs are reduced

37 The PBC estimated the total cost for the full implementation for Tranche 1-3 to be approximately $240 million (midpoint), with an upper range of $335 million. This estimate did not include contingency.

38 s9(2)(f)(iv)

[redacted]

39

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Delegation of key implementation decisions to Ministers ensures viable investment off ramps

42 Completing the delivery of Tranches 1 and 2 does not mean that Tranche 3 must be completed. This decision will be subject to a further DBC (if required) at a later date.

43 s9(2)(g)(i)

[redacted]

44

45 This paper seeks Cabinet approval for the DBC. It also seeks joint delegation to the Minister of Finance, the Minister for the Public Service and Digitising Government and the Minister for Children for the following decisions:

45.1 s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]

45.2 [redacted]

46 These decision points, as well as the s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted], will be informed by regular reporting from Oranga Tamariki and advice from GDDA and Treasury. They offer legitimate stage gates at which point Ministers can reassess whether Oranga Tamariki is delivering against its investment, and maximising alignment with the Target State before committing further funding. The mid-2027 approval to implement is the most significant of these decisions and the point at which additional funding will be required to enter into a full commercial agreement before implementing the preferred platform.

47 Should Ministers not support ongoing investment at these decision points, the remaining balance of Budget 24 investment would be returned. Not continuing with the investment would mean that Oranga Tamariki service delivery to children and families would continue to be compromised by the current (and likely worsening) limitations of existing case management systems indefinitely.

Investment assurance

48 In order to provide confidence in delivery against this investment, Oranga Tamariki has embedded a comprehensive suite of assurance activities within the FTSU programme. A Gateway Review was undertaken on the DBC in May 2026. The Gateway Review team assess the DBC as having an Amber/Green rating. An Amber/Green rating means *'successful delivery appears probable, however constant attention will be needed to ensure risks do not materialise into major issues threatening delivery'.* See **Appendix Three** for the Gateway Review Summary Findings – Delivery Confidence Assessment.

49 s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]

50 Additional independent quality assurance activities (including those agreed now or in the future with GDDA) and robust governance (including independent external advice) provide additional confidence. I also receive monthly reporting from Oranga Tamariki on this investment, including the status of delivery, financial performance and emerging risks and mitigation. It is my intention to share these regular updates with the Minister for Finance and Minister for the Public Service and Digitising Government to enable ongoing visibility of and accountability for this investment.

Cost-of-living Implications

51 There are no cost-of-living implications arising from this proposal.

Legislative Implications

52 There are no legislative implications arising from this proposal.

Regulatory Impact Statement

53 Impact analysis requirements do not apply as this is not a regulatory proposal.

Climate Implications of Policy Assessment

54 A Climate Implications of Policy Assessment (CIPA) is not required for this proposal.

Population Implications

55 Investment in upgraded frontline technology systems will enhance the organisation's ability to collect, analyse, interpret and make use of a range of critical population level information. This will have organisational benefit for Oranga Tamariki (ensuring visibility of tamariki and rangatahi Māori, Pacific children, children with disabilities) and will enable a more meaningfully contribution to social sector data.

Use of external Resources

56 No external resources were used in developing this paper.

Human Rights

57 No inconsistencies have been identified with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993. This investment may strengthen protections for children and families by progressing the overall system upgrade faster.

Consultation

58 Consultation has taken place with the following agencies and individuals: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, The Treasury, Public Service Commission, NZGP, Ministry of Social Development, Government Chief Data Steward, GDDA, Government Chief Information Security Officer, Ministry for Regulation, Ministry of Justice. Agencies outlined their support for the investment to proceed as there remains a strong strategic case and the revised delivery approach provides greater value for money than the approach in the previously endorsed DBC for Tranche 1 delivery.

59 s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]

Communications

60 I will consider making announcements at an appropriate time as delivery progresses.

Proactive Release

61 This paper and the DBC will be proactively released subject to redactions as appropriate, consistent with the Official Information Act 1982.

Recommendations

The Minister for Children recommends that the Committee:

1 **note** that Cabinet previously approved:

1.1 the Programme Business Case for the Frontline Technology Systems Upgrade (FTSU) in June 2023 [CAB-23-MIN-0291];

1.2 a tagged contingency of up to $62.5 million for Tranche 1 in April 2024 [CAB-24-MIN-0148.54]; and

1.3 the Tranche 1 Detailed Business Case and associated funding of $68.5 million in December 2024 [CAB-24-MIN-0495].

2 **note** that Oranga Tamariki has developed a revised Detailed Business Case which retains the existing strategic case, investment objectives and preferred investment option; and combines Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 into a single implementation to improve value for money and reduce delivery risk.

3 s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

4 [redacted]

5 s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]

6 **authorise**, subject to assurance processes, the Minister for Children, the Minister of Finance and Minister for the Public Service and Digitising Government to jointly approve the Approval to Deliver in mid-2027 once the design stage is complete [redacted] s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]

7 **direct** Oranga Tamariki to move to the next stage of investment planning and complete Gateway 3: Investment Decision.

Authorised for lodgement.

Hon Karen Chhour

Minister for Children

Appendix One

Tranche 1-2 Frontline Technology Systems Upgrade – Detailed Business Case and A3 Summary

Appendix Two – Key Risks, Funding Details and Key Deliverables and Milestones

Table 1: Key programme level risks for Tranche 1 and Tranche 2

Risk Description	Impact	Risk Mitigations
Organisational Capacity to Lead Change IF our front-line people leaders do not have the capacity or leaders' support to help embed technology changes	THEN FTSU Programme outcomes will be inconsistently realised, RESULTING IN sub-optimal service delivery to children and their families, system adoption challenges, and deviation from the Practice Approach	• Resource the Programme to actively deliver change, ensuring frontline leaders only need to enable rather than execute change tasks. • Leverage familiar training patterns to simplify the championing process. • Refresh the overarching Change Strategy.
Cutover Risk IF the technical and operational transition from legacy systems to the new platform is poorly executed during the cutover window	THEN critical workflows or data synchronisation will fail, RESULTING IN severe service outages and compromised casework capabilities	• Execute extensive testing and 'dry-runs' prior to go-live. • Establish robust rollback protocols and contingency systems. • Provision dedicated, high-capacity hyper-care support immediately following release(s).
Design Drift & Customisation Spread IF the programme fails to exercise strict governance over system configuration	THEN the new platform will suffer from design drift and customisation spread, RESULTING IN heavily modified out-of-the-box functionality,	• Strict architectural oversight via the FDRG and TAA. • Firm commitment to adapting business practices to Out-Of-The-Box (OOTB) capabilities wherever possible.
Data Quality Uncertainties IF the complexity and effort required to manage the impacts of existing data quality issues on the FTSU Programme are unclear or greater than anticipated,	THEN dependent workstreams and critical decisions on sequencing, data migration and co-existence strategy will stall or rely on unvalidated assumptions, RESULTING IN extended timelines, unbudgeted remediation costs, and erosion of programme value from persistent data-integrity failures.	• Execute early data quality analysis. • Foundational first-line controls for managing legacy information are defined within the FTSU Data Cleansing Approach and the FTSU Data Migration Approach. • Active engagement and alignment with the Enterprise Data Governance Group.

s9(2)(f)(iv)



s9(2)(b)(ii), s9(2)(g)(i)



Appendix Three

Gateway Review Summary Findings – Delivery Confidence Assessment

Delivery Confidence Assessment	AMBER/GREEN

The Review Team has confirmed that the Frontline Technology Systems Upgrade Programme (the Programme) has undergone a significant and logical evolution since the approval of the original Detailed Business Case in October 2024.

The current focus has been on the procurement phase, and while it took longer than originally intended, the additional time enabled market insights from across Australia and the United Kingdom to be factored into the revised approach.

This prudent approach has meant that the cost envelope can be reduced while also reducing the delivery risk. This approach aligns with Government Digital Delivery Agency (GDDA) and New Zealand Government Procurement (NZGP) guidance and brings international best practice to New Zealand that can be shared with other sector agencies.

The Review Team notes that Oranga Tamariki is now at a point of having to resubmit a Detailed Business Case based on procurement learnings and seeking approval for a required financial approval.

The Review Team supports Oranga Tamariki's renewed approach.

Oranga Tamariki is moving from a procurement phase to a design and delivery phase and needs to ensure that they do not underestimate the significant change journey that this Programme needs to establish and the resulting impact on the Organisation. This is in addition to a new set of risks and issues that will need to continue to be actively managed

The Review Team heard that the Programme Team is performing at a high level, bringing strong governance, project discipline, and momentum. This reflects the strong leadership from the SRO and Executive Sponsor which needs to be recognised.

Frontline Technology Systems Upgrade (FTSU) Programme
Summary Overview of Detailed Business Case (DBC) for Tranche 1-2

Modernising frontline technology to build a safer, more connected children's system that strengthens communities and delivers improved outcomes for children and their families

ORANGA TAMARIKI
Ministry for Childre

OUR CONTEXT

Our vision is that all children are safe, loved and nurtured by family, hapū, and iwi, supported by thriving communities. A key enabler of this vision for Oranga Tamariki are its frontline technology systems which support the way Oranga Tamariki works to achieve that vision. However, our 25-year-old frontline technology systems are hindering our ability to fulfil this vision in both the way we work now and our ability to change as we rapidly evolve to improve the way we partner and practice.

In recognition of this, in July 2023 Cabinet approved the Programme Business Case (PBC) for the Frontline Technology System Upgrade (FTSU) programme. The PBC outlined a delivery approach of three tranches of delivery, estimated at ~$240 million midpoint (excluding contingency). This was followed in December 2024 with Cabinet approval of the DBC for Tranche 1 delivery for $68.5million. These earlier business cases identified upgraded frontline technology as a necessary enabler for achieving the strategic intentions of Oranga Tamariki.

The urgency for upgrading case management systems has become even more pronounced as the demand for Oranga Tamariki services has substantially increased. The Government has also accepted recommendations arising from Dame Karen Poutasi's report to ensure greater safety for children including through mandatory training and reporting which, based on comparable international jurisdictions, is likely to further increase report of concern volumes in future years. Investment supports other Government priorities including reducing youth offending.

From February 2025 to April 2026, Oranga Tamariki progressed a comprehensive multi-staged procurement process. Due diligence conducted as part of the procurement process has made it clear that the strategic case and the investment objectives outlined in the PBC and DBC for Tranche 1 remain valid; and that there are options in the market which are suitable to replace existing systems, sufficiently adaptable over time and feasible from an implementation perspective.

There are three significant learnings which directly relate to achieving our Investment Objectives:

1. Child protection and youth justice systems are significantly more complex than other public sector systems due primarily to the inherent complexity behind the social work profession. This work is dynamic, sensitive, and high risk, and children intersect with many parts of the public service including Health, Courts, and Education.
2. Managing data migration is complicated and getting it right will take time: not getting it right can be expensive, resulting in losing the confidence of staff and, most importantly, could put children at risk.
3. Taking a tranche-based delivery approach that requires co-existence with legacy systems is not the best approach to implementation: it carries more risk, will be less cost effective and is less likely to deliver a better and safer outcome for children, families, caregivers and staff.

OUR SYSTEMS

The scope of this investment is to replace the core case management systems used internally and to support our partners.

CYRAS is our primary case management system which is the biggest and most complex system. CYRAS is over 25 years old and supports 4,500 users. It supports safety and wellbeing of children and young people at risk of harm or offending, providing care services, adoptions and transitions to adulthood.

s9(2)(b)(ii)

THE PROBLEMS WE NEED TO SOLVE

1 **It is not easy for children/young people to engage in their information or for kaimahi to locate information on the needs of children and young people or find what resources are available, risking the safety and wellbeing of children, young people and their families**

Children and young people, their whānau, and the people supporting them do not have clear, timely, or meaningful access to information about their circumstances, needs, and available supports. At the same time, kaimahi do not have reliable visibility of the full history, context, risks, and strengths of children and their families across the system. This obscures the lived experience of children and young people, contributes to delayed or fragmented decision-making, and creates unmanaged risk to the safety and wellbeing of children, young people, and their families.

2 **Inflexible, outdated, laborious and unhelpful systems, do not support how we need to work to support children, young people, their families and caregivers. This creates additional work and stress for kaimahi.**

Existing frontline technology systems are inflexible, outdated, and administratively burdensome, and reinforce case-centric, siloed, and linear ways of working that are misaligned with contemporary social work practice. These systems create inefficiencies and unnecessary workload for kaimahi, increasing stress and reliance on manual workarounds, and diverting time and effort away from relational, whānau-centred practice. As a result, Oranga Tamariki is unable to consistently apply its agreed practice approach and meet statutory obligations.

3 **Sharing and transfer of decision-making to or between iwi, Māori organisations and community Partners is not safely enabled**

The current technology environment does not safely or effectively enable information sharing, collaboration, or shared decision-making with iwi, Māori organisations and community partners. This limits the ability to support partnership-led responses, inhibits the transfer of responsibility and decision-making over time, and reduces confidence among partners, monitors, and decision-makers. Collectively, this weakens the ability of Oranga Tamariki to act as an effective system leader, demonstrate transparency and accountability, and build enduring, trust-based partnerships.

THE KEY BENEFITS OF INVESTING

- Improve tamariki and rangatahi outcomes
- Improve wellbeing and effectiveness of kaimahi
- Reducing technology risk, creating efficiency savings and enable improve compliance
- Improve collaboration with families, system partners and caregivers



WHY INVEST NOW?

The limitations with current technology already pose a material risk to the ability for Oranga Tamariki to meet statutory obligations consistently, enable its agreed practice approach, act as an effective system leader, and support partnership led responses, including the transfer of responsibility and decision making over time.

The current state is well evidenced:

- Demand for Oranga Tamariki services has substantially increased.
- Delayed or fragmented decision-making due to poor visibility of risk and context.
- Increased stress and inefficiency for frontline workers.
- Inability for children, families and caregivers to understand or access their own information.
- Reduced confidence from partners, monitors, and decision makers.
- Ongoing reliance on manual workarounds that introduce operational and privacy risk.

At a system level, the inability to reliably aggregate, analyse and share information constrains investment decisions, impedes system learning and improvement, blurs accountability for outcomes, and erodes public trust with the impression there is a lack of transparency.

Frontline Technology Systems Upgrade (FTSU) Programme
Detailed Business Case (DBC) Tranche 1- 2

ORANGA TAMARIKI
Ministry for Children

OUR PATH TO TECHNOLOGY SELECTION

Oranga Tamariki has undertaken a two-phase multi-stage procurement process to source: a Technology Platform (Platform) and then an Implementation and Support (I&S) Partner.

This approach enabled Oranga Tamariki to firstly test and evaluate the range of Platform options available in the market and secondly to identify suitable implementation partner(s). Following this procurement process, two technology platforms and their associated I&S Partners were endorsed as meeting requirements and activities associated with a final due diligence were completed.

A final assessment is underway to determine which technology platform offers the highest level of deliverability, the best overall value for money and lowest acceptable risk to Oranga Tamariki, whilst balancing alignment to the Digital Government Target State.

WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED SO FAR

Platform due diligence has identified a range of key learnings

The procurement process included significant due diligence on the two technology Platforms, including reference checks and site visits for both Platforms in Australia and the United Kingdom. These identified key learnings:

1. **Co-existence:** Co-existence featured as an area of significant risk for all reference sites, where they largely opted to avoid co-existence. In cases where co-existence has featured as a temporary existence state, this required delivery effort which manifested in significant schedule slippage, increased delivery and operational cost and increased operational burden
2. **Data migration:** Data migration was an area of significant challenge for all sites. With data quality issues and many years of legacy data to migrate, this was repeatedly characterised as difficult, time consuming and resource intensive. Data migration complexity far exceeded expectations and partial migration strategies were common, which reduced risk but constrained full outcomes. Delivery timeframes for all projects were delayed as a direct result of data migration issues.
3. **Configuration vs customisation:** All sites referenced the challenge of maintaining a critical focus on staying within the boundaries of the platform, and to configure where possible and avoid excessive customisation. Those sites that used excessive customisation encountered delivery timeline delays and operational complexities during upgrades.
4. **Change management:** All sites referenced the highly complex business change effort required to support successful embedding of the technology into operational use. All sites referenced the requirement to have a separately focused, well resourced change programme. With the change environment being most fragile after go-live (not before), having change management support continue well after go-live to support all users was critical to embedding the change. Ineffective change management was cited by sites as one of the critical factors in unsuccessful overall delivery.
5. **Delivery time and budget expectations:** All reference sites encountered delivery delays as a result of underestimating the complexity of delivery, and as a factor of many of the learnings identified above; and these almost always led to a significant increase in the final financial position.

As a result of these key learnings, the revised delivery approach seeks to deliver Tranche 1-2 together, with Tranche 3 to follow. This approach enables the retirement of all main legacy systems (CYRAS, s9(2)(b)(ii) to avoid the need for co-existence.

FUNDING AND APPROVALS

s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

The Programme Business Case (PBC) estimated the total cost for the full implementation for Tranche 1-3 to be ~$240 million midpoint (excluding contingency). The below table outlines the existing funding approved by Cabinet that is already within Oranga Tamariki baseline versus the new Crown funding required for Tranche 1-2 and Tranche 3 (to be requested via future budget rounds) and Oranga Tamariki baseline funding towards the overall implementation costs.

s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

Funding Source	Status (Confirmed / Proposed)	Amount ($m)	Timing
Existing Crown Funding	**Confirmed** through Budget 2024 and in Oranga Tamariki baseline	$74.50m*	Budget 2024
s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]			

Note: This number is based on $68.50 million of new Crown funding received through Budget 2024 and ongoing cost of $6 million for an additional financial year.

OUR IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH

The full programme's implementation will take five years to complete. This includes a three-year delivery time in total for Tranche 1-2 and a proposed timeline of two years for Tranche 3 (subject to a separate DBC). Delivery of the programme, as depicted, has been broken into two swim lanes.

FTSU Solution covers the delivery of the programme objectives across the three tranches incorporating the work of the Product, Design and Change workstream and the Technology workstream.

Kaimahi Change Experience shows how the changes are to be packaged and rolled out to the workforce, including early delivery of targeted practice enhancements and involvement in the new case management system design and experiencing learning and training in the new system.

s9(2)(b)(ii), s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

ORANGA TAMARIKI
Ministry for Children

Tranche 1-2 Frontline Technology Systems Upgrade

Detailed Business Case

July 2026

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INTRODUCTION



Oranga Tamariki – Ministry for Children is the state agency responsible for care, protection, youth justice, transition support and adoptions.

The Government's expectations of Oranga Tamariki and the return on this investment are clear. The Frontline Technology System Upgrade must:

- Maximise the capacity of the scarce social work and frontline workforce in order to create efficiencies and lift performance so that children are safer and less young people seriously offend.
- Act as a connector and integrator across the wider child protection and youth justice system, both government and non-government, so that children and young people are more visible, information is shared more readily and interventions are better co-ordinated and integrated.
- Contribute to the whole of government transition to a modern, interconnected technology eco system which realises savings and improves the experiences of all New Zealanders who rely on our services.

Oranga Tamariki acts as the statutory lead agency within a broader, integrated children's system, responsible for ensuring the safety, wellbeing, and long-term outcomes of tamariki and rangatahi who are at risk of harm or involved in youth justice processes. It plays a critical role in achieving the vision set out in the Child and Youth Strategy of making New Zealand the best place in the world for children and young people to live.

Within the wider system, the role of Oranga Tamariki extends beyond direct service delivery to include system leadership, coordination, and stewardship of cross-agency outcomes. It sets practice standards, leads responses to high-risk cases, commissions

services and aligns agencies toward shared objectives through integrated delivery models and a whole of system approach where:

- Oranga Tamariki provides care and protection intervention, adoptions, youth justice services, and oversight of children in care, underpinned by legislative authority to act when safety concerns arise. They also lead and support integrated planning at both the system level and for individual children who are in, or at risk of entering the statutory system.
- Partnering agencies including Health, Education, Social Development, Justice and Police play a critical and complementary role by addressing the broader determinants of child wellbeing. These agencies deliver specialised services, enable early identification and prevention, and provide holistic, wraparound support for children and whānau.
- Non-government organisations, iwi, and community partners are especially important in delivering frontline, culturally responsive services, ensuring locally grounded, whānau-centred and enduring solutions and have an important role in enabling system outcomes.

Consequently, this investment will not just enable improvements within a single agency. More fundamentally it will position Oranga Tamariki to lead, support and enable the changes needed to create system integration, or as described by Dame Karen Poutasi, the integrated safety nets that holds the safety of children and young people at the centre.

The role of a modern and Professional Case Management System

A modern and professional case management system is a critical enabler of this integrated system, strengthening the ability for Oranga Tamariki to deliver effective services and enhancing the effectiveness of partner agencies (both government and non government).

Social workers and frontline staff within Oranga Tamariki and across our community partners support tamariki, rangatahi and whānau in some of the most complex circumstances and across generations to achieve safety and wellbeing. This requires skilful professional practice which must be supported by modern and professional tools.

For Oranga Tamariki, a modern platform will:

- **Improve decision-making** through real-time, high-quality data and analytics, enabling earlier identification of risk and more targeted interventions.
- **Support consistency in practice**, embedding standards, workflows, and evidence-based approaches across the organisation.
- **Create social work capacity** by closing gaps within a constrained social work workforce and reinvesting social work resource from low to high value activities.
- **Enhance case visibility and continuity**, ensuring a complete, longitudinal view of each child's journey across services.
- **Strengthen system stewardship**, providing better insight into system performance, demand, and outcomes.

For partnering agencies, the system will:

- Enable **timely and secure information sharing**, ensuring partners have access to relevant insights to act earlier and more effectively.
- Support **coordinated, multi-agency responses**, reducing fragmentation and duplication of effort.
- Improve the ability to deliver **wraparound, child-centred services**, with clearer roles, responsibilities, and shared plans.
- Enhance **accountability and transparency**, with shared visibility of outcomes and progress.

At a system level, a modern case management capability underpins the shift from reactive intervention to **proactive, integrated responses**, enabling:

- The right response for the right child at the right time.
- Better alignment of services around the needs of children and whānau.
- Improved long-term outcomes through data-informed and collaborative decision-making.

Taken together, these shifts, supported by the substantial uplift in modern digital capability that will be delivered through this investment, represents a significant step-change in how the system currently operates. It shifts the focus from siloed responses to a connected, information-driven system, delivering more timely, effective, and equitable outcomes for tamariki and rangatahi.

The context for this Detailed Business Case

Current Oranga Tamariki frontline technology systems are over 25 years old and are hindering our ability to fulfil service deliver requirements, enable system integration and support the effectiveness of partner agencies.

In recognition of this, the Oranga Tamariki Frontline Technology Systems Upgrade Programme (the FTSU Programme) was established to identify options that can enable technology to support the frontline, partners, non-government organisations, iwi, and community partners.

Having completed a comprehensive discovery, due diligence and procurement phase, this Detailed Business Case (the DBC) presents a confident and certain pathway to delivering a fit for purpose social work case management system in a timely and cost effective manner that will maximise social work capacity, lift performance, create system integration and efficiencies and ultimately improve the safety and wellbeing of children.

This DBC builds off previous business cases, integrates lessons learned from child protection and youth justice jurisdictions internationally and confirms that achieving the intended investment objectives of this programme is not only realistically attainable, but ultimately can be delivered at less overall cost than originally anticipated.

To realise these expectations, Oranga Tamariki have taken a deliberate approach through the FTSU programme to identify solutions informed by Government procurement rules, the Digital Government Target State and a detailed understanding of the specific requirements that will best give effect to the complex interplay of legislative, practice, accountability and partnering requirements in which Oranga Tamariki and the wider child protection and youth justice system operates.

Considering in particular the Digital Government Target State, there has been a focus to:

- Seek to limit the need for extensive design and customisation (buy don't build).
- Look for options which will achieve an improved level of safety and a better experience for tamariki, rangatahi, partners, victims and caregivers (design for those we serve and deliver joined up customer experiences).
- Ensure solutions both enable appropriate and required information sharing across agencies whilst placing a high premium on privacy and protection of safe information (privacy by design).
- Explore opportunities to hardwire interagency collaboration within and between government and community partners (ensuring openness and interoperability).

At the same time, deliberate consideration has been given to those elements that are uniquely necessary to deliver a high quality, highly trusted statutory care, protection and youth justice social work service and approaches which are most able to be integrated by a workforce operating in a constrained and high demand environment and which can support whole of sector ways of working. This has included deliberately considering options that can safely embed existing and emerging technologies (such as AI) to support professional decision making and promote more effective and efficient ways of working.

Through the procurement and due diligence process, Oranga Tamariki has confirmed there are platforms in the market which can achieve the intent of this investment. Concurrently, a significant opportunity has been identified to deliver the proposed solution and achieve the Programme's investment objectives more efficiently, cost-effectively, and safely by refining the implementation approach set out in the previous DBC. This DBC focusses on the changes required to the implementation approach, and the required investment rephasing.

The pathway through to technology selection

In 2023 Oranga Tamariki submitted a Programme Business Case (PBC) outlining a programme of change to its technology systems to support the way frontline work to enable best practice[1]. It showed how the programme would improve outcomes for children and their families in line with government expectations. The PBC stated that Oranga Tamariki would seek funding for three tranches of work to upgrade frontline information systems. A Detailed Business Case (DBC) would be submitted for each tranche:

- Tranche 1: Care and Protection, Youth Justice, Residential and Adoption Services system (CYRAS) core functions of intake, plans, assessments, practice tools and interventions are replaced, whilst remaining in a coexistence state with legacy systems;
- Tranche 2: CYRAS remaining functions of adoptions, 'toward wellbeing', clinical services and transition to adulthood are replaced (which would enable the retirement of CYRAS); and
- Tranche 3: replacement of the funding and contracting and partnering systems.

In December 2024, Cabinet approved the DBC for Tranche 1 ($68.5 million) with an open market procurement approach advised by the New Zealand Government Procurement team. From February 2025 to April 2026, Oranga Tamariki progressed a comprehensive multi-staged procurement process. Due diligence conducted as part of the procurement process has made it clear that the strategic case and the investment objectives outlined in the PBC and DBC for Tranche 1 remain valid and achievable; and that there are options in the market which are *suitable* to replace existing systems, sufficiently *adaptable* over time and *feasible* from an implementation perspective.

The due diligence process has identified a significant opportunity to deliver the proposed solution and achieve the Programme's investment objectives more efficiently, cost-effectively, and safely by refining the implementation approach set out in the previous DBC. Key learnings from the procurement process, include:

- Child protection and youth justice systems are significantly more complex than other public sector systems due primarily to the inherent complexity behind the social work profession. This work is dynamic, sensitive, and high risk, and children intersect with many parts of the public service including Health, Courts, Social Development and Education.
- Managing data migration from legacy systems into new systems is complicated and getting it right will take time: not getting it right can be expensive and results in lost confidence of staff and children put at risk.
- Taking a tranche-based delivery approach that requires co-existence with legacy systems is not the best approach to implementation: it carries more risk, will be less cost effective and is less likely to deliver a better and safer outcome for children and their families and staff.

By delivering Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 together (with Tranche 3 to follow), not only are these risk factors mitigated but it will also enable the earlier retirement of CYRAS in full, avoiding coexistence, realising earlier savings and increasing the likelihood of successful implementation.

Value for money

The proposed investment represents a prudent and necessary response to a convergence of ageing technology, increasing demand, and rising system expectations. The revised delivery approach, combining Tranches 1 and 2 into a single implementation, provides significantly stronger value for money compared with the previously approved sequential tranche approach. The proposed investment is necessary to ensure Oranga Tamariki can continue to deliver its statutory responsibilities effectively and safely in a rapidly changing operating environment. It also materially contributes to closing gaps that exist as a result of a constrained social work workforce by reinvesting social work time from low to high value activities.

The revised delivery approach:

- Provides the best whole-of-life value for money.
- Minimises delivery and operational risk.
- Enables earlier and more effective realisation of benefits.
- Contributes to a more efficient and technologically enabled public service.

By altering the approach to delivery, there is greater potential to realise the full intent of the investment and deliver significant public value beyond financial considerations. It will:

- Improve the safety and wellbeing of children and young people through better, more timely decision-making.
- Enable frontline staff to spend more time with children and families by reducing administrative burden.
- Strengthen collaboration across the wider children's system through improved information sharing.
- Enhance transparency, accountability, and confidence in the system.

Without this investment, there is a material risk that Oranga Tamariki will be unable to realise the benefits of its broader reform programme, and that service delivery outcomes will deteriorate under increasing demand. Critically, investing now avoids escalating costs and risks associated with legacy systems and ensures that Oranga Tamariki is equipped to deliver safe, effective, and sustainable services into the future.

s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted]

With this approach, the strategic case, investment objectives, benefits and overall implementation timeframes outlined in the PBC do not change. What does change is the required phasing of investment to deliver Tranche 1-2 together.

s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted]

Detailed Business Case coverage

This revised DBC describes how Tranche 1-2 will be delivered and sets out:

- Updates to the Strategic Case including more contextual information (Strategic Case).
- Refinements on the technical solution and sequencing (Economic Case).
- Costs and funding arrangements (Financial Case).
- The commercial approach (Commercial Case).
- Delivery of Tranche 1-2 (Management Case).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



We serve the most vulnerable children, young people and families who come to our attention. We focus on keeping them safe and preventing them from coming into care or custody, when this is possible, by ensuring the children's system provides support to their families. Where children do come into care, we work with others to ensure their full needs are met and for young people with offending behaviour, we assist them to take responsibility for their actions and prevent further harm caused by reoffending.

Our vision is that all children are safe, loved and nurtured by family, hapū, and iwi, supported by thriving communities. Whilst this vision is clear and universally endorsed, there has been a lack of clarity about our core role and our purpose in achieving this vision, the accountabilities we hold directly and those that other parts of the children's system are expected to deliver upon. Addressing this has led to us becoming very clear on our three core roles:

- To be a high performing, highly trusted statutory social work and youth justice agency.
- To be an enabler and co-ordinator for Māori and communities.
- To lead and drive the children's system.

With a clear strategy and purpose, alongside a new operating model and fit for future organisational structure, we have set in place the foundations required to meet the performance expectations of Government, rebuild the trust and confidence of the public and drive towards improved outcomes for children and young people.

Oranga Tamariki has completed a substantial review of our practice, which has included the implementation of a new practice framework. This change has clarified the approach to practice which, underpinned by a relational, inclusive and restorative approach, combines the professional skills, knowledge, and responsibilities of the social worker with the knowledge, skills and responsibilities of families, caregivers, community and children's system partners.

Through collaborative relationships, resources and ways of working, children are held at the centre of a team where risk and safety is understood and responded to through a broader perspective of oranga. In a youth justice context, our practice supports the balancing of accountability measures with wellbeing measures aimed at addressing the underlying causes of offending behaviour. We are also able to better support caregivers and ensure that the rights and interests of victims remain at the forefront of our thinking. This is responding to risk and creating safety in an inclusive, relational, and restorative practice.

Since approval of the original Programme Business Case (PBC) in 2023, Oranga Tamariki has progressed the agreed practice and operating model shifts that underpin this investment case. These shifts were anticipated and provided for in earlier business cases, and this investment explicitly enables their success rather than introducing new strategic direction.

Why this investment is proceeding

A consistent and widely acknowledged conclusion from the previous business case work, external reviews, and monitoring bodies is that our over 25-year-old frontline technology systems are no longer fit for purpose and are hindering our ability to fulfil our vision, purpose and role across the integrated children's system effectively, both in the way we work now and our ability to change going forward as we continue to evolve to improve the way we connect, partner and practice.

The proposed investment represents a prudent and necessary response to a convergence of ageing technology, increasing demand, and rising system expectations. The revised delivery approach, combining Tranches 1 and 2 into a single implementation provides significantly stronger value for money compared with the previously approved sequential tranche approach. The proposed investment is necessary to ensure Oranga Tamariki can continue to deliver its statutory responsibilities effectively and safely in a rapidly changing operating environment.

Whilst technology alone can never make children safer or prevent the harm caused by young people who offend, it can either accelerate or impede the changes needed within Oranga Tamariki, alongside our key community partners and across the children's system as a whole. A modern digital capability represents a step-change in how the system operates. It shifts the focus from siloed responses to a connected, intelligence-driven system, delivering more timely, effective, and equitable outcomes for tamariki and rangatahi.

The current frontline technology systems impede our ability to:

- Implement best practice, supporting changes to best practice over time.
- Implement legislative change and make the strategic shifts necessary.
- Work collaboratively with the children's system, partners and with children and their families and caregivers.

The limitations of the existing frontline technology environment, and the risks they pose to effective statutory service delivery, were documented in detail in the earlier business cases and accepted as material and enduring. The current technology environment:

- Was designed for a now outdated operating model and practice approach.
- Reinforces case-centric, siloed and linear processes unsuitable for modern social work and professional practice.

- Obscures the lived journey of children and their families.
- Creates administrative burden that diverts staff from relational practice.
- Constrains safe information-sharing and collaboration with families and partners.
- Limits the ability for Oranga Tamariki to evidence outcomes and system impact.

These limitations already pose a material risk to the ability for Oranga Tamariki to meet statutory obligations consistently, enable its agreed practice approach, act as an effective system leader, and support partnership-led responses, including the transfer of responsibility and decision-making over time.

Without investment, the organisation risks locking new practice into old system constraints, undermining adoption and confidence, incurring ongoing cost through inefficiency and duplication, and failing to realise the benefits already assumed and endorsed through earlier business cases.

At a system level, the inability to reliably aggregate, analyse, and share information constrains investment decisions, impedes system learning and improvement, blurs accountability for outcomes, and erodes public trust with the impression there is a lack of transparency.

These issues are not resolvable through ‘fixes’ to the existing legacy systems.

This investment is not a discretionary investment for Oranga Tamariki. It is a necessary and time-critical investment that delivers stronger value for money by enabling better outcomes, reducing long-term costs, and mitigating risks to service delivery and child safety.

This solution enables Oranga Tamariki to deliver sustained benefits over time: improving outcomes for children and young people, reducing avoidable downstream costs across government, and ensuring that services remain safe, effective, and adaptable in the face of increasing demand and complexity. It supports more joined-up, future-focused service delivery that benefits not only Oranga Tamariki, but also partner agencies and communities in the children’s system.

Without this investment, there is a material risk that Oranga Tamariki will be unable to realise the benefits of its broader reform programme, and that service delivery outcomes will deteriorate under increasing demand. Critically, investing now avoids escalating costs and risks associated with legacy systems and ensures that Oranga Tamariki is equipped to deliver safe, effective, and sustainable services into the future.

What has been confirmed

Earlier business case work identified upgraded frontline technology as a necessary enabler for achieving the strategic intentions of Oranga Tamariki. The conditions anticipated at the time of those business cases are still present. Practice changes are active, partner-led delivery is progressing, and expectations for information-sharing and accountability have intensified.

Furthermore, since the previous DBC was approved, the urgency for modernising case management systems has become even more pronounced as the demand for Oranga Tamariki services has substantially increased. The Government has also accepted recommendations arising from Dame Karen Poutasi’s report to ensure greater safety for children including through mandatory training and reporting which, based on comparable international jurisdictions, is likely to further increase report of concern volumes in future years.

Taking the necessary steps now to replace outdated systems will significantly contribute to this Government's commitment to increasing the capacity of Oranga Tamariki and its partners to prevent, identify and respond to child harm.

This investment seeks to upgrade and replace frontline technology systems at Oranga Tamariki so they will:

1. Enable safe, visible, and relational journeys for children and their families and caregivers.
2. Support collaborative practice across agencies and partners.
3. Reduce administrative burden on staff.
4. Provide timely, trustworthy information for decision-making.
5. Adapt as practice, policy and service models continue to evolve
6. Respond to changing and increasing patterns of service demand.

Whilst acknowledging subsequent changes to the demand profile for Oranga Tamariki services has increased the urgency for change, this business case proceeds on the basis of strategic direction and options selection already agreed through earlier business cases. This business case focuses on refinement of the delivery approach to support disciplined management of implementation and service delivery risk, whilst protecting the anticipated benefits realisation.

Importantly, this investment does not change the strategy, practice direction, or frontline operating model of Oranga Tamariki, and continues to enable what has already been decided, endorsed, and commenced.

What we tested

Oranga Tamariki has undertaken two separate, multi-stage procurements – firstly to identify a Technology Platform (Platform) and secondly to identify an Implementation and Support (I&S) Partner. The procurement process has included significant due diligence on the Platform and I&S Partner solutions. This has included reference checks and in person site visits to Australia and the United Kingdom. The reference checks and site visits have identified a range of key learnings and assisted to validate whether solutions will meet requirements. In parallel with the procurement process, the FTSU Programme has progressed detailed discovery activity with regards to three specific areas of delivery risk:

- The need for **co-existence** of the new Solution with existing legacy systems (CYRAS as the core childcare system s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]
- The extensive **data cleansing and migration activity** required to move data from the existing legacy systems to the new Solution.
- The required programme and project delivery activity to support the complex delivery workstreams; and the required business **change management** to support the delivery into use by our frontline.

The procurement, due diligence and detailed discovery work has been essential in understanding solutions in depth; as well as the challenges of transitioning from legacy case management systems to contemporary systems, especially understanding how solutions operate in other child protection and youth justice jurisdictions.

What the evidence shows

The procurement, due diligence and detailed discovery work have identified a range of key learnings:

- **Co-existence**: Co-existence featured as an area of significant risk for all reference sites and where they largely opted to avoid co-existence. In cases where co-existence has featured as a temporary existence state, this required delivery effort which manifested in significant schedule slippage, increased delivery, operational cost and burden and an increased risk to the safety of children.
- **Data migration:** Data migration featured as an area of significant challenge for all reference sites. With data quality issues and many years of legacy data to migrate, this was repeatedly characterised as difficult, time consuming and resource intensive.
- **Configuration vs customisation:** All sites referenced the challenge in maintaining a critical focus on staying within the boundaries of the platform, and to configure where possible and avoid excessive customisation.
- **Change management:** All sites referenced the highly complex business change effort required to support successful embedding of the technology Solution into operational use.
- **Delivery time and budget expectations:** All sites referenced encountered delivery delays as a result of underestimating the complexity of delivery, and as a factor of many of the learnings identified above; and these almost always manifested with regards to a significant increase in the final financial position.

There are three significant learnings which directly relate to achieving our Investment Objectives:

1. Child protection and youth justice systems are significantly more complex than other public sector systems. Unlike most government case management environments, child protection and youth justice case management systems must support statutory decisions made in high-risk contexts with irreversible consequences for children and young people. They operate at the intersection of social work practice, law, and cross-agency responses and case management solutions need to be able to meet the needs of Oranga Tamariki and the wider child wellbeing system (including Health, Courts, Police and Education.
2. Managing data migration from legacy systems into new systems is complicated and getting it right will take time. Not getting it right can be expensive, resulting in lost confidence of staff and putting children at risk.
3. Taking a tranche-based delivery approach that requires co-existence with legacy systems is not the best approach to implementation. It carries more risk, will be less cost effective and is less likely to deliver a better and safer outcome for children and their families and staff.

The preferred option

Taking a children and young person focused approach, as the preferred option identified during the Detailed Business Case (DBC) for Tranche 1 (Option 3) remains unchanged. However, based on the learning through the discovery activity and the procurement process

due diligence activities (reference checks and site visits in particular), it has become clear that whilst most aspects of the PBC and DBC for Tranche 1 remain valid, the delivery approach for implementation needs to change.

With the current tranche delivery approach, co-existence will introduce significant and unacceptable delivery risk due to the complexity associated. More so, the risk to service failure and child safety is more significant due to the potential for data loss or data integrity issues.

To assist with mitigating the risks associated with co-existence and the other key learnings, significant additional resource and a longer timeframe would be required to deliver only Tranche 1. s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted]

The revised delivery approach seeks to deliver Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 together, with Tranche 3 to follow. This approach enables the retirement of all main legacy systems (CYRAS s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]) to avoid the need for co-existence. The revised delivery approach:

- Provides the best whole-of-life value for money.
- Minimises delivery and operational risk.
- Enables earlier and more effective realisation of benefits.

The investment delivers significant public value beyond financial considerations. It will:

- Improve the safety and wellbeing of children and young people through better, more timely decision-making.
- Enable frontline staff to spend more time with children and families by reducing administrative burden.
- Strengthen collaboration across the wider children's system through improved information sharing.
- Enhance transparency, accountability, and confidence in the system.

This will require a rephasing of the PBC investment. s9(2)(f)(iv), s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted]

The revised approach to deliver Tranche 1-2 together, represents **significantly stronger value for money** when assessed across cost, risk, deliverability, and whole-of-life outcomes. While the upfront investment for a combined Tranche 1–2 delivery s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted] is higher than the originally funded Tranche 1 envelope, this approach **avoids the materially higher total cost, risk exposure, and inefficiency** associated with a standalone Tranche 1 implementation.

A Tranche 1 only approach would:

- s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted]
- Introduce **prolonged system co-existence**, driving:
  - Duplicated operating costs
  - Complex integration overhead
  - Increased delivery duration.
- s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted]

In contrast, the combined Tranche 1–2 approach:

- **Eliminates the need for co-existence**, enabling earlier retirement of legacy systems.
- s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted]
- Delivers a **greater scope of capability for only a marginal incremental cost**, improving cost efficiency per outcome delivered.
- Provides **earlier realisation of benefits**, including operational efficiencies and improved service outcomes for children and young people.
- Avoids costly rework, duplicated effort, and extended programme overheads inherent in a phased approach.

From a whole-of-life perspective the total investment for Tranches 1–3 remains **within the original Programme Business Case range.** The PBC estimated the total cost for the full implementation for Tranche 1-3 to be ~$240 million midpoint (excluding contingency). s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

Confidence and remaining uncertainty

The procurement process, particularly through reference checks and site visits, has provided significant insight into implementation considerations for Oranga Tamariki.

Outside the responsibilities of the technology Platform and Implementation and Support partner, Oranga Tamariki will retain accountability for requirements definition and prioritisation, end-to-end integration, data quality and migration, scope and change control and organisational change and benefits realisation. Successful delivery will require governance discipline, delivery capability and organisational readiness.

- **Delivery success:** The Programme will need to actively manage scope and change through clear, enforceable governance. This will need to be supported by sufficient internal integration and architecture capability, realistic prioritisation, and timely

decision-making. Change leadership must start early and be sustained, while accepting that not all processes can remain unchanged and that some adaptation is necessary; along with a willingness to adapt processes where appropriate to avoid excessive customisation and delivery delay.

- **Scope control and an overarching "configuration-first" principle:** Staying focused on maintaining an "out of the box" approach (by configuration and limiting customisations) and the desire to deliver at pace all underscore the importance of purposeful governance to keep outcomes focused. The overarching insights from procurement due diligence was that with the right governance and organisational discipline in place, scope management becomes a strength, protecting value, accelerating delivery, and reinforcing long-term sustainability. Ultimately, the organisation's mindset toward adopting standard configuration versus pursuing bespoke design will materially shape outcomes.
- **Change management:** This programme involves a large-scale, organisation-wide transformation rather than a simple system replacement, introducing risks such as change fatigue, a pace of change that may exceed the organisation's capacity to absorb it, and cultural resistance to altering established practices. These risks are heightened because the change is large and across a wide number of kaimahi. An enhanced capability and capacity of the change workstream will be required to successful support the change. This will include leveraging the Implementation and Support partners who have a strong change capability to augment our existing change practices to build long term enhanced change practices and frameworks to support delivery.
- **Data quality and migration**: A key focus of delivery of a safe and stable platform is the need for careful management of risks and issues relating to data cleansing and migration. Ensuring sufficient programme effort is dedicated to these activities was repeatedly highlighted through procurement due diligence as a critical factor in successful delivery as well as an area that was easily underestimated in terms of the time and cost to complete these activities to a satisfactory level. Ensuring sufficient resourcing and time is committed to these activities will be a crucial consideration throughout the life of the Programme.
- **Resourcing expertise:** Effective delivery cannot rely solely on vendor capacity. Oranga Tamariki must maintain strong internal capability across architecture, integration, business design, change and adoption, and vendor management. The key lesson is that investing in expertise upfront reduces delivery risk, rework, and change impacts later.

What happens next

On approval of this Detailed Business Case, s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]

Once executed, the MSA will provide the contractual framework to support the

Establishment and Design phases, delivered through staged Statements of Work to enable appropriate control, scope, resource allocation, assurance, and decision-making at each phase to complete the design phase.

As part of seeking approval of this DBC, Oranga Tamariki would also seek Cabinet approval to progress the Establishment and Design phases within the existing funding allocation (to the extent that these activities do not move beyond the Approval to Deliver or s9(2)(b)(ii) process).

Whilst the design of the new technology is progressing, the Programme will also design and deliver a number of specific practice enhancements using existing systems. These practice enhancements are being designed to have a level of reuse of design that can be carried over to the new technology, thereby avoiding wasted effort and unnecessary cost. This will enable early realisation of some of the intended benefits of the future case management system at a smaller scale, provide early improvements for staff and children and young people and build confidence in the Programme's delivery and change capability.

An Approval to Deliver process to Joint Ministers in mid 2027 would be undertaken once the Design phase is complete s9(2)(b)(ii) decisions are known. This would seek approval to proceed to the Implementation phase.

STRATEGIC CASE: Revisiting the case for change

A Strategic Case was prepared as part of the previously approved Programme Business Case (PBC) in 2023 and built on for the Detailed Business Case (DBC) for Tranche 1 in 2024. The earlier business cases comprehensively articulated the case for change, assessed options, tested affordability and risk, and were subject to internal and external assurance.

The strategic rationale for upgrading the Oranga Tamariki frontline technology systems has been consistently reinforced through monitoring reports, independent reviews, and operational experience (**Appendix 1** refers to these reviews and their recommendations and commentaries).

Accordingly, this strategic case does not re-examine the underlying need for change. Instead, it summarises and reaffirms the established strategic context, provides updated information about changes within the Oranga Tamariki and the children's system[2] context. This increases the urgency of needed change and sets out how this business case advances implementation against the already endorsed direction.

Strategic context

Since approval of the original PBC, Oranga Tamariki has progressed the agreed practice and operating model shifts that underpin this investment case. These shifts were anticipated and provided for in earlier business cases, and this investment explicitly enables their success rather than introducing new strategic direction.

Furthermore, since the previous DBC was approved, the urgency for modernising case management systems has become even more pronounced, as the demand for Oranga Tamariki services has substantially increased. The Government has also accepted recommendations arising from Dame Karen Poutasi's report to ensure greater safety for children including through mandatory training and reporting which, based on comparable international jurisdictions, is likely to further increase report of concern volumes in future years.

Consideration has been given to how this programme can give effect to commitments to work collaboratively with other Government agencies to maximise value for money through developing and reusing common functions or ways of working that will likely be required by multiple agencies.

Regular engagement is in place, and an agreement remains between the Ministry of Social Development's transformation programme (Services for the Future) and Oranga Tamariki (noting each programme is at a different delivery phase) to:

- Commit to re-use government services and patterns where possible.
- Contribute to all of Government patterns, knowledge, and standards by engaging directly with Government Enterprise Architecture for New Zealand.

[2] 'Children system' refers to the wider engagement of the agencies, both government and non-government, who have a role and responsibility to meet the needs of children, young people, and their families.

- Consider whether the development of payment related solutions for a social services context by MSD are of use to Oranga Tamariki at an appropriate juncture in the FTSU Programme delivery.
- Explore the re-use of technology agnostic patterns developed by the programme for aspects like assessment, plans and practice tools by MSD in development of its tiered service model.
- Share and align experience and service patterns where it makes sense to do so.

As the programme progresses past the procurement phase and into the design phase, the programme will be now able to progress the above elements in detail. As the design phase progresses, further engagement with Government Digital Delivery Agency (GDDA) will be progressed to demonstrate how cross-agency collaboration is being carefully considered.

Additionally, the GDDA has developed a Digital Government Target State which defines guiding principles that enable cohesive and efficient delivery of digital initiatives. The programme is strongly aligned with the Digital Government Target State and procurement principles, and that alignment has been further strengthened through the revised delivery approach. This takes a deliberate, risk-informed approach, prioritising system coherence, public value, and long-term sustainability. Through the revised delivery approach, Oranga Tamariki is well positioned to lead across government in delivering integrated, future-focused digital services that generate enduring public value.

Where alignment is staged, this reflects conscious and disciplined sequencing to ensure safe implementation within a complex, high-risk, safety-critical operating environment. Adherence to the Digital Government Target State is addressed throughout this business case and assessed in full in **Appendix 2**.

The challenge facing children, young people, and the children's system

While most children in Aotearoa New Zealand are thriving, a significant number continue to experience persistent harm, unmet need, and inequitable outcomes, particularly Māori and Pacific children and disabled children. These challenges manifest as harm to children through child poverty, family violence, care and protection involvement, and youth offending. Although long-term trends in offending remain lower than a decade ago, recent data shows renewed pressure in key areas, reinforcing the need for sustained and system-wide responses.

Oranga Tamariki has a statutory role in responding to these challenges — not in isolation, but as part of a connected children's system made up of families, iwi, communities, partners, and multiple government agencies.

The role and direction of Oranga Tamariki

To deliver statutory responsibilities and promote the wellbeing of children and young people at risk of harm or offending, Oranga Tamariki works across the areas in the following figure:




Figure 1: What Oranga Tamariki does

Since its establishment as a standalone Ministry, Oranga Tamariki has undertaken significant work to clarify its purpose and role within the children's system, strengthen accountability for safety, oranga, and rights, and shift from transactional, incident-focused practice to relational, inclusive and restorative ways of working.

Within the wider system, the role of Oranga Tamariki extends beyond direct service delivery to include system leadership, coordination, and stewardship of cross-agency outcomes. It sets practice standards, leads responses to high-risk cases, and aligns agencies toward shared objectives through integrated delivery models.

This direction is underpinned by a:

- New practice approach, grounded in evidence and a strengthened focus on safety, contextualised within a holistic understanding of oranga (wellbeing)
- Refined operating model focused on system leadership, workforce enablement, and partnership.
- Clear expectation of how statutory responsibilities are delivered now and in the future.

These shifts are either implemented and being embedded or actively underway and are increasingly reflected in expectations of practice, leadership, and the performance of the children's system.

Why change is required

A consistent and widely acknowledged conclusion from the original PBC, subsequent DBC work, external reviews, and monitoring bodies is that existing frontline technology systems are no longer fit for purpose.

The limitations of the existing frontline technology environment, and the risks they pose to effective statutory service delivery, were documented in detail in the earlier business cases and accepted as material and enduring. The current technology environment:

- Was designed for a now outdated operating model and practice approach.
- Reinforces case-centric, siloed and linear processes unsuitable for modern social work practice.
- Obscures the lived journey of children and their families.
- Creates administrative burden that diverts staff from relational practice.
- Constrains safe information-sharing and collaboration with families and partners.
- Limits the ability for Oranga Tamariki to evidence outcomes and system impact.

These limitations already pose a material risk to the ability for Oranga Tamariki to meet statutory obligations consistently, enable its agreed practice approach, act as an effective system leader, and support partnership-led responses, including the transfer of responsibility and decision-making over time.

The consequences of the current state are well evidenced and include:

- Delayed or fragmented decision-making due to poor visibility of risk and context.
- Increased stress and inefficiency for frontline workers.
- Inability for children and families to understand or access their own information.
- Reduced confidence from partners, monitors, and decision-makers.
- Ongoing reliance on manual workarounds that introduce operational and privacy risk.

At a system level, the inability to reliably aggregate, analyse, and share information constrains investment decisions, impedes system learning and improvement, blurs accountability for outcomes, and erodes public trust with the impression there is a lack of transparency.

These issues are not resolvable through ‘fixes’ to the existing legacy systems.

Why investment is needed now

Earlier business cases identified upgraded frontline technology as a necessary enabler for achieving the strategic intentions of Oranga Tamariki. The conditions anticipated in those cases are still present. Practice changes are active, partner-led delivery is progressing, and expectations for information-sharing and accountability have intensified. However, as the demand for Oranga Tamariki services has substantially increased since the approval of earlier business cases, the urgency for modernising case management systems has become even more pronounced.

A modern case management system is a critical enabler for an integrated system model, strengthening the ability for Oranga Tamariki to lead and enhancing the effectiveness of partner agencies. The vision of Oranga Tamariki is that ‘*All children are safe, loved and nurtured by whānau, hapū, and iwi, supported by thriving communities.’* A key enabler of this vision for Oranga Tamariki are its frontline technology systems which support the way Oranga Tamariki works to achieve that vision.

Our social work and professional staff support tamariki, rangatahi and whānau in some of the most complex circumstances and across generations to achieve safety and wellbeing.

This requires skilful professional practice which must be supported by modern and professional tools.

For Oranga Tamariki, a modern platform will:

- **Improve decision-making** through real-time, high-quality data and analytics, enabling earlier identification of risk and more targeted interventions.
- **Enhance case visibility and continuity**, ensuring a complete, longitudinal view of each child's journey across services.
- **Strengthen system stewardship**, providing better insight into system performance, demand, and outcomes.
- **Support consistency in practice**, embedding standards, workflows, and evidence-based approaches across the organisation.

For partnering agencies, the system will:

- Enable **timely and secure information sharing**, ensuring partners have access to relevant insights to act earlier and more effectively.
- Support **coordinated, multi-agency responses**, reducing fragmentation and duplication of effort.
- Improve the ability to deliver **wraparound, child-centred services**, with clearer roles, responsibilities, and shared plans.
- Enhance **accountability and transparency**, with shared visibility of outcomes and progress.

At a system level, a modern case management capability underpins the shift from reactive intervention to **proactive, integrated responses**, enabling:

- Earlier prevention and intervention.
- Better alignment of services around the needs of children and whānau.
- Improved long-term outcomes through data-informed and collaborative decision-making.

The combined model anchored by the statutory role and function of Oranga Tamariki, enabled by strong partnering agencies, and supported by modern digital capability represents a step-change in how the system operates. It shifts the focus from siloed responses to a connected, intelligence-driven system, delivering more timely, effective, and equitable outcomes for tamariki and rangatahi.

Demand for services has increased

The demand picture for Oranga Tamariki has substantially changed since the PBC and DBC for Tranche 1, significantly increasing the pressure on an already constrained children's system.

In 2023/24 Oranga Tamariki received 74,941 Reports of Concern (ROCs) for 53,638 children, compared to 108,032 ROCs for 63,103 children in 2024/25.

Further increases in volume are anticipated with pending substantive reform of the child protection system signalled through the government's decision to accept in full the recommendations arising from the Dame Karen Poutasi review into the death of Malachi Subecz. This includes the introduction of a mandatory training and reporting regime and if implemented well, these measures have the potential to increase the visibility of children at the greatest risk of harm. However, international jurisdictions who have adopted similar measures have demonstrated that, without ensuring that the system is able to respond to increased demand including workforce capacity, child safety can be compromised rather than strengthened. This risk was explicitly noted by the Independent Children's Monitor in its review of the implementation of the Dame Karen Poutasi recommendation, which cautioned that reforms intended to increase the visibility of children must be accompanied by system readiness[3].

With the recent report of concern volume increases, despite best efforts, the timeliness of responses has decreased and without system improvements this picture may worsen as Dame Karen Poutasi recommendations begin to be implemented.

Oranga Tamariki is working hard to address workforce pressures, by addressing the need to engage more social workers and other allied professional and para-professional roles in an environment where there is a shortage of suitable practitioners. These workforce pressures impact the ability to respond on time and to deliver on statutory requirements, for example making timely, quality visits to children in care.

Addressing workforce challenges alone will not be sufficient to mitigate the risks of current and future volume demand overwhelming the system. Technology improvements delivered through a modern case management system are now even more essential to enable access to quality information which is shared, understood and used to inform decision making that will better prevent, identify and respond to child harm.

System expectations and alignment have intensified

Expectations for information-sharing, partner enablement, cultural capability, data governance, performance improvement and transparency and monitoring have increased across government and the social sector. These apply to the full continuum of service responses provided by Oranga Tamariki including both youth justice and care and protection.

In contrast to increasing Reports of Concern, there has been an almost 15% reduction in serious child and youth offending since June 2023, including reductions in repeat offending[4]. Government investment in expanded Fastrack initiatives, Military Style Academy Pilots, improvements in residence and intensive wraparound response teams has demonstrated the level of Oranga Tamariki and interagency effort which will be required to make continued and sustained improvements in this area.

Responding to recommendations 1, 2 and 6 of the Dame Karen Poutasi Review, a Multi-Agency Hub was established in January 2026; Oranga Tamariki is the lead agency with the Ministry for Social Development, NZ Police, Department of Corrections, Ministry of Education and Health NZ around the table. Part of this work will be understanding how individual systems can be adapted to support the work in the Hub, addressing concerns

[3] Towards a stronger safety net to prevent abuse of children - In-depth review | May 2024

[4] Factsheet - Target 3 - Reduced child and youth offending - June 2025

around the lack of visibility in the system of children where their sole parent has been incarcerated.

The accelerating cross-agency work programme in response to Whanaketia – the Abuse in Care Inquiry - is providing a blueprint for safer care. The Government response is focused on three areas: addressing the wrongs of the past; making the care system safe and empowering those in care, their whānau and communities. Oranga Tamariki has more work to do in this area as is clear from its own, and the Independent Children Monitor's report, on compliance with National Care Standards and safety of children in care. The existing frontline technology systems will not meet these expectations, particularly in relation to making the care system safe, or support these innovations at the pace or scale required.

Practice and operating model changes are active

Oranga Tamariki has now:

- Completed implementing a practice approach and framework built on relational, oranga-focused approaches.
- Introduced new practice tools and assessment models.
- Progressed partnership and commissioning change across the children's system.

Frontline technology is a critical enabler that allows these changes to be embedded, sustained, and scaled.

Without investment, the organisation risks locking new practice into old system constraints, undermining adoption and confidence, incurring ongoing cost through inefficiency and duplication, and failing to realise the benefits already assumed and endorsed through earlier business cases. This investment aligns directly with whole-of-government digital and data strategies, social investment and commissioning reform, child and youth wellbeing priorities, and responses to findings from inquiries and independent monitors.

Investment intent

Whilst acknowledging subsequent changes to the demand profile for Oranga Tamariki services has increased the urgency for change, this business case proceeds on the basis of strategic direction and options selection already agreed through earlier business cases. Its focus is on delivery, and refinement of delivery approach to support disciplined management of implementation and service delivery risk, whilst protecting the anticipated benefits realisation.

Importantly, this investment does not change the strategy, practice direction, or frontline operating model of Oranga Tamariki, and continues to enable what has already been decided, endorsed, and commenced.

What success looks like

The benefits sought through this investment are consistent with those identified and endorsed in previous business cases. They have since been refined through benefits logic mapping and a fully approved Benefits Realisation Plan, but their intent remains unchanged: improved safety and oranga for children and their families, improved effectiveness and wellbeing of staff, and stronger system-level accountability and partnership.

The figure below shows how changes to frontline technology systems will contribute to the outcomes for those across the system, with children and families at the centre.



Figure 2: How changes will contribute to outcomes.

The blue boxes link directly to the delivery of statutory responsibilities to ensure children and young people are safe and thriving within the care of their families, hapū, iwi and community, with the support of the children's system, preventing any further harm and ensure their safety and wellbeing. This is a first area of focus and priority for the Programme, as benefits realised have closest proximity to and impact on the experiences of children.

The brown boxes show how the Programme will begin to contribute to shared aspirations across the sector. These will be used to demonstrate agency and sector accountability (such as the Independent Children's Monitor, Ombudsman and Children's Commissioners Board).

The green boxes show the value of the investment in terms of Government priorities and how public trust and confidence will be influenced over time.

A successful future state is one where frontline technology:

- Puts children and their families at the centre, not cases.
- Makes risk, need, and context visible over time.
- Supports locally led, centrally enabled ways of working.
- Enables shared decision-making with partners.
- Allows children and families to access and understand their own information.
- Provides confidence that statutory responsibilities are being met.

In practice, this means:

- Improved safety and oranga (wellbeing) outcomes.
- Reduced risk of re-traumatisation of children in the care system.
- More time for staff to engage directly with children and families.
- Stronger partnership capability.
- Improved system learning and improvement, accountability and trust.

Conclusion

The strategic case for investing in upgraded frontline technology systems for Oranga Tamariki has been tested through multiple business cases, reviews, and assurance processes, and remains valid in light of current and emerging system pressures.

What has changed is urgency. Practice has shifted, demand for services have increased and expectations of the children's system have intensified. The government has continued to reinforce its intent, through recent and proposed child protection and youth justice reform, to better prevent, identify and respond to child harm and to address the harm associated with youth offending including harm to victims.

Relying on outdated technology will mean a failure to meet these expectations, and an inability to capitalise on the new practice approach and refined operating model as well as multi agency and community led responses.

This business case therefore proceeds on the basis that the case for change is established and that the focus must shift to delivery.

ECONOMIC CASE

The purpose of this Economic Case is to determine the option that will deliver the best value for money. This case sets out the outcome of the work undertaken since the Programme Business Case (PBC) and Detailed Business Case (DBC) for Tranche 1 were prepared. This work builds on the options identification and assessment process, developed at the PBC and DBC for Tranche 1 stages.

The work includes refining and confirming the options including:

- Reconfirming the investment objectives.
- Reconfirming the technical solution.
- Reconfirming the scope and refining the delivery approach outlined in the PBC and DBC for Tranche 1.

The outcome of this informs the recommendation of the refined preferred option.

Reconfirming the investment objectives

The **investment objectives** approved in the PBC in 2023 and further refined in the DBC for Tranche 1 in 2024 and remain unchanged:

- To enable improvements in quality practice and to achieve positive outcomes for the safety and oranga of children at risk of harm or where there are offending behaviours, and their families.
- To make it easier for our kaimahi to work productively, spending more time working directly with children, their families and communities
- To support a system wide approach to working with children, young people, their families and caregivers (system in this case being Oranga Tamariki and its Partners and other government agencies).
- To make it easier for kaimahi, Partners and children's agencies to access quality information to inform decision-making at all levels.

The requirements and dimensions of choice approved in the DBC for Tranche 1 remain unchanged.

Reconfirming the technical solution

The PBC's findings about the technical solution

At the PBC stage, five technical solution options were considered to replace the current frontline technology systems.

A range of options were assessed from doing nothing to a complete replacement of all frontline systems. Based on that analysis the PBC identified the preferred option was to put in place a new frontline technology system which would be delivered on existing commercial cloud services, with additional services procured as required over the lifetime of the Programme using a business-driven iterative approach.

This approach would provide benefits around cost-effective licensing, economies of scale, leverage experience, smaller support team needs, improved resilience (including disaster recovery) and ease of contractual and commercial management.

The PBC stated that, at the DBC for Tranche 1 stage, this option would be considered in more detail to see what this solution would mean in practice - what existing platforms would be used and what new ones would need to be procured. Following this process, engagement with NZGP would be undertaken to understand the procurement approach.

The DBC for Tranche 1 findings about the technical solution

At the DBC for Tranche 1 stage, an assessment was conducted to assess whether existing commercial cloud Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) platforms could be leveraged or whether there would need to be an open procurement process.

NZGP provided advice that an open procurement process was required. s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] A decision about whether this platform would need to be further developed or replaced would be made once the outcome of the technology solution procurement was complete.

The preferred approach proposed in this business case supports how the market has been tested to determine if compatible and fit for purpose products (other than those currently used) have emerged.

Reconfirming the technical solution

Since the DBC for Tranche 1 was developed, as a result of progressing the planned procurement process, Oranga Tamariki has refined the potential platforms that the new frontline technology systems could be delivered on. Oranga Tamariki has approached the procurement as two separate, multi-stage procurements, firstly for a FTSU Technology Platform (Platform) and secondly for an Implementation and Support (I&S) Partner.

s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]

Reconfirming the scope with a refined delivery approach

The PBC findings about scope and delivery approach

The PBC stated that the programme scope would be delivered through a multi-year tranche-based delivery approach, with a long tail of continuous improvement delivery in a business-as-usual mode. The below figure sets out approach and scope proposed in the PBC for each of the three tranches. The proposed scope was:

- Tranche 1: Intakes, referrals, and assessments; Partner access contract and funding.
- Tranche 2: Planning, intervention and placement.
- Tranche 3: Transition to adulthood, cleanup tasks.




Figure 3: Programme staging in PBC

The DBC for Tranche 1 findings about scope and delivery approach

The DBC for Tranche 1 completed further analysis to test the proposed scope and delivery approach. Three options for the delivery of scope for the DBC were developed and assessed. These included those that were assessed at the PBC stage. The following describes each option as it applied for Tranche 1:

- **Option 1: Support Services Focus:** Under this option the focus would be on moving financial and administrative functions and capabilities off existing frontline systems early. In Tranche 1 the Funding and Contracting (FAC) system and the services and administration parts of CYRAS would be moved to the new frontline technology systems. Some work on high value case management business functions would also start. In Tranches 2 and 3 case management functions would be moved from CYRAS to the new frontline technology systems, starting with higher value functions and processes and moving progressively to lower value ones.
- **Option 2: Partnering focus approach**: Under this option a partnering focus approach would be taken by starting on systems that are accessed and used by Partners and other agencies. This would mean moving functionality from the following systems onto the new frontline technology systems in Tranche 1 - Strengthening Families Report Tool (SFRT, Te Kete and Family Start Network (FSNet). In Tranches 2 and 3 case management functions would be moved from CYRAS to the new frontline technology systems, starting with higher value function moving progressively to lower value ones.
- **Option 3: Children and young person focus approach:** Under this approach the focus would be to better support the frontline work in key areas of improving children's safety and oranga and reducing harm from youth offending. It would put in place functionality to support intake, frequently used plans, assessments, practice tools, and interventions used on CYRAS. It would most quickly deliver improvements to the experiences of children, families, caregivers and staff which is aligned to the new practice framework and practice approach. It would make these functions much easier and more efficient for staff to use, thus delivering the earliest business value. Like the other two options case management functions would be

moved from CYRAS to the new frontline technology systems, starting with higher value functions moving progressively to lower value ones. By the end of Tranche 2 all remaining case management functions will be off CYRAS and on the new frontline technology systems. However, there would be residual supporting services on CYRAS that would be moved to the new frontline technology systems in Tranche 3. For this reason, CYRAS was not expected to be decommissioned until the end of Tranche 3. Tranche 3 would move functions off FAC and the low volume frontline services systems – Te Kete, FS Net and SFRT.

These three options were assessed using a Multi Criteria Analysis (refer **Appendix 3** for this multi criteria analysis). Option 3 was the preferred option identified during the DBC for Tranche 1. This delivery approach outlined three tranches of delivery:

- Tranche 1: CYRAS core functions of intake, plans, assessments, practice tools and interventions are replaced, whilst remaining in a coexistence state with legacy systems.
- Tranche 2: CYRAS remaining functions of adoptions, 'toward wellbeing', clinical services and transition to adulthood are replaced (which would enable the retirement of CYRAS).
- Tranche 3: replacement of the funding and contracting and partnering systems.

Refining the delivery approach

Oranga Tamariki has undertaken two separate, multi-stage procurements – firstly to identify a Technology Platform (Platform) and secondly to identify an Implementation and Support (I&S) Partner. The procurement process has identified options in the market which are *suitable* to replace existing systems, sufficiently *adaptable* over time and *feasible* from an implementation perspective.

The procurement process has included significant due diligence on the Platform and I&S Partner solutions. This has included reference checks and in person site visits to Australia and the United Kingdom. The reference checks and site visits have identified a range of key learnings and assisted to validate whether solutions will meet requirements. In parallel with the procurement process, the FTSU Programme has progressed detailed discovery activity with regards to three specific areas of delivery risk:

- The need for **co-existence** of the new Solution with existing legacy systems (CYRAS as the core childcare system and the Caregiver Information System (CGIS).
- The extensive **data cleansing and migration activity** required to move data from the existing legacy systems to the new Solution.
- The required programme and project delivery activity to support the complex delivery workstreams; and the required business **change management** to support the delivery into use by our frontline.

The procurement, due diligence and detailed discovery work has been essential in understanding solutions in depth. This has enabled comprehensive assessment of options in order to determine their suitability as an effective replacement, adaptability to changes required over time and feasibility from an implementation perspective. It has also provided deep insight into the challenges of transitioning from legacy case management systems to contemporary systems, especially understanding how solutions operate in other child protection and youth justice jurisdictions.

Key learnings

- **Co-existence:** Co-existence featured as an area of significant risk for all reference sites. One reference site commenced their delivery project with a co-existence aim but amended their approach to avoid co-existence due to the technical and delivery failure risks. In other sites, co-existence featured as a temporary existence state, but this required significant delivery effort which manifested in schedule slippage, increased delivery timelines, increased operational cost and burden and an increased risk to the safety of children. Other sites opted to avoid co-existence for these reasons. s9(2)(b)(ii), s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted]
- **Data migration:** Data migration featured as an area of significant challenge for all reference sites. With data quality issues and many years of legacy data to migrate, this was repeatedly characterised as difficult, time consuming and resource intensive. In all sites, data migration complexity far exceeded expectations and partial migration strategies were common which reduced risk but constrained full benefits and extended transition complexity. In all sites, the delivery timeframes were delayed as a direct result of data migration challenges.
- **Configuration vs customisation**: All sites referenced the challenge in maintaining a critical focus on staying within the boundaries of the platform, and to configure where possible and avoid excessive customisation. Those sites that experienced excessive customisation of the platform encountered delivery timeline delays (due to more extensive development and testing) and operational complexities with regard to upgrade complexities that have manifested in higher total cost of ownership of the solution than expected.
- **Change management:** All sites referenced the highly complex business change effort required to support successful embedding of the technology solution into operational use. Either through direct experience of not having supported this at the right level, or by having a strong and fit-for-purpose change programme, all sites referenced the requirement to have a separately focused, well resourced change programme. Where this was done well, it was supported by a change and training network of champions across the organisation; and with the change environment being most fragile after go-live (not before), having change management support well after go-live to support all users was critical to embedding the change. Ineffective change management was cited by sites in being one of the critical factors in unsuccessful overall delivery.
- **Delivery time and budget expectations:** All sites referenced encountered delivery delays as a result of underestimating the complexity of delivery, and as a factor of many of the learnings identified above; and these almost always manifested with regards to a significant increase in the final financial position.

Key conclusions

Ultimately the goal is to deliver a case management system that improves the ability of our staff to respond to the safety and wellbeing of children. The procurement and due diligence process has been essential in understanding the risks of implementations of technology solutions in similar jurisdictions; as well as the challenges of transitioning from legacy case management systems to contemporary systems; especially understanding how technology solutions operate in other child protection and youth justice jurisdictions.

There are three significant learnings which directly relate to achieving our Investment Objectives:

1. Child protection and youth justice systems are significantly more complex than other public sector systems. Unlike most government case management environments, child protection and youth justice case management systems must support statutory decisions made in high-risk contexts with irreversible consequences for children and young people. They operate at the intersection of social work practice, law, and cross-agency responses and case management solutions need to be able to meet the needs of Oranga Tamariki and the wider child wellbeing system (including Health, Courts, Police and Education.
2. Due diligence and international reference sites consistently identify data migration as a major risk, driven by historic poor data quality, volume, and lineage issues. Data migration from legacy systems is typically slower and harder than expected; partial migration has often been used to reduce risk but limits benefits and makes it harder for frontline workers to access complete information.
3. A tranche by tranche delivery approach which requires co-existence with legacy systems increases timeframe, operational, service continuity, and cost risks, and reduces the likelihood of achieving safer outcomes for children and their families, and time saving benefits for staff.

Preferred option

Option 3 as the preferred option identified during the DBC Tranche 1 remains unchanged – taking a children and young person focussed approach. However, based on learnings through procurement process due diligence activities (reference checks and site visits) and detailed discovery work, it has become clear that whilst most aspects of the PBC and DBC Tranche 1 remain valid, the delivery approach to implementation **needs to change.**

With the current tranche delivery approach, co-existence will introduce significant and unacceptable delivery risk due to the complexity associated. More so, the risk to service delivery failure and child safety is more significant due to the potential for data loss or data integrity issues.

To assist with mitigating the risks associated with co-existence and the other key learnings, significant additional resource and a longer timeframe would be required to deliver Tranche 1. As a result, the estimated cost of Tranche 1 is more than the current funding level. The revised delivery approach seeks to deliver Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 together, with Tranche 3 to follow. This approach enables the retirement of all main legacy systems (CYRAS, s9(2)(b)(ii) to avoid the need for co-existence and retains a viable investment off-ramp. This approach is also consistent with the previously endorsed position of taking a children and young person focused approach, as delivering Tranche 1-2 together reduces the child safety risk (as seen in international jurisdictions who have attempted a phased approach).

Risk assessment of the refined delivery approach

A detailed risk deep dive has been completed on the delivery approach of the DBC Tranche 1 versus the preferred delivery approach of delivering Tranche 1-2 together (followed by Tranche 3). This analysis has taken into account the due diligence learnings and modelled the future trajectory of the programme strategic risks across these two different delivery pathways. The comparative analysis highlighted a fundamental strategic trade-off: enduring chronic operational friction caused by complex co-existence (DBC for Tranche 1 delivery approach) versus navigating an acute, high-stakes transition (Tranche 1-2 delivered together).

Scenario 1: Tranche Delivery Aligned with the DBC Tranche 1 Scope

This model delivers the scope sequentially over a multi-year period, delivering Tranche 1 before advancing to Tranche 2 and then Tranche 3 scope. This pathway artificially segments the delivery to align with the current funding envelope.

- **Key Challenges:** This pathway mandates the prolonged co-existence of new and legacy systems. This will subject Oranga Tamariki to the operational friction observed in reference sites. The Programme must build and maintain complex integrations, generating a sustained operational burden. Frontline staff will face ongoing disruptions as they navigate fragmented workflows across multiple years. The severity of these risks could extend to increased child safety risks where information is missing, absent or not easily accessed to inform decision making. The overall risk profile plateaus at a 'Very High' level throughout the delivery lifecycle, representing a chronic strain on organisational capacity.

Scenario 2: Combined Delivery Aligned with Tranche 1-2 Delivered Together

This model combines Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 scope and delivery through a single, consolidated implementation phase.

- **Key Challenges:** This pathway eliminates the need for co-existence with legacy systems, bypassing the integration and dual-maintenance burden entirely. However, combining the delivery introduces a longer initial build timeline. Crucially, the delivery risk concentrates entirely into a single deployment window, creating an extreme, high-stakes cutover risk as the organisation undertakes a significant system transition. The risk spikes acutely as the programme progresses to go-live and must be managed extremely carefully as the obvious impacts on child safety of a system failure at implementation would likely be significant.

As illustrated in the figure below, Scenario 1 creates a sustained plateau of high risk across multiple years, whereas Scenario 2 presents an acute spike as the Programme progresses towards Go-live. In a tranche delivery model that requires co-existence and integration between new and legacy platforms (Scenario 1), any schedule slippage may introduce the severe risk of hitting a funding gap, requiring the programme to pause, lose resources, or halt entirely mid-transition. This would leave Oranga Tamariki in a costly and complex hybrid environment that requires significant overhead to maintain the co-existence with no clear path to the future state. This means that the high-risk exposure of Scenario 1 may extend beyond the completion state shown in Figure 4 below (i.e. September 2028).

By comparison eliminating these uncertainties under scenario 2 flattens the risk profile throughout the programme life, enabling focussed attention to be given throughout design and implementation phases on testing and refining the platform, thereby reducing the risk of system failure at go live.




Figure 4: Forward-looking Risk exposure

A more detailed assessment of risk assessment of the two scenarios is in **Appendix 4.**

Confirmed scope

Scope of delivery

The PBC and DBC for Tranche 1 considered the following systems within the scope of delivery as outlined in the below figure.

s9(2)(b)(ii)

[redacted]

With the revised delivery approach delivering Tranche 1-2 together, the scope of systems to be replaced for the preferred option is outlined in the below figure.



The scope of Tranche 1-2 will include:

- The replacement of the core case management system CYRAS.
- The replacement of the s9(2)(b)(ii)
- Decommissioning of CYRAS, s9(2)(b)(ii)

A description of these systems can be referenced in **Appendix 5**.

Tranche 3, which includes partnering systems, will be subject to a future Detailed Business Case and funding bid. Recent Government decisions have been made to transfer Strengthening Families (impacting SFRT system) to the Whānau Ora Commissioning Agencies (via Te Puni Kōkiri) and the transfer of Family Start (impacting the FS Net system) to the Social Investment Agency. This would leave one partnering system in scope for Tranche 3 (Te Kete, used by the multi-agency High and Complex Needs team), dependent on these transfer processes.

In scope

The following are in scope of Tranche 1-2:

- The identification, scoping and delivery of Targeted Practice Enhancements as early deliverables (within the current platform) that can transition to the future state platform. These offer early improvements to kaimahi, children and families and will offer opportunities to test change and implementation approaches.

- Procure the new technology platform and implementation and support partner(s).
- Put in place the foundations of the system that Tranche 1-2 can be built on.
- Building a new modern frontline technology platform, and replace and retire:
    - CYRAS;

s9(2)(b)(ii)



- Change management to support internal users e.g., training, embedding change, enabling and supporting practice.
- As changes are made, updating standard reporting and the data model in the data warehouse.

Out of scope

The following are out of scope of Tranche 1-2:

- Retirement of any other frontline systems.
- Other changes to other non-frontline systems.
- Other changes to data and analytic systems for non-frontline technology systems.
- Major changes to the organisation, e.g. changes to practice, the operating model, strategic goals, or structural change.
- Partners' systems that are not owned or operated by Oranga Tamariki.
- Other agencies' systems that are not owned or operated by Oranga Tamariki.
- ICT systems and hardware for Partners.

Economic assessment of the shortlisted options

This section sets out an economic assessment of value for money based on costs and benefits.

Costs

The PBC estimated the total cost to implement the entire programme to be between $214 and $335 million over 10 years (midpoint $240 million), with an assessment of:

- Tranche 1 – between $56 million and $78 million.
- Tranche 2 – between $58 million and $80 million.
- Tranche 3 – between $29 million and $40 million.
- Ongoing – between $84 million and $118 million.

The DBC for Tranche 1 anticipated delivery for $68.5 million (with no allocated contingency) based on known market conditions and without the benefit of the deep research that has been enabled through the procurement process.

Key learnings from international comparators has made it clear that in order to mitigate the risks associated with co-existence (and other factors), significantly more time and investment would be required than the original DBC anticipated in order to deliver Tranche 1 successfully. This has been further intensified by a three-way co-existence environment with CYRAS, s9(2)(b)(ii), s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

Quantitative risk assessment (QRA)

An assessment of uncertainty was undertaken to determine the appropriate level of contingency to be included, and to understand the relative sensitivities of the cost uncertainties. This was completed across both the DBC for Tranche 1 delivery approach and the preferred option of delivery of Tranche 1-2 with Tranche 3 to follow to assess the degree of uncertainty underpinning the costs to implement:

- Level of resources required to deliver the Programme.
- Vendor and internal resource rates.
- Platform and middleware license costs.
- Vendor support costs.
- Implementation timeframe.
- Foreign exchange.
- Decommissioning legacy systems.

The uncertainty ranges were used in a Monte Carlo simulation model to evaluate the uncertainty in the Programme's total cost.

s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

This reconfirms the high-risk nature and uncertainty associated with the delivery approach of the DBC for Tranche 1 and increases confidence in the feasibility of successfully implementing the revised approach of delivering Tranche 1-2 together.

Sensitivity analysis

The dominant uncertainty affecting costs was the uncertainty in the programme duration. This is not unusual for a multi-year programme of this type due to the impact of time extensions on a large number of the resources and vendor costs, including in this case a potential reduction in the legacy system licensing savings if programme delays occur.

This is a strategic risk for the programme that will be closely managed and mitigated to ensure delivery meets the outlined scope and within the agreed timeframes and that strong change control practices and governance exists and are maintained throughout.

The other uncertainty areas (vendor build and licensing costs, resource rates, resource numbers) were even contributors to the contingency levels assessed.

Assumptions

For the purposes of the benefit-cost analysis the following assumptions were made:

- Frontline technology systems would be delivered in two Tranches to eliminate the risks associated with a co-existence with legacy systems. The approach enables the retirement of all main legacy systems (CYRAS, s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]
- The combined Tranche 1-2 delivery will occur later than the current Tranche 1 timing, but when delivered will provide a larger set of benefits at once.
- By combining Tranche 1-2 into a single implementation, the Programme will deliver efficiency savings for frontline user as well as operational maintenance and support teams, through a single end to end case management system.

Benefits

Non-monetary benefits

The Programme is delivering fit for purpose frontline technology that will be critical to the ability of Oranga Tamariki to fulfil its statutory role. However, delivering this frontline technology on its own will not deliver all the capability. For this reason, many of the benefits are indirect and cannot be solely claimed by the Programme.

Resolving efficiency issues will lead to productivity improvements. The intention is that by resolving these issues more frontline staff can be freed up for more value-added activities enabling relational, restorative, and inclusive social work practice and responding to volume increases of reports of concern. This will go toward partially addressing the issues raised in various reports and commissions of inquiry. It will also partially address rising volume of case work.

The combined Tranche 1-2 delivery will provide a larger set of non-monetary and monetary benefits at once as compared to the PBC. The table below sets out the benefits from this proposed investment.

Non-monetary benefits	Description
Improved outcomes and oranga for children, young people and families	
Improved oranga and safety of children, young people and families that have come to the attention of Oranga Tamariki	Addressing the problems outlined for this programme will enable staff to get the time they need with children and their family to ensure they get the right amount of support when they need it. They will have the information they need to make informed decisions especially when a child is at immediate risk.
Improved ability to address youth offending	Addressing the problems will enable Oranga Tamariki to better address youth offending in particular, through earlier and more effective matching of young people to appropriate interventions contributing to reduced reoffending, increased responsive to victims and enhanced public safety and confidence
Improved flow of children through the care and protection and youth justice system	It is not intended that children remain in the Oranga Tamariki system permanently however there are several barriers that prolong agency involvement unnecessarily. Addressing these barriers, including workflow through the case management system will mean less children experience delays in the system waiting for decisions or supports they need as the case management systems will enable improved visibility. This will make it easier to progress decisions and responses in timely ways. For example, improvements to the recording of assessments and plans will improve capacity in the system: children who need a statutory response will have that decision reached faster via the assessment process; those who are already within a statutory response will have their needs understood and associated plans regularly reviewed and updated (e.g. Court plans and reports or Family Group Conference plans) in alignment with their unique needs. This may create more capacity in the system and will have a flow on impact on workloads, meaning those children who do require a service response receive one of a higher quality.
Reduction in low value activities **(Oranga Tamariki has undertaken a time in motion study so that this improvement in efficiency can be fully or partially measured**	
Improved staff efficiency	The existing case management process is time consuming, for example entering data in multiple places. The new processes and frontline technology systems would reduce the time spent on the system as all processes would be in one place, centred around the child's record.
Improve wellbeing and effectiveness of staff	Staff will be less frustrated by the time they spend on the system, exacerbated by usability issues. Having more time to spend on improving the oranga of children and supporting their families will improve job satisfaction and support reduced workload stress over incomplete tasks because they are easier to complete.
Reduced time in gathering, extracting and analysing information from the system	When a request is made for information about some areas of its business Oranga Tamariki has to spend a considerable amount of time manually extracting and synthesising that information across multiple systems and places which is time-consuming.
Reduction in time Partners spend gathering information	Partners have to spend a lot of time with Oranga Tamariki gathering information about children and families. This takes time away from working directly with the child and their family. This benefit will improve the time and quality of those interactions. It will also avoid overhead for those Partners which should be passed to Oranga Tamariki when substantive contracting starts.
Improved information	

Non-monetary benefits	Description
Less data quality issues	Improving usability and enabling more structured information gathering and storage will reduce the opportunities for data errors. More structured/validated data will enable more data to be retrieved e.g. less stored in case notes. Data design will employ existing statistical data standards which will facilitate downstream analytical use of the data and will also benefit the operational use of historically linked case data.
Better information for policy and operational decision makers	Improved information and the ability to share robust data about children and families in need of support can inform system and organisation decisions about where to invest to improve the safety and oranga of children. This benefit will allow better decision making, assessment of organisational performance, improved prioritisation of resources to meet current needs, and best enables meeting operational needs. These benefits apply to Government, the child protection system/agencies (including Oranga Tamariki) and impacted partners. Note: Appendix 7 (Privacy Analysis) and the Management Case (Managing Privacy) sections provide more information on the data security protections required.
Better information for case decision-makers	These benefits apply to frontline staff (both Partners and Oranga Tamariki) who can make more informed decisions. This means that children and their family will spend the right amount of time getting support, the right support, and when it is needed.
Improved confidence and trust	This will apply to everyone who interacts with Oranga Tamariki including children and families, caregivers, Partners, Government, NGOs and the public.

Table 1: Non-monetary benefits from the investment proposal

Impact of not making these changes

In addition to the non-monetary benefits stated above, there are consequences of not making changes. This includes:

- The ability to realise the full benefits of the wider programme through changes to the operating model.
- The ability of Oranga Tamariki to operate effectively to meet its statutory responsibilities to keep children safe and reduce youth offending.
- The ability for Oranga Tamariki and other agencies to be able to evidence that children are safer and having their needs met either individually or collectively because of actions being taken
- The ability of Oranga Tamariki to mitigate the risk of demand failure as a result of current and future increases in Report of Concern volumes.

Monetary benefits

The Programme expects monetary benefits from reduction in system operating and support costs as a result of decommissioning all the systems outlined as in scope. This is outlined in the table below.

Monetary benefits	Description
Efficiency savings	
Reduced maintenance and	The Programme will replace and decommission all the systems outlined in scope, and as a result existing operating costs for these systems will be saved.

Monetary benefits	Description
operating spend on existing frontline technologies	All savings from decommissioning applications will be reinvested back into the upgrade programme. These costs are quantified in the Financial Case.
Reduced technology risk	
Decreased time/cost to modify the system in response to policy or legislative change	By the end of the Programme, Oranga Tamariki will have a simpler and more resilient case management system. This will mean Oranga Tamariki is more able to respond quickly and economically to Government policy changes. The new system will substantially improve system agility. It is envisaged that the implementation of policy changes will be easier with less time required to design, build and test technology responses. This is important for longer term sustainability of the technology and enabling system evolution to meet future government requirements.

Table 2: Monetary benefits from the investment proposal

Identifying the preferred option

Option 3 from the DBC for Tranche 1 was identified as having the strongest alignment to achieving the benefits outlined (both monetary and non-monetary) noting the assumption of the cost to deliver Option 1-3 was assumed to be the same ($68.5 million). Option 3 is still the preferred approach (taking a children and young person focus approach). The assessment against cost and benefit remains unchanged from the DBC for Tranche 1.

The refined preferred option

The preferred option (option 3) of the previous DBC remains unchanged and most aspects of the PBC and DBC for Tranche 1 remain valid. However, based on the learnings through the discovery activity and the procurement process due diligence activities (reference checks and site visits in particular), it has become clear that the delivery approach for implementation needs to change. With the current tranche delivery approach, co-existence will introduce significant and unacceptable delivery risk due to the complexity associated. More so, the risk of service failure (which could impact child safety) is more significant due to the potential for data loss or data integrity issues.

To assist with mitigating the risks associated with co-existence and the other key learnings, significant additional resource and a longer timeframe would be required to deliver Tranche 1. As a result, the estimated cost of Tranche 1 is already demonstrated to be more than the current funding level, noting that the risks associated with co-existence are unacceptable. The revised delivery approach seeks to deliver Tranche 1-2 together, with Tranche 3 to follow. This approach enables the retirement of all main legacy systems (CYRAS, s9(2)(b)(ii) to avoid the need for co-existence.

The combined Tranche 1-2 delivery will occur later than the Tranche 1 timing assumed in the DBC for Tranche 1, but when delivered will provide a larger set of non-monetary and monetary benefits at once. With this revised delivery approach, the strategic case, investment objectives, benefits and overall implementation timeframes outlined in the PBC do not change. What does change is the required phasing of investment to deliver Tranche 1-2 together.

The revised delivery approach represents significantly stronger value for money when assessed across cost, risk, deliverability, and whole-of-life outcomes. While the upfront investment for a combined Tranche 1–2 delivery is higher than the originally funded

Tranche 1 envelope, this approach avoids the materially higher total cost, risk exposure, and inefficiency associated with a standalone Tranche 1 implementation.

A Tranche 1 only approach would:

- s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]
- Introduce **prolonged system co-existence**, driving:
  - Duplicated operating costs
  - Complex integration overhead
  - Increased delivery duration.
- s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

In contrast, the combined Tranche 1–2 approach:

- **Eliminates the need for co-existence**, enabling earlier retirement of legacy systems.
- s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]
- Delivers a **greater scope of capability for only a marginal incremental cost**, improving cost efficiency per outcome delivered.
- Provides **earlier realisation of benefits**, including operational efficiencies and improved service outcomes for children and young people.
- Avoids costly rework, duplicated effort, and extended programme overheads inherent in a phased approach.

From a whole-of-life perspective, the total investment for Tranches 1–3 remains **within the original Programme Business Case range.** The PBC estimated the total cost for the full implementation for Tranche 1-3 to be ~$240 million midpoint (excluding contingency). [redacted] s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

COMMERCIAL CASE: Preparing for the potential deal

Procurement strategy

The purpose of this Commercial Case is to describe the procurement strategy and commercial arrangements for the Programme. It reflects the approach approved through the DBC for Tranche 1 in December 2024 and incorporates the procurement activities that have since been completed.

This procurement strategy was designed to maximise openness, fairness, and value for money, while ensuring the selection of fit for purpose frontline technology platform and delivery partners capable of supporting the long-term operational and service delivery needs of Oranga Tamariki.

The approach aligns with:

- New Zealand Government Procurement Rules.
- Oranga Tamariki procurement policies and best practice.
- Audit Office procurement guidance.
- Good probity and conflict-of-interest management principles.

Where possible Oranga Tamariki ensured that opportunities for New Zealand businesses, including Māori, Pasifika, and regional businesses, as well as social enterprises, were created. Throughout the procurements, Oranga Tamariki has engaged with, and will continue to engage with, New Zealand Government Procurement (NZGP) to ensure that appropriate government procurement processes are followed.

This Commercial Case outlines the commercial arrangements and procurement strategy underpinning the FTSU procurements completed during 2025–26.

Commercial approach

Oranga Tamariki is an experienced and mature procurer of modern cloud-based technology systems. Since its formation in 2017 Oranga Tamariki has used a ‘Cloud-first’ technology strategy that is aligned to the NZ Digital government Cloud First Policy. Oranga Tamariki has undertaken significant cloud system procurements so has well defined procurement processes and agreements. That experience will be leveraged in this programme of work.

Oranga Tamariki has undertaken a two-phase multi-stage procurement process to source:

- A Technology Platform **(Platform)**.
- An Implementation and Support **(I&S)** Partner.

On completion of the procurement processes, the commercial relationship will be established, and this relationship will be held directly between Oranga Tamariki and relevant suppliers.

Rationale for the two-stage approach

The Platform and the I&S Partner procurements were intentionally separated and delivered through a two-phase approach, as this was assessed to be the most effective and low-risk procurement strategy for Oranga Tamariki.

This approach enabled Oranga Tamariki to objectively test and evaluate the range of Platform options available in the market as a standalone exercise. In particular, it allowed platforms to be assessed on their own merits, including those for which Oranga Tamariki had limited or no prior implementation experience, without introducing additional variables such as I&S Partner preferences or delivery methodologies. The procurement for the Platform was to assess against the scope of the PBC, ensuring the platform selected could meet the needs of Tranche 1-3 as a strategic platform of choice.

The two-stage process also ensured that only I&S Partners with demonstrable accreditation and experience on the selected Platform were considered. Oranga Tamariki required I&S Partners with specialised skills, sufficient capacity, and proven technical expertise specific to the chosen Platform to meet the Programme's requirements. Procuring the Platform first provided clarity to the market and enabled Respondents in the second stage to clearly evidence their relevant experience and credentials. The procurement for the I&S Partner was to assess against the scope of Tranche 1 scope, noting that on successful delivery, the I&S Partner would be extended for further delivery of Tranche 2 and 3.

By completing the Platform selection ahead of the I&S Partner procurement, the subsequent implementation and support proposals were more targeted and comparable. I&S Partner Respondents were able to focus their responses on a known Platform, resulting in higher-quality submissions and a more efficient and robust evaluation process.

A single-stage procurement approach was considered but discounted. This would have required Oranga Tamariki to assess multiple combined proposals, each potentially including different platform options and delivery approaches. Such complexity would have significantly increased evaluation effort, introduced comparability challenges, and carried a material risk of delays to the commencement of the Programme. The two-stage approach mitigated these risks and supported a clearer, more defensible procurement outcome.

Procurement lead and probity auditor

Oranga Tamariki appointed a dedicated Procurement Lead and an independent Probity Auditor s9(2)(b)(ii) to lead and support the end-to-end procurement process.

The Probity Auditor has provided real-time probity advice throughout the procurement process. Interim probity reports were provided ahead of key decision points, and the auditor has confirmed that procurement activities were conducted in accordance with probity principles and good procurement practice. A final probity report will be issued following contract award.

Procurement completed to date

Technology platform procurement

The Platform procurement was undertaken in accordance with the approved Procurement Plan, focusing on identifying platforms capable of delivering Tranche 1-3 scope. The

Technology Platform procurement commenced with an open Registration of Interest (ROI) released through the Government Electronic Tenders Service (GETS) on 10 Februa ry 2025. The ROI closed on 17 March 2025, s6(b)(ii) [redacted]

Implementation and support (I&S Partner) procurement

A separate I&S Partner procurement was undertaken in accordance with the approved Procurement Plan, focusing on suppliers capable of delivering Tranche 1 scope against the shortlisted Platforms. The ROI named the shortlisted Platforms and requested that only suitably certified and experienced I&S Partners respond. s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]

Full Solution assessment

Following the RFP process, s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] he purpose of the Platform and I&S Partner assessment was to identify a preferred Full Solution for progression to final approval. This required determining which Full Solution offered:

- The most suitable replacement option for the existing legacy systems (notably CYRAS as our case management system) within scope of the programme.
- The most future proofed resilience that retains the greatest ability to adapt to changes over time.
- The most assurance on a timely, cost effective and lower risk implementation.

The first phase of procurement activities had already determined that s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] taken forward satisfied the questions of platform suitability and adaptability (albeit with differing value propositions and trade-offs). Therefore, the focus of the assessment of the Full Solution focussed more strongly on the third question of the feasibility of implementation.

Given the differing commercial approaches and associated risk profiles, a comprehensive assessment was required. This was achieved through assessment of the complete, end-to-end offerings that integrated both the Platform and I&S Partner components into a single solution.

The Full Solution assessment considered value for money, affordability, and risk across the combined Platform and I&S Partner offerings. This provided a robust and defensible comparison between the options and ensured the recommended solution best meets operational, financial, and strategic objectives.

Assessment approach

To enable a holistic comparison, a risk-based Full Solution assessment was undertaken. Relevant commercial, financial, and delivery information from both procurements was consolidated.

This information was provided to a cross-functional group drawn from both Platform and I&S Partner evaluation panels. This group was responsible for assessing a comprehensive view of each proposed Full Solution. Its assessment incorporated both organisation-level and solution-specific due diligence, including:

- Evaluation learnings from the previous procurement processes, including due diligence.
- Identified strengths and risks.
- Supplier capability and financial viability.
- Pricing structures and total cost of ownership.
- Overall affordability within approved funding settings.
- Legal and contractual considerations.
- Programme timelines and delivery.

In addition, a strategic programme risk assessment was applied to each solution to evaluate delivery confidence, integration risk, and alignment with programme objectives.

Outcome

Based on this complete view including a commercial and risk-informed assessment, the s9(2)(b)(ii) have been assessed with a view of which offers the best overall value for money with the lowest acceptable risk to the organisation. Final work will be progressed to determine which technology platform offers the highest level of deliverability, the best overall value for money and lowest acceptable risk to Oranga Tamariki, whilst balancing alignment to the Digital Government Target State.

The outcome of this final assessment will provide the basis for a decision on the preferred technology platform and will provide a basis to enter initial commercial negotiations and then seek approval to proceed. s9(2)(b)(ii)

FTSU I&S Partner commercial models

Four FTSU I&S Partner models were considered for the implementation of the new frontline technology systems under the DBC for Tranche 1. This included:

- Prime vendor - under this model a vendor that supports and manages all the parts and aggregates the solutions provided by other individual vendors. This is a multi-vendor implementation and support model, led by a prime vendor on behalf of Oranga Tamariki.
- Single vendor - under this model a single vendor would provide all, or the bulk of the services themselves.
- Consortium-based multi-vendor model - under this model vendors have an agreed partnering model between themselves.
- FTSU Lead System Integrator - under this model Oranga Tamariki would be the lead system integrator[5].

The DBC for Tranche 1 noted that the preferred approach would be tested through the procurement process and that Oranga Tamariki remained open to alternative approaches. As a result of the outcome of the procurement process, it has been confirmed that the FTSU Programme will be the lead systems integrator overall, integrating internal ICT services with those of the successful Platform and I&S Partner. MSAs and SOWs created with the successful providers would align with Oranga Tamariki commercial processes and standards.

Many vendors required to support delivery (outside the Platform and I&S Partner) already have commercial agreements with Oranga Tamariki. Vendor performance including performance against cybersecurity requirements and ongoing security monitoring fall under BAU arrangements. For other services required, these would be sourced using organisational and All of Government procurement processes and integrated via the FTSU Programme.

Contract form and key commercial assumptions

Commercial arrangements for technical changes to platforms

A mix of commercial arrangements will be needed to procure technical services to implement the new frontline technology systems. Some of these are already in place and some will be new.

The below tableTable 3 sets out these arrangements for platforms affected in Tranche 1-2.

System	What it does
New technology platform New I&S partner	**Current commercial arrangements** Not applicable. **Description of the high-level services required** The high-level implementation services that need to be procured are: • New technology platform licensing • Configuration and customisation of new technology platform

[5] A systems integrator in this context is the role of coordinating the delivery of work across multiple vendor partners.

	• Integration with CYRAS • Data cleansing and migration for CYRAS, [redacted] • Data cleansing and migration for s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] • Support of change management activities • Support for the new frontline technology systems **Proposed implementation and support arrangements** Procured through the Technology Platform and I&S Partner procurement processes. Work completed under new MSA and SOWs.
Changes to the main existing cloud-based platforms	
EDAP	**Current commercial arrangements** EDAP is supported by s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] **Description of the high-level services required** The high-level implementation services needed as part of this programme are: • Set up and run of extract transform and load of new platform data. • Configuration of new datasets. • Ongoing development of data standards for Partners, NGOs and other government agencies. • Update direct data feeds with other government agencies. **Proposed implementation and support arrangements** This work will be completed using SOW's under the current MSA.
PowerBI	**Current commercial arrangements** PowerBI is currently supported by the internal resources with some tasks performed by s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] are also able to provide PowerBI services if required. **Description of the high-level services required** • Reporting will need to be developed. **Proposed implementation and support arrangements** This work will be completed using SOWs under a current MSAs for s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]
Other	Existing support Partners will have to support the FTSU Implementation Partner(s) to integrate the new frontline technology system (s) with other cloud platforms such as: • Microsoft Office platform (including, Teams, Office) – supported by s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] • SharePoint system – supported by s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] • Genesys cloud platform – supported by [redacted] • ServiceNow - ITIL Service management platform – supported by s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] This programme will not make any changes to the existing commercial arrangements for those Vendors. This work will be done using SOWs under the current MSA. The FTSU I&S Partner(s) will work with the support Partners to implement and then hand off changes for ongoing support by those vendors.
Changes to legacy systems	
CYRAS s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]	**Current commercial arrangements** CYRAS s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] are currently supported by s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] The contractual arrangements for that support are in place. **Description of the high-level services required** The services that are needed throughout the entire programme are advising on functionality of the existing CYRAS system s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] system (if in scope), and delivery of key work items to enable data migration and decommissioning at the appropriate time. **Proposed implementation and support arrangements**

	This work will be completed using SOW's under the current MSA.
Legacy application cloud infrastructure	**Current commercial arrangements** Legacy application cloud infrastructure sits on the AWS Platform which is currently supported by s9(2)(b)(ii) The contractual arrangements for that support are in place. **Description of the high-level services required** The services that are needed throughout the entire programme are advising on the existing infrastructure, making key updates to that infrastructure during the implementation phase when needed, and delivery of key work items to enable decommissioning of relevant infrastructure components at the appropriate time. **Proposed implementation and support arrangements** This work will be completed using SOW's under the current MSA.
s9(2)(b)(ii)	**Current commercial arrangements** s9(2)(b)(ii) The contractual arrangements for that support are in place. **Description of the high-level services required** The services that are needed throughout the entire programme are advising on functionality of existing s9(2)(b)(ii) (if in scope), and delivery of key work items to enable data migration and decommissioning at the appropriate time. **Proposed implementation and support arrangements** This will be completed using SOW's under the current MSA.

Table 3: Commercial arrangements to be used during implementation of Tranche 1-2

Procurement timeline

The table below sets out indicative high-level milestones relating to the completed procurement process and the remaining procurement milestones.

Actions	Stage 1 Software Platform Provider	Status	Stage 2 Implementation & Support Partners	Status
Procurement plan approved	5 Nov 2025	Complete		
Gazette to market	15 Nov 2025	Complete		
ROI issued to market on GETS	10 Feb 2025	Complete	24 Sep 2025	Complete
Date of submission for ROI responses	17 Mar 2025	Complete	16 Oct 2025	Complete
ROI evaluation recommendation	19 May 2025	Complete	4 Nov 2025	Complete
Invite selected respondents to complete RFP stage	20 May 2025	Complete	5 Nov 2025	Complete
Date of submission for RFP responses	28 Jul 2025	Complete	16 Jan 2026	Complete
RFP evaluation recommendation	22 Sept 2025	Complete	5 Mar 2026	Complete
All Respondents notified	24 Sept 2025	Complete	6 Mar 2026	Complete
Full Solution recommendation	15 May 2026	Complete		

Actions	Stage 1 Software Platform Provider	Status	Stage 2 Implementation & Support Partners	Status
Final assessment of technology platform	July – August 2026			
Contract negotiation	June – September 2026			
Contract management plan	June - September 2026			
Master Services Agreement signed	October 2026			

Table 4: Indicative timeline procurement

Key contract provisions

The contractual models in place are well defined and supported by mature processes. Oranga Tamariki operates established governance arrangements, actively monitors performance and quality, and applies robust value for money, risk and issue management processes. Individual supplier contract management plans underpin these arrangements.

The contracts follow best practice and clearly address the following areas:

- Defining contract duration and including break clauses depending on the nature of engagement enabling Oranga Tamariki to scale services up or down as required.
- Clearly documenting agreed deliverables through Statements of Work.
- Specifying the respective roles and responsibilities of the service provider and Oranga Tamariki.
- Setting out payment mechanisms, including prices, milestones and licensing arrangements.
- Establishing change control processes for new requirements and updated services.
- Confirming remedies in the event of failure on the part of the service provider to deliver the contracted services on time, to specification and price.
- Clearly articulating the treatment of intellectual property rights and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI).
- Addressing data sovereignty requirements and specify agreed data centre region.
- Ensuring compliance with appropriate regulations.
- Defining operational and contract administration terms and conditions.
- Establishing mechanisms for resolving disputes and disagreements.
- Allocating risk appropriately between the parties.
- Specifying any options at the end of the contract.

These contracts will factor in the risk versus return pricing into service delivery models. For example:

- Resource augmentation apply agreed hourly rates with no risk loading.
- Time and Materials (T+M) for implementation operating within capped pricing, with no risk loading. Prices can only vary through Oranga Tamariki approved change control.

- Fixed-price engagement includes a transparent risk loading to protect delivery of the business outcome. Prices only change through Oranga Tamariki approved change control.

All contractual arrangements will go through independent legal review to ensure consistency and minimise unnecessary risk.

Contracting in Economic Benefits

Through procurement of the technical services to implement the new frontline technology systems, consideration will be given to contracting in economic benefits, where possible.

In practice guidance, the economic benefit criteria should answer how the supplier creates value in New Zealand beyond the contract itself. Consideration of factors should include does the supplier employ, train, or develop people in New Zealand, use New Zealand businesses and suppliers, build capability long-term and improve sustainability or community outcomes within New Zealand.

For the Implementation & Support Partner procurement, these criteria have been incorporated into an economic benefits requirement in the evaluation criteria. This applied a 10% weighting aligned to the new Rule 8 under the New Zealand Government Procurement Rules (5th edition).

Respondents have demonstrated a commitment to wider economic benefits. Collectively, this has demonstrated strong alignment to key economic benefit areas, delivering local economic support, workforce and capability development, community outcomes, sustainability, long-term economic resilience, and cultural and social inclusion, underpinned by robust governance and accountability to ensure benefits are both tangible and enduring beyond the life of the contract.

The Respondents have agreed to include the economic benefit commitments contractually, ensuring they are measurable, proportionate, and actively monitored.

Implementation, change and assurance services

Oranga Tamariki as a Participating Agency has set up a sound procurement framework to access All of Government (AoG) panels. Secondary procurements undertaken across the panels enable engagement of professional services and provide access to suitably qualified, experienced and available resource to support delivery of the programme.

Table 5 sets out the services that will be required which could be or will be filled by external consultants or contractors. Contractors will only be engaged if there are no internal or clear market options available. For contracted resource the key contract provisions are set out in the existing commercial arrangements with AOG panels.

Services	Description of potential service
Technical Quality Assurance (TQA)	Independent review of technical architecture, design and implementation. External consultant.
Independent Quality Assurance (IQA)	Services to undertake an external quality assurance at different parts of the programme. External consultant.
Security	Services to complete C&A activities and reviews. Internal or external consultant.

Services	Description of potential service
Gateway review	Services, through Treasury, for Gateway review services. External consultants.
Testing	Services for testing of software solutions, independent of the FTSU I&S Partners. External consultants.
Specialist expertise	Service to ensure engagement representative of Partners and population groups, for example Pacific design thinking and ensuring the needs of disabled people are considered. External consultants.
Other	Servicers as required for delivery needs. Internal or external contractor/

Table 5: Business services and professional services

Service streams and required outputs

The programme will be delivered through a set of workstreams that are integrated to support the design, implementation, operation, support and ongoing improvement of the technology platform. These service streams represent the functional components required to achieve the business led outcomes the programme requires, rather than programme phases or organisational roles and will be delivered within agreed timelines.

The workstreams cover the full lifecycle of the platform delivery, from design and configuration/development through to implementation, go-live and ongoing support. This includes governance, security, user adoption and continuous improvement. Each workstream is defined in terms of outputs and performance expectations to support outcome focussed procurement, MSA, SOW development and performance management underpinned by a contract management plan. This is outlined in the table below.

Service Stream	Output (What success looks like)	Performance Expectation (Scope and Quality)
Solution fit and Design (Platform)	A platform that meets agreed business requirements and supports business-led intended outcomes.	Scope: Platform configured or developed to support agreed business processes and integrations. Quality: Configuration aligns with approved processes, requirements, architecture standards and minimal rework required.
Implementation and Deployment	Successful deployment	Scope: End to end implementation including build, deployment and release activities. Quality: Platform is stable at go-live.
Data Migration and Integration and API's	Required data, system integrations and API's function as intended.	Scope: Migration of agreed datasets and implementation of required API's and integrations, Quality: Data is complete, accurate and validated. Integrations and API's operate reliably.
Testing and Quality Assurance	Platform is fit for purpose prior to go-live.	Scope: Functional, integration and user acceptance testing is complete for all in-scope components.


Service Stream	Output (What success looks like)	Performance Expectation (Scope and Quality)
		Quality: Any defects resolved before go-live.
Change management and adoption	Users are willing, ready and able to use the platform.	Scope: Change and Communication plan released, training activities scheduled for end user groups. Quality: Users demonstrate capability to perform key tasks using the platform.
Service Transition and hand over to BAU	Smooth handover to BAU operations team.	Scope: Transition to operational business support including knowledge base material. Quality: Operational business staff equipped to support the platform with minimal reliance on the partner.
Operations and Support	Reliable, stable and ongoing operation of platform.	Scope: Incident management, support and maintenance. Quality: Platform availability and performance meet agreed SLAs.
Security, Privacy and Compliance	Meets security, privacy and regulatory obligations.	Scope: Security controls (NZISM), privacy and compliance activities for the platform. Quality: No critical security or privacy incidents, compliance requirements are met.
Strategic Asset optimisation	Continues to evolve, maintains technical currency to maintain sustained value over time.	Scope: Identification and implementation of agreed updates, enhancements and optimisations. Quality: Evidence based and aligned to business-led objectives.
Commercial and Contract Management	Clear accountability and value for money throughout the engagement	Scope: Commercial management, reporting and contract governance. Quality: Accurate SLA and performance reporting, correct invoicing, proactive relationship management.

Table 6: Service Streams, Outputs and Measures

Payment mechanisms

The technology platforms identified through the procurement process s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]. All system integrations, APIs and development work must be completed prior to completing the security requirements (including all certification and accreditation NZISM) before go-live. This is outlined in the table below.

s9(2)(b)(ii)



Procurement risks

The FTSU Programme Risk and Issue Management Framework establishes formal categories to ensure risks are managed and reported on consistently. The risks detailed in

[6] Oranga Tamariki pay for NZISM compliance assessment. The supplier is required to remain involved to provide material or adjustment of solution to meet the control requirement.

this section fall under the Procurement & External category, which addresses threats arising from supplier activities, contracting, external dependencies, or market forces.

Risk Allocation Matrix

The risk allocation outlined below is aligned with Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) NZ Government Procurement (NZGP) guidance, including the principle that risk should be allocated to the party best able to manage them while agencies retain accountability for public value, legislative compliance, and operating outcomes.

The table below sets out the proposed allocations of key procurement risks between Oranga Tamariki and potential providers. Percentages indicate primary responsibility for managing each risk. They are indicative and reflect intended allocation rather than a mathematically precise distribution.

s9(2)(b)(ii)



As Oranga Tamariki will be procuring services and resources that are available in the marketplace, the overall procurement risk profile is considered medium and consistent with comparable government programmes. However, delivery of the programme is highly dependent on external vendors and specialist contractors for key components of delivery.

This dependency introduces risks including limited market capacity or supplier availability within required timeframes, variable supplier capability and quality of delivery, supplier resilience over the life of the programme and cost escalation for multi-year delivery. These risks may increase by ongoing skills shortages in the technology and professional services market with an increasing demand for skilled resources in digital, data and cybersecurity.

At a high level these risks will be actively managed through robust supplier and commercial management practices. This includes clearly defined outcomes-based requirements, fit for purpose procurement and contracting approaches, proactive


[7] This may change based on the contracting model

engagement with the market and ongoing performance monitoring against agreed service levels and milestones.

Additional mitigations include strong governance and assurance, targeted use of specialist advice from other public-sector agencies, independent programme and technical assurance to support informed decision-making throughout the life of the programme.

The following table sets out high level procurement risks for Tranche 1-2.

s9(2)(g)(i)



s9(2)(g)(i)



FINANCIAL CASE: Affordability and funding requirements

The Financial Case provides a high-level view of operating cost implications and funding sources to provide early visibility of key affordability and fiscal factors, including cash flow timing and any impacts on implications for the multi-year operating allowance. The costs outlined in this Financial Case are based on the technology option that has the higher cost and these costs will be further refined through the finalisation of the technology choice and the next stage of planning and design. This builds on the work done in the Programme Business Case (PBC).

What the PBC found

The PBC estimated the total cost to implement the entire programme to be between $214 and $335 million over 10 years (midpoint $240 million). The table below sets out a summary of these costs by each tranche and the funding arrangements.

Tranche and year	Funding Source	OPEX (millions)
Tranche 0: FY2023/24	Oranga Tamariki	$12.38
Tranche 1: FY2024/25 and FY2025/26	Government, with some small savings from legacy components	$56.15 to $78.05
Tranche 2: FY2026/27 and FY2027/28	Government, with some small savings from legacy components	$57.75 to $80.27
Tranche 3: FY2028/29	Government with savings from retirement of legacy systems	$29.35 to $40.80
2029/30 – 32/33 and ongoing costs	Government with savings from retirement of legacy systems	$84.92 and $118

Table 10: Operating costs for the Programme in the PBC

Cabinet approved the Detailed Business Case (DBC) for Tranche 1 delivery for $68.5 million with no contingency allocated. The indicative delivery timeframes for Tranche 1 remained unchanged from the PBC, as it was subject to the outcome of the procurement phase.

Tranche 1-3 overall affordability

Implementation Cost

The PBC estimated the total cost for the full implementation for Tranche 1-3 to be ~$240 million midpoint (excluding contingency). s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

s9(2)(f)(iv)

Contingency for Tranche 1-3 implementation

The contingency for the full Tranche 1-3 implementation is based on Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). s9(2)(f)(iv) This figure is based on using the 85th percentile of total cost over the course of the implementation horizon from the QRA Monte Carlo simulation.

The dominant uncertainty affecting the costs was the uncertainty in the programme duration (which is not unusual for a multi-year programme of this type because of the impact of time extensions on a large amount of the resources and vendor costs, including in the case a potential reduction in the legacy system licensing savings if programme delays occur). The table below summarises this outcome for the Tranche 1-3 implementation, s9(2)(f)(iv)

s9(2)(f)(iv)

The programme has factored in contingency in its overall costings based on the 85th percentile, as consistent with best practice for programmes of this nature and complexity.

s9(2)(f)(iv)

Operating Affordability

s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted] However, increased case complexity and evidence-based practice have led to more bespoke arrangements and higher service delivery costs. In addition, Oranga Tamariki faces significant wage and inflationary pressures across all expenditure areas, alongside rising volumes of reports of concern, which increase demand for frontline social workers.

Therefore, Oranga Tamariki cannot absorb the investment for this investment case and is seeking new crown funding through upcoming Budget rounds.

Ongoing licensing, support and maintenance costs will be self-funded through license savings from decommissioning of legacy systems after Tranche 1-2 implementation.

Tranche 1-2 overall cost

Implementation Cost

The preferred delivery approach to combine the scope of Tranche 1-2 requires rephasing of the investment. The PBC anticipated a funding range for Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 of $114 - $158 million, midpoint $136 million (excluding contingency).

The costing model has been refined to reflect the combined implementation of both tranches as well as Targeted Practice Enhancements, s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted] sitting within the PBC range for Tranche 1-2 implementation. This funding excludes the ongoing licensing and support cost and any licensing costs savings from the decommissioning of legacy systems after the go-live of Tranche 1-2. This is outlined in the figure below.

s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

In line with Guidance on Accounting for Software as a Service (SaaS) released by Treasury in February 2022, all costs included in this programme have been determined to be operating costs and therefore no capital is required.

The investment phasing is indicative at this stage and vary from year to year depending on the functionality being implemented and programme structure required to support that implementation. The final phasing of investment will be confirmed s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted] and Approval to Deliver steps. This is outlined in the table below.

s9(2)(f)(iv)



Key points relating to the above table are:

- It is anticipated that implementation will be 3 years in duration (excluding any decommissioning activities required) and will be spread over three financial years.
- Additional funding required above the level already been approved as part of DBC Tranche 1 will be sought s9(2)(b)(ii) .
- Ongoing licensing, support and maintenance costs will be self-funded through license savings from decommissioning of legacy systems after full implementation.

The breakdown of costs can be seen in **Appendix 6.**

[9] Assumes IPET of $6.5 million from FY 25/26 to FY 27/28 is approved.

Contingency for Tranche 1-2 implementation

The contingency for the full Tranche 1-2 implementation is based on a proxy from the Tranche 1-3 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) assessed at similar level of uncertainty to the T1-3 QRA.

s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

The dominant uncertainty affecting the costs arises from the programme duration (which is not unusual for a multi-year programme of this type because of the impact of time extensions on a large amount of the resources and vendor costs, including in the case a potential reduction in the legacy system licensing savings if programme delays occur).

The table below summarises this for the Tranche 1-2 implementation.

s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

The programme has factored in contingency in its overall costings based on the 85th percentile, as consistent with best practice for programmes of this nature and complexity.

Funding and approvals

s9(2)(g)(i) [redacted] At the same time, Oranga Tamariki is facing increased volumes and complexity in its care services, placing financial pressure on the delivery of existing services.

s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

The table below outlines the existing funding approved by Cabinet that is already within Oranga Tamariki baseline versus the new Crown funding required for Tranche 1-2 and Tranche 3 yet to be requested through upcoming budget rounds and Oranga Tamariki baseline funding towards the overall implementation costs.

s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

Funding Source	Status (Confirmed / Proposed)	Amount ($m)	Timing
Existing Crown Funding	**Confirmed** through Budget 2024 and in Oranga Tamariki baseline	$74.49m[10]	
s9(2)(f)(iv)			

Table 14: Funding and Approvals

The final phasing of investment will be confirmed s9(2)(b)(ii) and Approval to Deliver steps.

Costing considerations

Costing methodology

To estimate the cost of the programme, a detailed costing model was developed and multiple-facilitated workshops with subject matter experts were held to understand the scope and effort required for implementation. The costing model is based on:

- Detailed requirements.
- Market data on the FTSU Implementation vendor costs.
- Detailed costings provided by both platform and implementation partners through procurement negotiations.
- The QRA undertaken to estimate contingency.

The following approaches were applied for key cost areas to give estimates of costs for delivery:

- FTSU Implementation costs – These costs have been informed by the rates and effort used for other recent technology programmes within Oranga Tamariki, and further to this leveraging existing support Partner rate cards as guides for vendor costs.

[10] This number is based on $68. million of new Crown funding received through Budget 2024 and ongoing cost of $6 million for an additional financial year.

- Platform pricing information – based on the pricing information provided by the respective platform respondents through procurement process.
- Vendor implementation costs – have been informed by the pricing information provided by the respective implementation and support partner respondents, through the procurement process.
- Temporary and permanent staff costs – based on known rates, using existing team member costs as indication. These costs include all permanent staffing costs (e.g. KiwiSaver).
- Contractors' and consultant costs – the costs used are based on known rates, and recent Market Rate analysis published publicly by Robert Walters[11].

Cost assumptions

- Licensing and vendor support costs will be required from 2026/27 and thereafter those costs are ongoing.
- All specialist delivery type roles are based on contractor rates, however where possible 'permanent' or 'fixed term' capability will be preferred but this will be dependent on the market condition at the time and if skilled capability is readily available without compromising delivery timeframes and quality. This assumption and principle is subject to any internal or other policy guiding limitations with respect to headcount.
- Timeline to implement Tranche 1-2 is estimated to be 3 years plus decommission of legacy systems, and it is assumed there are no legislative dates to be met and there is no requirement to deliver in an accelerated timeframe. This timeframe has been informed by the procurement process, including the due diligence phase.
- Specialist ICT resources, programme delivery resources and business subject matter expertise will be available as planned.
- Third Party costs are based on existing agreed rate card the suppliers and are aligned with AOG rates.
- Ongoing costs after the full implementation will be self-funded through savings resulting in the decommissioning of legacy systems.
- Decommissioning of Legacy systems will commence six months after go-live. Cost savings will be used to offset ongoing licensing and support costs and partial implementation costs for Tranche 3.

The Programme will continue to revisit and test these assumptions throughout the delivery of the programme.

Financial risks

The table below sets out the financial risks which may cause costs to be different.

[11] Robert Walters 2026 salary guide

Risk	Mitigation
Foreign Exchange Risk - If foreign exchange rate volatility is high, then this will increase cost uncertainty because it is likely licensing is in US$.	Fix licensing costs in NZ$ with vendor where possible.
Annual Inflation - If inflation continues to be high, then this will create uncertainty around variable costs components.	The programme will aim to negotiate fixed price contracts on the cost elements with the largest inflation exposure.
s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]	
Resourcing - If the level of resourcing and/or, resource mix between permanent and contractor base and/or the resource rates are to be found to be incorrect then this could result in cost pressure.	The level of resourcing has been validated and reviewed by multiple parties with subject matter expertise in similar work. A conservative approach was applied regarding the split between contractor and permanent resources, with majority of specialist resources being allocated and costed as contractor resources. This risk is also accounted for in the QRA with specific contingency attributed to this risk.
s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]	
Implementation Timeframes – If the programme implementation timeframe is materially longer than anticipated in the costings then this will result in a cost pressure for the programme	The programme will validate the final implementation timeframes as part of the Detailed Design phase with the vendors to gain further assurance on the likely timeframes before the Approval to Deliver will be submitted for approval. This risk is also accounted for in the QRA with specific contingency attributed to this risk.
Timely decommissioning of Legacy systems – If there is any time delay with the decommissioning of legacy systems then additional funding will be required to fund ongoing licensing and support costs	Timing of implementation timeframes will be confirmed as part of detailed design and strong governance will be applied to ensure the programme remains within the agreed implementation timeframes. This risk will be re assessed as part of the Approval to Deliver process to gain greater certainty. This risk is also accounted for in the QRA as part of the wider licensing contingency.

Table 15: Outline of key financial risks

MANAGEMENT CASE: Planning for successful delivery

The FTSU Programme has been set up to deliver the Oranga Tamariki Frontline Technology Systems Upgrade. This Management Case outlines the arrangements the FTSU Programme will put in place to ensure successful delivery of Tranche 1-2 and to manage the associated risks.

Governance

The Executive Leadership Team act as the primary governance body for Oranga Tamariki and is the final escalation point for the programme. The programme governance has been delegated from the Executive Leadership Team (Te Riu) to the Executive Sponsor and the FTSU Steering Committee.

The figure below outlines the governance hierarchy, key programme engagement forums supporting the governance function of the programme and the programme structure supporting the delivery of the programme. It highlights the strong business practice-led approach to the programme rather than a technology-led approach. Monthly updates are provided to the Executive Leadership Team and the Minister for Children.

FTSU Governance Structure

This is an overview of the programme governance structure, including the different groups and programme participants that contribute to the overall management and governance of the programme




Figure 9: FTSU Programme governance and programme management structure

There are two key layers of governance for the programme:

- **Te Riu – Oranga Tamariki Executive Leadership Team** - Te Riu act as the primary governance body for Oranga Tamariki, Te Riu would be the last escalation point within the governance structure for the FTSU Programme, after exhausting the programme governance bodies below. The programme governance would escalate risks and issues and endorse proposals of significance to Te Riu for approval.

- **FTSU Programme Steering Committee -** The FTSU Programme Steering Committee meets monthly and is accountable to the Chief Executive of Oranga Tamariki for the success of the programme. The primary purpose of the Steering Committee is to provide executive management and oversight of the FTSU Programme to ensure the successful delivery of the business outcomes as outlined in the Detailed Business Case. Membership includes 2 independent members who provide expertise in governing large complex technology programmes.

Supporting the programme governance structure is the monthly Programme Working Group and the FTSU Design Review Group. Their roles are:

- **FTSU Working Group -** The Working Group reports directly to the FTSU Steering Committee. The Working Group acts as a supporting and advisory forum to the Steering Committee through the SRO. It supports the programme to be on track to achieve the investment objectives and proposed benefits by ensuring Oranga Tamariki practice approach and legal obligations are embedded in scope considerations of the programme. It provides advice on the direction, prioritisation, and scope within programme increments.
- **FTSU Design Review Group (FDRG) -** The FDRG is the technology decision review group for the FTSU Programme. Its main purpose is to support the Executive Sponsor, Senior Responsible Owner and Programme Director on all technology decisions by providing recommendations and advice in alignment with Enterprise strategy, patterns, standards, principles and business outcomes. It acts as an assurance mechanism between the 'design' and 'technology' workstreams to ensure technical decisions and designs are in alignment with intent and expectations of end users.

Key roles

Key to the successful delivery of this programme is a deliberate approach to being business and practice led. This means that each layer of governance and delivery will include resources who are practitioners and therefore understand what the final technology solution must deliver in order to achieve the intended results for the workforce, and ultimately for children, young people and their families.

This will be supported by a partnership approach, where practice SMEs, technology SMEs and key programme roles take a joined-up approach to deliver their respective roles and responsibilities to ensure a practice lens over all work. This partnership approach is intended to be modelled in each layer of the programme from leadership through to delivery teams.

Given the scale of the programme, specific expertise will be brought into the programme team to provide the necessary capacity and focus (such as change management, procurement and assurance). This will be supported through communities of practice with the relevant aligned BAU function (for example the organisation's EPMO).

The table below sets out a summary of key governance, programme and cross organisational BAU roles and responsibilities.

Governance role	Key responsibilities
Oranga Tamariki Leadership Team (Te Riu)	The primary role of Te Riu in relation to this programme is to: • provide oversight of the change workstreams and programmes • provide assurance that portfolio benefits remain aligned to the Oranga Tamariki strategy and vision

Governance role	Key responsibilities
	• monitor programme delivery and resolution of risks and issues • provide assurance that workstreams and programmes adhere to quality assurance processes • approve key operational solution design and delivery decisions • endorse budgeted investment decisions, significant procurement contracts and internal and external engagement strategies for the portfolio.
Executive Sponsor	The Executive Sponsor is the Chief Social Worker and Deputy Chief Executive Professional Practice (CSW/PPG) who owns the FTSU Programme's vision and is ultimately accountable for the success of the FTSU Programme and the benefits it seeks to achieve.
FTSU Programme Steering Committee	The primary role of the Steering Committee is to provide governance over the implementation and delivery management of the FTSU Programme. Their role is to: • Monitor the FTSU Programme's progress – scope, deliverables, costs and any other areas contained in the Programme Management plan (PMP). • Approve any planned changes within their delegation or approve escalation of changes for approval at the appropriate level. • Resolve and remediate escalated programme issues and risks. • Ensure that key dependencies with this programme and other projects at Oranga Tamariki are well managed. • Provide assurance to the Executive Sponsor and Oranga Tamariki leaders that the FTSU Programme remains on course to deliver their desired outcomes. • Provide assurance that Māori, Pacific, disabled people and other community groups are being adequately engaged with and their interests represented.
Senior Responsible Owner (SRO)	The SRO is the Director Programmes in the Chief Social Worker Professional Practice Group and is the visible owner of the overall business change.
FTSU Working Group	The FTSU Working Group support the Executive Sponsor, Senior Responsible Owner and Programme Director in providing overall direction and management for the programme. The Working Group reports directly to the FTSU Steering Committee.
Programme Director	The Programme Director reports to the Executive Sponsor and works closely with the Steering Committee and alongside the Senior Responsible Owner. Their role is to: • Provide reporting to governance bodies and Central Agencies as required. • Be responsible for planning, supporting governance and overseeing the successful delivery of the FTSU Programme. • Manage the FTSU Programme budget. • Manage risk and issues. • Manage and use resources across various projects within the FTSU Programme. • Co-ordinate projects and their interdependencies. • Undertake health checks.

Governance role	Key responsibilities
	• Manage stakeholders and change management activities.
Senior Supplier	The Senior Supplier is the Chief Technology Officer, who is responsible for programme's technology solutions, and accountable for ensuring the technical integrity, alignment with technology strategy, cybersecurity posture, and overall quality of all technology products and services delivered.
FTSU Design Review Group (FDRG)	This group will approve FTSU technical design decisions and artefacts that are covered by existing precedents and have little or no business impact or security risk and do not create technical debt. FDRG fulfils the design governance role for the FTSU Programme.
Architecture Forum (AF)	This group is responsible for approving technology architecture designs and decisions that are enterprise-wide and endorsing Enterprise Architecture changes including technology principles, patterns and standards.
Technology Assurance Authority (TAA)	This group is responsible for: • Approving artefacts such as control catalogue assurance templates and process documentation, testing standards. • Making recommendations relating to assurance activities, or recommended changes to the assurance plan to the Programme Steering Committee. • Endorsing programme stage gate readiness e.g. Assurance Plans, Operational Readiness Plans and Closure Reports) to Programme Steering Committee. Approving Enterprise Architecture changes.
Data Governance Group (DGG)	The DGG ensures the alignment of Oranga Tamariki data activities and supporting digital enablers with the strategic direction and implementation plans of the organisation to deliver value from data.

Table 16: Key roles and responsibilities for the FTSU Programme

Assurance arrangements

The Risk Profile Assessment (RPA) has identified this Programme as a high-risk investment due to the scope, scale, and complexity of the Programme. This complexity arises particularly from the known challenges associated with migrating very dated technology to modern platforms.

Assurance approach

The FTSU Programme has established a comprehensive Assurance Plan commensurate with its High-risk profile. The assurance approach combines ongoing assurance, embedded in programme delivery, with targeted, milestone-based reviews aligned to critical decision points. This framework is directly aligned with the 'three lines of defence' model mandated by the Government Digital Delivery Agency (GDDA)[12].

[12] Formerly known as the Government Chief Digital Office (GCDO).

The three lines of assurance model

Assurance for programme delivery is executed across three distinct lines to ensure delivery confidence and objective scrutiny:

- **First Line (Programme Management Self-Assurance):** Primary responsibility for embedding assurance into day-to-day delivery sits with the Programme Management Office (PMO) and Workstream Leads. Core assurance activities include quality gates, peer reviews, and retrospectives.
- **Second Line (Enterprise Oversight):** This line leverages Oranga Tamariki enterprise functions for specialist assurance. It includes targeted compliance and design reviews by the Technology Assurance Authority (TAA), Data Governance Group, Risk and Assurance and Legal, Privacy and Security Teams.
- **Third Line (Independent Assurance):** Impartial scrutiny is provided through objective assessments conducted by external and internal independent parties. Key activities include milestone-based Gateway Reviews, regular Independent Quality Assurance (IQA) engagements, Technical Quality Assurance (TQA), and Probity Reviews.

Central agency oversight

To ensure alignment with system-level expectations and whole-of-government priorities, the programme is subject to ongoing assurance oversight by key central agencies:

- **The Treasury:** Leads investment assurance, coordinating Gateway Reviews and Targeted Investment Reviews (TIRs) to ensure public value.
- **Government Digital Delivery Agency (GDDA):** Oversees ICT-enabled transformation to ensure strict alignment with system-wide digital standards.
- **New Zealand Government Procurement (NZGP):** Provides expert probity and process guidance to ensure the programme's procurement approach remains compliant and fit for purpose.

Major assurance engagements tracking

The execution of independent and internal reviews is directly aligned with key milestones in the implementation plan. The specific scope, triggers, frequency, and providers for all assurance activities are comprehensively detailed in the FTSU Programme Assurance Plan.

To maintain ongoing visibility of planned, active, and completed reviews, the Programme uses a dynamic Major Assurance Engagements Tracker. This includes tracking mandatory prerequisites for upcoming delivery phases, such as the Programme IQA, Technical Quality Assurance (TQA) intervals, the pre-go-live readiness reviews, and the Controls Assessment Report.

An extract of the current Major Assurance Engagements Tracker is shown in the table below.[13]

Engagement	Purpose	Timing	Key Milestone	Status/ Result
Completed Assurance Engagements				
Gateway - Gate 0	The strategic assessment is a broad, strategic review that was undertaken at the start-up stage of FTSU programme to inform decision-making.	February 2023	Programme Business Case (PBC)	Amber/Green
Gateway Review 0/2	Strategic Assessment and Delivery Strategy, with a specific focus on the Tranche 1 Detailed Business Case (DBC)	July 2024	Detailed Business Case for Tranche 1 (DBC)	Amber
Internal PMP Review	Provide assurance to the Chief Executive and the FTSU Programme Sponsor as the programme progresses into delivery of Tranche 1.	May 2025	Programme Team Establishment	N/A
Targeted Investment Review (TIR)	The purpose of this review is to complete an early Gate 3 review to ensure the correct path through procurement and to implementation is being taken, and to provide recommendations accordingly.	May 2025	Procurement Approach	N/A
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)	To provide confidence to the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO), Executive Sponsor, and Treasury that the FTSU Programme has adequately quantified its risks and holds sufficient financial contingency. As the Programme evaluates two distinct platform options via a competitive procurement process, these options represent different technical architectures, implementation methodologies, and risk profiles.	March 2026	Revised Detailed Business Case for Tranche 1-2 (DBC)	N/A
Independent Quality Assurance (IQA)	Readiness to deliver and programme health, including: • The establishment of key programme artefacts and programmatics. • FTSU's implementation of 2025 TIR recommendations. • Assessment on programme capability and capacity, including the governance structure.	March 2026	Refreshed Programmatic Establishment	Green
Gateway 0/2: Delivery Strategy	This review focuses on this revised Detailed Business Case (DBC). The aim is to ascertain that the acquisition and delivery strategy are appropriate	May 2026	Revised Detailed Business Case for	Amber/Green

[13] The Programme Assurance Engagement Schedule illustrates the completed major assurance activities, as well as those scheduled and planned to date. The Establishment Phase of FTSU Programme will inform future assurance needs and planning, including the onboarding of an independent Assurance Partner.

Engagement	Purpose	Timing	Key Milestone	Status/ Result
	for the desired business change, and that implementation plans are in place.		Tranche 1-2 (DBC)	
Scheduled and Planned Assurance Engagements				
s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]				
Gateway 0/3 Investment Decision	This review focuses on the Approval to Deliver. The review takes place before the agency seeks approval to commence delivery.	June 2027	Approval To Deliver	Planned

Table 17: Extract of Major Assurance Engagements

Assurance action management and continuous improvement

The Programme is committed to constructive engagement with all assurance activities. When independent or internal assurance reviews yield findings, the PMO tracks and implements all recommendations through a rigorous Agreed Actions Management process. Progress is reported to the Programme Director and Steering Committee until formally closed.

Furthermore, insights derived from these assurance engagements are captured in a centralised Lessons Learned Register governed by the Programme Lessons Learned Framework. This framework extends beyond internal programme reflections to take learnings from other initiatives within Oranga Tamariki, and relevant digital delivery programmes across the public sector and other jurisdictions. This ensures that emerging lessons are continuously incorporated into programme artefacts and future assurance planning.

This continuous learning loop is further reinforced by the Programme Risk and Issue Management Framework and the Quality Management Plan and Standard. Both frameworks act as active triggers for self-learning and proactive course correction, ensuring that identified risks and quality matters drive immediate process improvements. Together, these interconnected frameworks complete a robust and mature programme control environment.

As the Programme transitions out of procurement and into the Establishment and Design Phases, it is acknowledged that this control environment will naturally evolve. Planned future updates and continuous improvements to programmatics will be mutually agreed upon with the incoming Implementation & Support Partner. This ensures integrated ways

of working with the vendor(s) and establishes a unified FTSU approach to assurance and quality as the delivery phase commences and progresses.

Delivery and implementation planning

Programme delivery methodology

The overall programme will be governed using Managing Successful Programmes (MSP) principles, providing the structure, controls, and assurance required for a high-risk, complex investment. Within this framework, delivery will also utilise aspects of an adapted Scaled Agile Framework (SAFe) and iterative delivery principles – this is largely to assist with break down and completion of work within the Design and Implementation phases, but will not involve incremental production releases. This approach is proposed as it supports coordination across multiple delivery and specialist teams, alignment to business priorities, and regular interrogation for improvement opportunities.

While there will be the presence of agile principles and methods, it is recognised that waterfall methods will also be required for specific components of delivery, including (but not limited to) procurement, regulatory assurance, architectural foundations, and transition activities. This hybrid approach ensures the programme remains pragmatic and fit for purpose.

To successfully integrate agile, waterfall, and programme management methods, the following considerations will be applied throughout delivery:

- **Governance:** clearly defined decision rights and tolerances, with empowered roles to enable timely decision-making while maintaining appropriate programme controls.
- **Design decisioning:** utilising out-of-the-box functionality first and having strong governance and frameworks for design decision-making on configuration and customisation.
- **Planning and execution cadence:** short, time-boxed iterations delivered within defined programme phases, supported by a clear programme blueprint to maintain line of sight to agreed plans, outcomes, benefits, and funding approvals.
- **Organisational readiness:** recognising that iterative delivery and ways of working require both cultural and operational adaptation, and ensuring the organisation remains capable of supporting sustained delivery at pace.
- **Collaboration:** a deliberate balance between programme management disciplines and agile principles, supported by strong collaboration and knowledge sharing across delivery teams, product owners, and programme leadership.

This adapted delivery approach reduces delivery risk by providing flexibility to respond to change, while retaining sufficient upfront planning and design to manage dependencies and assurance expectations. It enables Oranga Tamariki to focus on delivering incremental value and practice outcomes, while retaining the ability to adjust scope, sequencing, and priorities in response to changing policy direction, Government priorities, or investment constraints.

The final delivery approach may change as this will be developed in conjunction with the implementation partner during completion of the Ways of Working work package in the Establishment Phase.

Programme approach

The new functionality will be delivered through a ten-year programme, the first four years have been completed through internal business planning and has tested processes and prototyped in preparation for Implementation. This has also involved the procurement process to identify the Technology Platform and Implementation & Support Partner.

The figure below sets out the proposed approach to implementing and embedding the new tools. It shows that this work will be delivered for Tranche 1-2 and the proposed timeline for Tranche 3 (subject to a separate DBC).

s9(2)(b)(ii), s9(2)(f)(iv)



Delivery of the programme, as depicted, has been broken into two swim lanes.

- **FTSU Solution** covers the delivery of the programme objectives across the 3 tranches incorporating the work of the Product, Design and Change workstream and the Technology workstream.
- **Kaimahi Change Experience** shows how the changes are to be packaged and rolled out to the workforce including early delivery of targeted practice enhancements and involvement in the new case management system design and experiencing learning and training in the new system.

Implementation plan

The table below outlines the key phases, activities, expected timings and dependencies for the Programme. These will be further defined after the Establishment and Design Phases are complete and confirmed as part of the Approval to Deliver in mid 2027.

Phase	Key Activities	Timing	Dependencies	Responsible
Tranche 1-2				
Tranche1-2 Requirements	Defining scope at a functional level An assessment of 'product fit' during procurement activities	May 2026 – Mar 2027		PD&C Workstream lead
Tranche 1-2 Establishment Phase	Establishing Ways of Working, Governance controls & assurance	Nov – Dec 2026	CE approve contract execution & MSA	Programme Director
Tranche 1-2 Design	Design to support delivery of Tranche 1-2 scope	Jan – Jun 2027		Technology Workstream/ PD&C Workstream leads
Tranche 1-2 Development & Implementation	Development and Implementation	Jul 2027 – Jun 2029	Government approval to deliver	Technology Workstream lead
Data migration, integration and EDAP	Ensuring data is ready to be migrated and carrying out this activity	Jul 2027 – Mar 2029	Government approval to deliver	Technology Workstream lead
Tranche 1-2 National Rollout	Go live rollout of solution for Tranche 1-2	Jul - Dec 2029	Authority to Operate and Certification & Accreditation	Technology Workstream/ PD&C Workstream leads
Tranche 1-2 Decommissioning	s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]	Sep 2029 – Mar 2030		Technology Workstream lead
Tranche 3 (subject to separate Detailed Business Case)				
Tranche 3 Requirements, Design, Development	Design to support delivery of Tranche 3 scope Development and Implementation	Jul 2029 – Jun 2031		Technology Workstream/ PD&C Workstream leads
Tranche 3 National Rollout	Go live rollout of solution for Tranche 3	Jul – Dec 2031		Technology Workstream/ PD&C Workstream leads

Phase	Key Activities	Timing	Dependencies	Responsible
Tranche 3 Decommissioning	s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]	Sep 2031 – Mar 2032		Technology Workstream lead
Close out phase	Completion of programme close out activities.	Feb 2032 – Jun 2032		Programme Director

Table 18: High-Level Implementation Plan

Notes:

- Some aspects of pre-work for the establishment phase and targeted practice enhancements have commenced.
- Change-related activities and timing have been pulled into a standalone summary below and are not duplicated in this summary table.
- Dates will be confirmed further after the Establishment and Design Phases are completed.

Off ramps

The tranche approach allows deliberate stage-gated decisions which are built into the Programme as follows:

1. **Gate 1**: Following the completion of the Design Phase, the Approval to Deliver stage in mid 2027 will seek Government approvals to proceed to the Implementation Phase.
2. **Gate 2:** At the end of Tranche 1-2, a further stage-gate exists to seek funding to deliver Tranche 3.

At the end of Tranche 1-2 there could be a stop/pause decision which, if taken, would still mean most of the value would have been delivered. Tranche 1-2 delivers the most value for internal users because they implement all functions in CYRAS and s9(2)(b)(ii) and retire the CYRAS system.

Tranche 3 delivers the most value to external users (Partners and relevant agencies) and delivers the ability to retire the remaining frontline systems generating a financial savin g and the ability to realise the remaining benefit for Partners. s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]

Recent Government decisions have been made to transfer Strengthening Families to the Whānau Ora Commissioning Agencies (via Te Puni Kōkiri) and the transfer of Family Start to the Social Investment Agency. This would leave one current partnering system in scope for Tranche 3 dependent on these transfer processes, noting that Oranga Tamariki is progressing significant work in the approach to partnering and the future DBC would provide further clarity around partnering technology system needs.

Establishment and design phases

The purpose of the Establishment Phase is to address the foundational activities that will enable Oranga Tamariki, the FTSU Programme, the Platform and the I&S Partner to successfully deliver the required outcomes.

Following this, the Design Phase will undertake detailed design and planning prior to Implementation beginning.

Each phase has clearly defined entry and exit criteria that are agreed prior to the commencement of a phase. The purpose of this is to ensure that the scope of delivery within a phase remains clear and that phases do not blend into each other.

A pre-Establishment Phase is underway which includes the drafting of strategy and approach documents to support future design. This also includes development of current state processes, production of architecture documents, and commencing the detailed business requirements activity (which completes at the end of the Establishment Phase). Work is also underway to identify and scope Targeted Practice Enhancements as early deliverables within the current platform that can transition to the future state platform. These offer early improvements to kaimahi, children and families and will offer 'proof of concept' opportunities to test change and implementation approaches. These activities will build early confidence in the FTSU programme's delivery cadence and ensure that the FTSU Programme is well placed once procurement activity is completed; and the engagement with the successful vendor in the Establishment Phase can commence without delay.

This will then be followed by the Establishment Phase which will ensure that the programme is set up for success by ensuring that the following outcomes are met:

- **Delivery Model** - agree the 'ways of working' between Oranga Tamariki and the I&S Partner. Includes defining governance structures, communication approach, decision-making processes and roles and responsibilities, with alignment to Oranga Tamariki culture and values as a key consideration.
- **Delivery Methodology** - agree delivery methodology, cadences, escalation paths and a roadmap of milestones for the Design Phase.
- **Tools & Templates** - agree the tools to be used in the FTSU Programme and standard templates.
- **Onboarding Readiness** - vetting and induction of partner(s) team resources required for completion of Design Phase activities.
- **Design Phase Statement of Work** - agree the Design Phase Statement of Work between Oranga Tamariki and the I&S Partner (including commercials).

This will then be followed by the Design Phase**,** ensuring that the following outcomes are met:

- **Future State Process & Detailed Requirements** - current state process walkthroughs with I&S Partner and future state process agreed (confirming configuration vs customisation). Product familiarisation sessions to be held with a focus on identification of areas where customisation may be required. Detailed requirements developed and agreed with vendor to inform the build phase.
- **Architecture and technical foundations** - validate target architecture approach, define integration strategy, validate non-functional requirements. Design of access control, repositories, Continuous Improvement/Continuous Development (CI/CD) pipelines, and baseline security controls.
- **Security, Privacy, and Compliance** - initial Security Risks Assessment (SRA) and baseline of controls required to mitigate risks. Input into establishment of any initial environments (Certification & Accreditation).

- **Environments, Access, and DevOps foundations** - define strategies that contribute to the environmental foundations.
- **Data and migration foundations** - Data Strategy, confirming data sources likely to be in scope for delivery, data cleansing, mapping approach, migration tooling, reconciliation, and a phased migration/cutover approach.
- **Testing and quality strategy** – Test Strategy including environments data requirements, entry/exit criteria, defect triage, tools and User Acceptance Testing (UAT) approach.
- **Change, training, communications and readiness foundations** - includes high level impact assessment, communications plan, training approach, stakeholder engagement plan.
- **Go Live & Support (Hypercare and ongoing) foundations** - planning and strategies for go-live/support. Outline intended cutover approach, what initial support looks like (hypercare) and draft support and transition model.
- **Implementation Phase Statement of Work**: agree the Implementation Phase Statement of Work between Oranga Tamariki and the I&S Partner (including commercials).

At the end of the Establishment and Design phases, the Implementation Phase ensures that the scope defined within the design phase is delivered. During this phase, plans are executed to deliver the solution:

- Delivering key technical components, including software development, system configuration, infrastructure setup, data migration.
- Validates the solution through testing and user acceptance activities.
- Concludes with deployment to the live environment, user training and transition to operational support

Capability and capacity to deliver

The Treasury Targeted Investment Review (TIR), completed in May 2025, highlighted:

> *"Oranga Tamariki will require an 'industrial strength' team with leadership and experience to deliver the size and complexity of FTSU. For Stage 2 procurement to be successful, and to minimise implementation risk, the current vacancies must be filled at pace and the mobilisation of three programme dedicated leadership roles accelerated; It is critical that FTSU gets the 'aces in their places' in parallel and where possible, ahead of the vacancies that will make up their teams remaining capability is a priority focus."*

Confidence in the programme's capacity and capability to deliver has grown since the approval of the previous DBC and the TIR with significant effort has been put into ensuring the programme has secured appropriately skilled and experienced personnel. An Independent Quality Assurance review, completed in March 2026, emphasised this level of confidence:

> *"The programme is adequately resourced for the current phase, having established a core team with diverse capabilities. The dedicated core team will help establish continuity and build Oranga Tamariki's institutional knowledge, which is important for a multi-year programme such as this. The team includes a mix of experienced Oranga Tamariki subject matter experts and specialised contractors."*

and;

"The SRO and Executive Sponsor have provided consistent and stable leadership during a period of organisational instability. The programme leadership team, including the Programme Director and recent recruits, has brought additional expertise, lifted programme maturity, and built confidence across governance and second line support function."

Significant attention has also been made in ensuring the required level of governance membership, including external Steering Committee members. External Steering Group members have affirmed approaches being taken by the programme consistently accord with best practice.

At a micro level, the programme has also evidenced delivery capability across the design, development and implementation cycle through the recent successful release of a digitised All About Me Plan. This was delivered on time, within budget and has been received well by kaimahi. Lessons learnt from this, and other planned Targeted Practice Enhancements, are of vital importance in strengthening the change capability of both the programme and the wider organisation ahead of the more intensive implementation of the full case management solution.

As the programme transitions to active delivery, extensive planning has been undertaken to identify the key resource groupings required to deliver the programme successfully, ensuring the appropriate capacity and capability are in place at each stage of delivery. These resource groupings reflect the specialist skills and roles required across the programme lifecycle and have been developed to support effective sequencing and dependency management.

Resource requirements have been modelled and forecast within the financial model, aligned to the financial year, to ensure affordability and consistency with funding profiles. This approach enables the programme to scale resources in line with delivery demand while maintaining robust financial control.

As of June 2026, the programme had 34 resources allocated and actively contributing to delivery. Resourcing is expected to increase as the programme progresses, peaking at approximately 107 FTE in FY28/29, before tapering as major delivery milestones are achieved and the programme transitions towards completion. **Appendix 6** contains a detailed resourcing view by role and financial year and the table below provides a summary of the resourcing profile.

Area	Current State	Gap / Risk
Overarching Programme Roles		
Senior Responsible Owner Programme Director Senior PMO Lead Procurement Specialist Assurance and Risk Lead Communication & Stakeholder Engagement Lead Senior PMO Scheduler	Most roles are in place.	No risk currently exists
Programme Delivery & Coordination		

Area	Current State	Gap / Risk
Programme Managers (Product Development & Change and Technology) Project Manager / Delivery Manager Implementation / Transition Lead Programme Coordinators	Most roles are in place.	To mitigate risk of non-delivery the Implementation/Transition Lead is to be employed six months prior to deployment.
Business Product Ownership		
Manager Practice Enablers / Product Manager Practice SMEs Senior Advisors Business Product Owner	Most roles are in place. Additional Practice SME roles to be filled for the Design phase.	Not filling the additional Practice SME roles would leave a significant gap. SMEs will be critical to describing how processes currently work, how any changes can be best implemented in the future, and with ensuring seamless engagement with non-programme experts in the organisation.
Technical Product Ownership		
Technical Product Owner Environment/Release Manager System Managers System Leads Technical Business Analyst Technical Integration Analyst Release Analyst Technology Solution Lead	Technical Product Owner in place now with remaining roles to be filled in the Implementation phase.	Not filling these roles would leave a gap with product ownership and management, however these are required toward the end-third of the Implementation Phase and into the post go live period.
Business Analysis		
Process Design and Business Analyst Lead Lead Business Analyst Senior Business Analysts Service Designers	Most roles are in place with remaining being actively recruited.	Most roles are in place and matching the cadence of business analysis activity. Limited risks currently exists however if remaining positions are not filled as expected, this could delay business analysis deliverables being completed as planned.
Change, Comms, Engagement and Training		
Content Writers Change and Organisation Readiness Lead Change Managers Change Analysts Training Lead Regional Engagement Lead Trainers	Some roles in place to match current change and communications deliverables. Most of the remaining roles will be recruited through the Implementation Phase to support change and training activity in line with the indicative delivery timeline.	Not filling these roles would impact on the quality of delivery of the changes to staff, however most of these roles are only required toward the middle of the Implementation Phase and into the post go live period.

Area	Current State	Gap / Risk
Architecture		
Programme Business Architect Programme Architect Enterprise Architect Solution Architect Portfolio Architect Integration Architect	Most roles are in place with Portfolio and Integration Architects to be appointed once Establishment Phase commences.	Not filling these roles would leave some gap around some technical aspects relating to how the final solution would be designed.
Testing		
Programme Test Lead Programme Test Manager Test Analysts	The Test Lead role will be filled following commencement of the Establishment phase. Test Analysts to be onboarded as required.	Not filling these roles would create delays around establishing the Test Strategy during the Design Phase and the progressing of Test Planning and test execution during the Implementation Phase (noting these would only be required from near the start of the Implementation Phase).
Data		
Data Lead Data Portfolio Architect Data Architect Data Release Engineer EDAP Platform Engineer EDAP Release Manager Data Product Owner Data Engineer Snr Data Analyst Reporting Specialist	The Data Lead is onboard. Additional roles will be filled once Establishment and Design phases commence.	Not filling these roles would create delays around progressing the data planning, cleansing, migration and reporting deliverables and activities.
Security & Privacy		
Security Consultant / Architect Privacy Consultant	Currently internal resources are being used to support.	To implement the 'by design' principles that ensure that Privacy and Security are designed throughout design and implementation, these roles will be contracted during the Establishment Phase.

Table 19: Capability and Capacity Summary

Change and engagement

One of the key success factors of the Programme will be effective change management. This section sets out planned change-related activities, linked to delivery. Full details are set out in the FTSU Programme's Change Strategy and Framework and Organisational Readiness Framework.

The table below outlines the key phases, activities, expected timings and responsibilities.

Focus Area (Phase)	Key Activity / Engagement	Timing	Responsibility
Phase 1: Change preparation	The FTSU Change Management Strategy and Framework The FTSU Organisational Readiness Framework (including measures and reporting approach) Programme Communications Plan Programme Stakeholder Engagement Plan Change Impact Assessments Establish Change Governance (as required)	Sep 2026 – Jun 2027	Programme Manager Product Design and Change Change and Organisational Readiness Lead
Phase 2: Design and build – change alignment	Detailed Change Management Plan Updates to Change Impact Assessment Training Plan (incl. Learning Needs Analysis Stakeholder Engagement and Governance inclusion in design decision making Embed non programme users and stakeholders into design and UAT where appropriate	Jul 2027 – Jun 2029	Programme Manager Product Design and Change Change and Organisational Readiness Lead
Phase 3: Early establishment of change and readiness capability and capacity	Detailed Change Management Plan updates Activation of the Change Network, including set up of Regional Engagement Leads Structured communications to maintain awareness and build capability Role-based training design and development commences Readiness tracking begins and regular cadence of reporting established Hypercare model definition (may be able to start earlier)	Mar 2028 – May 2029	SRO Programme Manager Product Design and Change Change and Organisational Readiness Lead
Phase 4: Accelerated change and evidence-based readiness	Evidence from non-programme user UAT results	May – Dec 2029	SRO Programme Director

Focus Area (Phase)	Key Activity / Engagement	Timing	Responsibility
	Deliver training (at scale) with tracked completion and competency Execute readiness assessments Targeted problem solving and intervention (e.g. low readiness, resistant groups) Readiness reporting to support go-live decision making		Programme Manager Product Design and Change Change and Organisational Readiness Lead
Phase 5: Cutover, go-live, and hypercare – rapidly stabilise operations and user behaviour	Full go-live readiness assessment and reporting Cutover communications Hypercare Model activation Define and activate daily operational rhythm (e.g. stand ups) Engagement and communications mechanism for leaders with direct Sponsor support.	Sep 2029 – Mar 2030	Chief Executive and Te Riu Sponsor SRO Programme Director Programme Manager Product Design and Change Change and Organisational Readiness Lead
Phase 6: Embed, measure, and optimise	Transition of programme delivery into 'business as usual' Measurement of adoption, operational performance to confirm realisation Track metrics outlined in Benefits Realisation Plan Targeted communications for reinforcement	Mar 2030 onwards	Sponsor SRO Programme Manager Product Design and Change Change and Organisational Readiness Lead

Table 20: High-level Change Plan

Notes:

- Dates here align with the Implementation Plan.
- Dates will be confirmed further after the Establishment and Design Phases are completed.
- Phases 1-3 sets the foundation for change and therefore only phases 4-6 would be required and repeated for a Tranche 3 implementation.

Who is directly impacted by the change (users)

Approximately 4,500 internal users and some external users will be impacted by the change in their day-to-day mahi. The table below sets out the frontline technology systems user groups who are directly impacted by the change.

Stakeholders in this group are expected to be ready, willing and able to adopt the new system that underpins the new ways of working. Within Oranga Tamariki the frontline workforce is highly motivated to transition to systems that better support their work.

System User/ Audience	Engagement Style	Training Needs	Day-to-day Interest
Operational Leaders e.g., Managers / Supervisors / Team Leaders / Case Leaders	Collaborate	M-H	M-H
Frontline staff from Tamariki and Whānau Services, Youth Justice Services and Residential Care (including Care and Protection (C&P) residences, Youth Justice residences), Adoptions, Caregiver Recruitment and Support, and Transition Support Services	Collaborate	H	H
Enabling staff e.g., Chief Social Worker Professional Practice Group, System Leadership (including Legal, Policy, Data)	Involve	M	L
Consumers / Data and Information users e.g., Data Solutions, External Monitoring, Practice Quality, and Customer Information Requests	Involve	H	M
Partners/Contracted Service Providers who will use the new frontline technology systems, e.g.: • Iwi/Māori Organisations • Community groups • Service Providers	Empower	M	L
VOYCE - Whakarongo Mai & Advisory Groups Tamariki & Rangatahi Whānau	Empower	L	L

Table 21: System user engagement groups

The level of impact / interest in the changes along with the level of influence / accountability for the work will determine the level of communications, engagement, training, and support required. both for those impacted by the changes, and those who will be needed to support the changes.

Stakeholder engagement and communications

Communications and engagement are the key mechanism to create awareness of the FTSU Programme and ensure key stakeholders feel engaged, understand how changes affect them, and what support is available during and after the change.

Communications can mitigate information gaps or misinformation that could adversely impact change and adoption. Separate communications and engagement plans have been developed to support the change strategy. This includes a high-level analysis of Stakeholders and the approach for communications and engagement with each stakeholder group. These plans will be reviewed throughout the programme.

Stakeholder engagement needs to be balanced with the business driver, to have minimum disruption to core business. For this reason, our approach will be to:

- Provide opportunities for internal and external stakeholders to influence and shape the way the new frontline technology systems will work.

- Ensure the correct stakeholders are involved at the right time in the process.
- Ensure that engagement activities are coordinated across different child focused government agencies supported by central agencies.
- Ensure the relationship owners are equipped with the right tools and materials to effectively manage stakeholder group(s).
- Co-ordinate and align stakeholder engagement with other large projects.

The building of stakeholder relationships started during high level requirements gathering and the development and build of Te Aronga (digitised All About Me Plan), and it is essential that these relationships endure and evolve through the design, build, implementation and post implementation.

A key stakeholder group are Māori who are present across the full range of stakeholders listed. It is imperative that engagement with Māori and Pacific Partners is done in a culturally sensitive way using a kaupapa approach to ensure that any planned initiatives are agreed upfront and are well-received by Māori and Pacific Partners.

Working with other agencies

Where appropriate the FTSU Programme will work with other digital enablement programmes and projects underway across the children's agencies that will give effect to the legislative requirements in the Children's Act. This means that the FTSU Programme will need to be flexible and responsive to changing needs. The focus will be on ensuring those systems can receive information and data from Oranga Tamariki and Oranga Tamariki can receive information and data from them.

Consideration has been given to how this programme can give effect to the commitments made in 2024 and continue to work collaboratively with other Government agencies to develop and reuse technology-agnostic patterns (common functions or ways of working such as payments, case planning and identity verification that will likely be required by multiple agencies).

Sharing of technology-agnostic patterns can reduce the amount of time required to complete service design, gather requirements, and therefore offset the effort required for technical design steps. This would mean that solutions developed within the programme will both draw from and contribute to technology solutions across other government agencies.

In particular, there is an agreement between the Ministry for Social Development’s (MSD) transformation programme (Services for the Future) and Oranga Tamariki (noting each programme is at a different delivery phase) to:

- Commit to re-use government services and patterns where possible.
- Contribute to all of Government patterns, knowledge, and standards by engaging directly with Government Enterprise Architecture for New Zealand.
- Consider whether the development of payment related solutions for a social services context by MSD are of use to Oranga Tamariki at a later juncture in the FTSU Programme delivery.
- Explore the re-use of technology agnostic patterns developed by FTSU for aspects like assessment, plans and practice tools by MSD in development of its tiered service model.
- Share and align experience and service patterns where it makes sense to do so.

As the programme progresses past the procurement phase and into the design phase, the programme will be now able to progress the above elements in detail. As the design phase progresses, further engagement with Government Digital Delivery Agency (GDDA) will be progressed to demonstrate how cross-agency collaboration and reuse options are being carefully considered, before investment decisions are finalised.

Digital Government Target State

The GDDA has developed a Digital Government Target State which defines guiding principles that enable cohesive and efficient delivery of digital initiatives.

The programme is strongly aligned with the Digital Govenrment Target State and procurement principles, and that alignment has strengthened through the revised delivery approach. This involves taking a deliberate, risk-informed approach, prioritising system coherence, public value, and long-term sustainability.

Where alignment is staged, this reflects conscious delivery sequencing to ensure safe implementation in a high-risk, safety-critical environment.

The programme demonstrates strong alignment across the key principles, particularly in areas that are critical for long-term system value:

- **Joined-up government and system coherence** - Accelerated retirement of legacy platforms reduces fragmentation and improves system-wide integration.
- **Public value–driven investment** - Decisions are explicitly anchored in child safety, service reliability, and long-term sustainability, rather than agency preference.
- **Open, interoperable, and future-ready design** - API-led integration and a “configuration-first” approach support re-use and adaptability.
- **Cloud-first and modern platforms** - Use of commercial SaaS platforms aligned with Government Cloud First.
- **Data as a strategic asset** - Strong emphasis on data quality, migration, governance, and analytics capability.
- **Security, privacy, and resilience by design** - Privacy-by-design, New Zealand Information Security Manual (NZISM) compliance, and robust access controls embedded from the outset.

The revised approach is not only lower risk, but it is more consistent with the intent of the Digital Government Target State, particularly around simplification, cohesion, and long-term value.

The move to combined Tranche 1–2 delivery materially improves alignment with digital principles:

- Reduces duplication and technical complexity by eliminating prolonged co-existence.
- Accelerates transition to a simplified digital estate.
- Improves whole-of-life cost efficiency and sustainability.
- Enables earlier realisation of system-wide benefits.

Investment decisions are evidence-led, risk-informed, and outcome-focused, demonstrating a mature application of the Digital Investment Principles. The programme reflects a high level of maturity in digital investment discipline:

- Structured around Better Business Case principles.
- Strong value-for-money focus (whole-of-life, not just upfront cost).
- Explicit trade-offs between risk, cost, and outcomes.
- Clear alignment between investment decisions and service outcomes.

The procurement approach has increased confidence in both solution suitability and deliverability, while ensuring transparency, fairness, and value for money.

The procurement model demonstrates best practice alignment:

- Open market, competitive procurement with strong market engagement.
- Two-stage approach (platform then partner) to ensure optimal solution fit and delivery capability.
- Independent probity oversight and assurance.
- Focus on proven platforms ("buy not build") and long-term adaptability.
- Clear emphasis on value, capability, and delivery confidence.

Any areas of "medium" alignment are intentional and well-managed. These are sequencing decisions, not gaps — ensuring alignment is achieved sustainably rather than prematurely.

Area	Alignment
Modular / agile delivery	Adapted to balance agility with statutory risk, assurance, and safety-critical delivery.
Reuse across government	Strong intent and active collaboration underway, with further reuse enabled post-foundation delivery.
Partner integration	Phased to manage risk and ensure safe, stable rollout.

Table 22: Medium Alignment to Digital Government Target State

Adherence to the Digital Government Target State is addressed throughout this business case and assessed in full in **Appendix 2**.

Managing privacy

The new frontline technology system will enable highly sensitive data about children and their family members to be shared with a range of government and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and will offer greater controls and protections than current systems allow. The approach will be focused on taking a best practice approach to upholding privacy and security, whilst recognising that appropriately sharing information (both internally and externally) is intrinsic to the obligations Oranga Tamariki has to child safety and public accountability.

In 2020, it became compulsory for serious privacy breaches to be notified to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner's OPC. In 2024, following a number of breaches requiring reporting, Oranga Tamariki undertook a Privacy Review of its own volition. The OPC also issued a compliance notice. Oranga Tamariki has since put in place a plan to respond to the range of identified systemic issues that have contributed to these privacy breaches, including building a privacy culture, better management and disposal of physical documents and strengthening processes, practice and policy. In some cases, technology aspects have contributed to privacy breaches with a particular contemporary issue being the management of third party access.

The FTSU programme is well positioned to contribute to the strengthening of privacy practices and insights from the privacy review and the associated work programme will be used to inform the design of the new frontline technology systems. The privacy review report highlighted the following recommendations that will be relevant to the FTSU Programme:

- Access to the system should be limited to those who need it, all staff should not be able to see all children, just those they need to. The same applies to Partners and families. This would restrict open access to information by applying technological controls such as permission access, confidential file locks and graduated access to individual files.
- Enable the monitoring of access to personal information to pick up on unauthorised access and internal and external user browsing.
- Ensure data is available to support privacy reporting.
- Privacy controls to be incorporated as an inherent feature of systems and processes.
- Engage with Māori stakeholders to confirm that systems (and processes) are aligned with the concepts of mana and tikanga.
- Ensure that contracts and other arrangements with third parties include appropriate protections and safeguards, and relationships with key stakeholders with whom personal information is shared should be the subject of regular oversight.
- Processes should be designed to automatically apply retention periods to defined categories of information in a manner that is consistent and easy to understand.
- Upskill staff in basic computer skills and encourage all staff to use digital records.

Figure 12 sets out indicative data flows between various system users and data users. It shows where data about the children is being passed within Oranga Tamariki, between other government agencies and to private individuals and external Partners. The black system icon shows that the entity accesses data directly from the system.




Figure 11: Indicative data flows

A Brief Privacy Analysis (BPA) for the FTSU Programme has been undertaken (refer **Appendix 7**). That BPA has helped to find, assess and resolve any identified privacy risks arising from collecting, using and sharing personal information. The full Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA) will be undertaken and signed-off closer to the Design phase of the programme. The FTSU Programme will adopt the privacy-by-design methodology. This means privacy will be embedded within the FTSU Programme and help meet the Government Chief Privacy Officer's core expectations. PIA checks will be done at key points in the process - specifically through design, development and testing.

The FTSU Programme will ensure any use of real data during development and testing has the appropriate access and anonymisation applied to protect the information. Special emphasis will be placed on ensuring privacy protection throughout the development and testing process, prior to the system becoming operational.

Risk management

Risk and issue management framework

The FTSU Programme operates a mature, active control environment governed by the established Programme Risk and Issue Management Framework, fully aligned with the Oranga Tamariki Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Framework. This framework ensures that all delivery risks are identified, categorised, and treated, while active issues are surfaced and resolved without delay.

Risk management within the FTSU Programme is an active driver of delivery strategy, structured across a two-tier approach:

- **Strategic Programme Risk:** High-level risks with broader impacts, across business change, procurement, workforce capacity, and technology delivery are managed via the Master Programme Strategic Risk Register.

- **Operational Delivery Risk:** Managed at the workstream level following agile principles. Delivery risks are tracked continuously in JIRA and reviewed fortnightly by Workstreams to ensure mitigations are effective and actionable.

Risk monitoring and escalation pathways

To foster a transparent, open, and proactive risk culture, the programme has established a rigorous, multi-layered cadence for risk monitoring and reporting. This ensures risks are continually tested and surfaced across all levels of the programme:

- **Fortnightly:** Workstream-level operational risk discussions are held to identify, treat, and mitigate tactical delivery risks before they escalate.
- **Monthly:** A dedicated programme leadership risk workshop is conducted to review the aggregate risk landscape, calibrate risk ratings, and ensure mitigations remain effective.
- **Monthly Reporting:** The formal Programme Status Report submitted to the FTSU Steering Committee maintains comprehensive visibility of *all* Key Strategic Risks, ensuring the governance board always has visibility of the programme's risk profile.
- **Quarterly Deep Dive:** The Steering Committee conducts a dedicated Strategic Risk Deep Dive to intensely interrogate the strategic risk landscape and test mitigations.

These monitoring forums are underpinned by predefined escalation pathways to ensure timely executive decision-making. While the standard reporting cadence provides ongoing visibility, any operational risk that rapidly escalates in severity, or any strategic risk that breaches acceptable thresholds, triggers immediate, out-of-cycle escalation to the Programme Director, Senior Responsible Owner, Executive Sponsor and Steering Committee when required.

Furthermore, should a Very High risk exceed programme tolerances, fundamentally threaten the critical path, or require enterprise-level intervention, it is escalated directly to Te Riu (Executive Leadership Team) via standard portfolio reporting. Additional reporting by the Executive Sponsor to the Chief Executive occurs on a monthly basis and the two independent Steering Group members are available to the Executive Sponsor and Chief Executive for additional independent executive advice when requested.

Issue management and resolution strategy

While risks represent potential future impacts, issues are realised events that demand immediate intervention. The programme distinguishes itself through a highly proactive, resolution-oriented approach to Issue Management:

- **Immediate Escalation:** Unlike risks, which may follow regular reporting cadences, high-impact issues bypass standard cycles. They require immediate escalation to the PMO and Programme Director to initiate rapid triaging.
- **No-Blame Culture:** To ensure issues are surfaced the moment they arise rather than hidden, the programme fosters a strict "no-blame" reporting culture. The focus is entirely on transparency and psychological safety.

- **Resolution-Oriented Action:** Once an issue is escalated, it is assigned a dedicated resolution owner. The governance focus shifts immediately from analysis to executing corrective actions, unblocking workstreams, and minimising impact on the delivery schedule.

Top programme-level risks

The following table outlines the most material Strategic and Delivery risks currently facing the Programme, directly reflecting the top-rated exposures from the Master Programme Strategic Risk Register.

This table outlines risks that carry a Current Risk Rating of **VERY HIGH**. Further to the comparative risk analysis detailed within the Economic Case, these top-tier risks echo the fundamental strategic trade-offs inherent in the delivery pathways and formed part of the methodology to assess the full solution. This trade-off is most relevant when weighing the chronic pressures on organisational Change Capacity and ongoing operational disruptions (arising from prolonged co-existence) against the acute threats arising from a consolidated cutover.

A comprehensive view of all current programme risks is maintained in the Master Programme Strategic Risk Register.

Risk Description	Impact	Risk Mitigations	Owner
Business Change Fatigue & Readiness Gap IF business users experience change fatigue and lack adequate readiness and change support	THEN system adoption will be slow and resistance will rise, RESULTING IN sub-optimal service delivery to children and their families, delayed benefits realisation, and reputational damage.	• Establish a dedicated Change function. • Provide dedicated change support for adoption to alleviate pressure on frontline leaders.	Programme Manager, Product Design and Change
Organisational Capacity to Lead Change IF our front-line people leaders do not have the capacity or leaders' support to help embed technology changes	THEN FTSU Programme outcomes will be inconsistently realised, RESULTING IN sub-optimal service delivery to children and their families, system adoption challenges, and deviation from the Practice Approach	• Refresh the overarching Change Strategy. • Resource the Programme to actively deliver change, ensuring frontline leaders only need to enable rather than execute change tasks. • Use of Implementation and Support partners with a strong change capability to augment our existing change practices to build long term enhanced change practices and frameworks to support delivery. • Leverage familiar training patterns to simplify the championing process.	Programme Manager, Product Design and Change
Uncoordinated Change Systems IF business-as-usual (BAU) teams or other initiatives make	THEN the FTSU Programme's baseline requirements, integration points, and data	• Formalise approaches from All About Me Plan (AAMP) into long-term procedures for FTSU change control.	Programme Manager, Product Design and Change

Risk Description	Impact	Risk Mitigations	Owner
uncoordinated changes to the current systems, business processes, or the operating model	assumptions will be invalidated, RESULTING IN last-minute rework, schedule slippage, budget overrun, and risk of critical functionality being misaligned.	• Implement strict, coordinated emergency change processes (e.g., code freezes). • Share roadmap with governance forums via standing CTO updates at Steering Committee.	
Cutover Risk IF the technical and operational transition from legacy systems to the new platform is poorly executed during the cutover window	THEN critical workflows or data synchronisation will fail, RESULTING IN severe service outages and compromised casework capabilities	• Execute extensive testing and 'dry-runs' prior to go-live. • Establish robust rollback protocols and contingency systems. • Provision dedicated, high-capacity hyper-care support immediately following release(s).	Programme Manager, Technology Delivery
Sustained Maintenance Burden IF Oranga Tamariki is forced to operate across fragmented new and legacy platforms for an extended period	THEN the ongoing BAU burden for system maintenance, C&As, dual testing cycles, and upgrades will compound, RESULTING IN severely depleted operational capacity and escalating technical maintenance costs	• Pivot to combined Tranche 1-2 scope delivery to eliminate the requirement for complex, prolonged co-existence. • Active management of decommissioning schedules. • Ring-fence dedicated operational resources for BAU maintenance.	Programme Director
Design Drift & Customisation Spread IF the programme fails to exercise strict governance over system configuration	THEN the new platform will suffer from design drift and customisation spread, RESULTING IN heavily modified out-of-the-box functionality,	• Strict architectural oversight via the FDRG and TAA. • Firm commitment to adapting business practices to Out-Of-The-Box (OOTB) capabilities wherever possible.	Programme Manager, Technology Delivery
Data Quality Uncertainties IF the complexity and effort required to manage the impacts of existing data quality issues on the FTSU Programme are unclear or greater than anticipated,	THEN dependent workstreams and critical decisions on sequencing, data migration and co-existence strategy will stall or rely on unvalidated assumptions, RESULTING IN extended timelines, unbudgeted remediation costs, and erosion of programme value from persistent data-integrity failures.	• Execute early data quality analysis. • Foundational first-line controls for managing legacy information are defined within the FTSU Data Cleansing Approach and the FTSU Data Migration Approach. • Active engagement and alignment with the Enterprise Data Governance Group.	Programme Manager, Technology Delivery

Table 23: Key Programme Risks

Benefits management

A Benefits Realisation Plan has been developed for the Programme. Its purpose is to describe in detail how the Programme intends to manage and track the realisation of benefits.
The Benefits Realisation Plan documents the following for each benefit:

- Benefit descriptions.
- Benefit owners.
- Benefits (with weightings).
- Measure descriptions.
- Measure owners.
- Forecasted realisation dates.
- Assumptions.
- Dependencies.

The table below summarises the seven benefits and the benefit owners.

Benefit	Benefit Owner/s
Benefit 1 - Improved tamariki and rangatahi outcomes *Measure- Tamariki / rangatahi access to information (uptake/usage)*	Chief Social Worker and DCE Professional Practice DCE Tamariki and Whānau Services
Benefit 2 - Improved collaboration with whānau *Measure - Whānau access to information (uptake/usage)*	DCE Tamariki and Whānau Services DCE Youth Justice Services and Residential Care
Benefit 3 - Improved collaboration with children's system partners and caregivers *Measure - Partner agencies/caregiver access to information (uptake/usage)*	DCE Tamariki and Whānau Services DCE Enabling Communities and Investment
Benefit 4 - Improved compliance *Measure - Reporting/auditability (availability of reporting)*	DCE System Leadership
Benefit 5 - Efficiency savings *Measure - Reduced maintenance and operating $ (including licence costs)*	Chief Technology Officer
Benefit 6 - Kaimahi ora *Measure - Kaimahi perception of information quality/availability/useability* *Measure - Reduced administrative burden (time/motion study)*	Chief Social Worker and DCE Professional Practice
Benefit 7 - Reduced technology risk *Measure - Decreased time/cost to modify the system in response to policy or legislative change*	DCE Tamariki and Whānau Services DCE Youth Justice Services and Residential Care

Table 24: Benefit Profiles (Summary)

The benefits have been designed to reflect the impact of the changes implemented through the programme and to inform assessment of delivery success. They represent key drivers that enable wider organisational and system change and are dependent on how the system is used in future to realise positive, longer-term social outcomes.

To inform baseline measures, a time-and-motion study was undertaken in 2025. The purpose of this study was to test assumptions about potential versus actual time savings that could be realised by staff as a result of the proposed changes. For example, a current working assumption is that Te Aronga (the new All About Me Plan) could save a social worker up to four hours each time a new plan for a child is created.

Not all benefits are efficiency-related. Capturing experiential benefits, through mechanisms such as service user surveys, will also be critical in assessing whether the benefits identified in the Strategic and Economic Cases are being realised. Improvements to practice quality (such as better assessments and plans) will be able to be evidenced through regular quality assurance and case file review undertaken by the Chief Social Worker's office. As the programme progresses, further benefits may be identified and added to the plan. They will be assessed by determining the extent to which improvements delivered through the FTSU Programme contribute to enhanced performance reporting, quality assurance, continuous improvement, and the organisation's ability to meet its monitoring obligations, including those arising from the Care Standards.

NEXT STEPS

What is authorised and what remains conditional

This DBC is seeking approval to proceed with the revised implementation approach as outlined by combining Tranche 1-2 into a single implementation.

The approval of this DBC for Tranche 1-2 will authorise the following:

- Completion of the final assessment to determine which technology platform offers the highest level of deliverability, the best overall value for money and lowest acceptable risk to Oranga Tamariki, whilst balancing alignment to the Digital Government Target State.
- Finalisation of commercial and legal negotiations to agree the Master Services Agreement (MSA) with the selected technology platform and implementation partner.
- Seek Joint Ministers approval to execute the MSA and to then subsequently execute the Statement of Works for the Establishment Phase and Design Phases.
- Approval to progress the Establishment and Design phases within the existing funding allocation (to the extent that these activities do not move beyond the Approval to Deliver or s9(2)(b)(ii)).

This approval does not authorise commencement of the Tranche 1-2 implementation phase.

s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

Escalation and return triggers

An Approval to Deliver process in mid 2027 to Joint Ministers would be undertaken once the Design phase is complete and s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]. This would seek approval to proceed to the Implementation phase.

Immediate actions following approval

Following approval of the Detailed Business Case for T1-2, the table below summaries the key actions to be progressed.

Focus Area	Next Step / Action	Timing / Trigger	Responsibility
s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]			

Focus Area	Next Step / Action	Timing / Trigger	Responsibility
	s9(2)(b)(ii) [redacted]		
Commercial and legal negotiations	Complete commercial and legal negotiations with preferred technology supplier.	Jun-Sep 2027	Programme Director
Commercial Settings	Contract Approval (MSA) Agree Statement of Work Establishment Phase	Oct 2026	Programme Sponsor
Establishment Phase	Commence Establishment Phase Agree Statement of Work for Design Phase	Nov 2026 Dec 2026	Programme Director
Design Phase	Commence Design Phase Agree Statement of Work for Implementation Phase	Jan 2027 Jun 2027	Programme Director
Approval to Deliver	Gateway 3 Review Approval to Deliver Submitted	Jun 2026 Jun 2027	Programme Sponsor
Implementation Phase	Commence Implementation	Jul 2027	Programme Director

Table 25: Immediate actions following DBC approval

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Reviews and inquiries into Oranga Tamariki

This table includes relevant recommendations or commentary

Review/ Inquiry into Oranga Tamariki	Relevant Recommendations or Commentary
Investing in New Zealand's Children and their Families **Expert Panel report** **2015**	Agree to develop a new technology ecosystem to support the proposed operating model: Replacing the current case-management system CYRAS with a system that is child-centric, modern, highly usable, provides the right level of automation, and supports an evidence-based approach, a new sector-wide partner management system, a new high-trust information sharing system that is connected across agencies, Partners, families and caregivers, brokered by a Child Information Management system, with a consent-based approach, and an extended architecture that enables Partners to innovate and build their own systems (such as mobile apps) to use our services/data.
Ko te Wā Whakawhiti – the Māori-led inquiry **Whānau Ora Commissioning Agency** **2020**	Action point 2: A structural analysis and review of Oranga Tamariki systems, policies, processes, and practices: F) Review Oranga Tamariki case management H) Implement better data, monitoring and tracking systems including a registry of children/families in contact with Oranga Tamariki, improved transparency and families/hapū/iwi/community access to their data/information.
Te Kuku o te Manawa **The Office of the Children's Commissioner report** **2020**	4.3. Increase transparency and accountability by proactive release of aggregated data about their activities and their impacts on pēpi Māori and whānau, including inequities, using common statistical standards and practices. This needs to use timely, high quality ethnicity data, be designed with Māori, and comply with Māori data sovereignty principles.
He Pāharakeke, he Rito Whakakīkinga Whāruarua **Waitangi Tribunal Inquiry (WAI2915)** **2021**	Overall, it is necessary that Oranga Tamariki meet the six critical dimensions of data quality[14] so that data can be accessed and utilised appropriately across agencies… statistics provided by Oranga Tamariki fall well below the data quality standards.
Hipokingia ki te Kahu Aroha Kipokingia ki te Katoa (Te Kahu Aroha) **The Ministerial Advisory Board report** **2021**	Recommendation 6: That Oranga Tamariki builds its ability to be responsive to Partners and to community requests for the information needed in order to know what support families require and what resourcing will be required to support provision of this for as long as success takes. Recommendation 22: The organisation's performance monitoring framework should be enhanced to be more strongly aligned with a well-defined organisational strategy and vision. Recommendation 23: Improvements should be made to the availability, relevance, and range of data used for decision-making. Recommendation 24: The ongoing development of information infrastructure should be prioritised.

[14] The six critical dimensions were set by the Government Statistician in 2002.

Review/ Inquiry into Oranga Tamariki	Relevant Recommendations or Commentary
	Recommendation 25: Information sharing should be improved, taking into account the purpose and enabling functions of the Privacy Act 2020. This could include Oranga Tamariki and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner working together to ensure that Oranga Tamariki designs a future-proofed tikanga approach to sharing information with hapū, iwi, Māori collectives, and communities.
Independent Review of the Children's System Response to Abuse **Dame Karen Poutasi (DKP)** **2022**	iii. multi-agency teams working in communities in Partnership with iwi and NGOs [are] resourced and supported throughout the country to prevent and respond to harm. iv. Medical records held in different parts of the health sector should be linked to enable health professionals to view a complete picture of a child's medical history.
Practice review in relation to Malachi Subecz and his whānau **Chief Social Worker at Oranga Tamariki** **2022**	Recommendation: that as a matter of urgency Oranga Tamariki reiterates to all staff the requirements of the case recording policy and the need to record and action the voices of whānau and other people who make contact. Recommendation: that Oranga Tamariki progress the action within the Future Direction Plan to establish a national visibility model for caseload/workload management, that enables regular reporting and identifies gaps in capacity where additional workforce investment and wider resources may be required. Recommendation: that work is accelerated as part of the Future Direction plan to fundamentally shift how Oranga Tamariki assesses and responds to Reports of Concern without partner agencies to ensure collaborative decision-making and support.

Table 26: Relevant reviews and recommendations

Appendix 2: Assessment against Digital Government Target State

This programme is well aligned to the Digital Government Target State and Digital Investment and Procurement Principles, with alignment strengthening further through the revised Tranche 1–2 delivery approach.

Where full alignment is not yet realised, this reflects deliberate phasing decisions, legacy constraints, or prudent risk management, rather than any divergence in strategic intent.

The revised Tranche 1–2 delivery approach substantially improves alignment compared with the earlier sequential tranche delivery approach. An assessment of alignment to the Digital Government Target State and the Digital Investment and Digital Procurement Principles is summarised in the table below. Noting that as the programme progresses past the procurement phase and into the design phase, further engagement with Government Digital Delivery Agency (GDDA) will be progressed to seek to further strengthen and align to the principles below.

Digital Investment and Digital Procurement Principle	Level of Adherence (self-assessed)	Rationale for self-assessment
Act as a joined-up and coherent digital government system	High	The revised Tranche 1–2 delivery approach described in this business case materially improves coherence to the Digital Future State by accelerating legacy system retirement and reducing prolonged fragmentation of systems. Opportunities for data sharing and integration (for example, with agencies such as MSD) will be considered through the design phase.
Follow GCDO / GDDA leadership, mandates, and standards	High	This business case explicitly aligns with the Digital Future State, Cloud-First Policy, NZISM, Government procurement rules and central assurance expectations. Governance, assurance, and investment sequencing are structured to support system-level oversight and ministerial decision points.
Invest for public value (not agency preference)	High	Investment decisions prioritise child safety, system reliability, and long-term sustainability over short-term agency convenience. The shift to combined Tranche 1–2 delivery addresses material child-safety and system risks, even though it requires rephasing funding, demonstrates public value for money with a lower overall cost than anticipated in the Programme Business Case.
Implement once and reuse (DPI and AoG assets)	Medium–High	The programme delivery to date has evidenced commitment to leveraging AoG procurement mechanisms and shared architecture standards. Architectural intent aligns strongly with the principle, caveated that the planned Establishment and Design phases are yet to be executed.

Digital Investment and Digital Procurement Principle	Level of Adherence (self-assessed)	Rationale for self-assessment
Open and interoperable by design	High	The solution emphasises APIs, integration, and avoidance of proprietary lock-in. The deliberate move away from heavy customisation and the commitment to "configuration first" support future interoperability and digital system/asset ecosystem participation.
Adopt agile investment and modular delivery	Medium	A hybrid MSP / SAFe approach with modular workstreams and staged gates will be used. Full continuous and modular delivery is constrained by statutory risk, delivery risk, assurance, and certification requirements, but modular design and iterative build are retained to enable efficient implementation.
Buy, don't build	High	This business case clearly describes the open-market procurement approach taken, leveraging proven platforms and implementation partners rather than bespoke system build. Customisation is explicitly treated as a managed risk with a "configuration first" philosophy.
Cloud-first	High	Cloud-based platforms are foundational to the solution sought, aligning directly with the NZ Government Cloud-First Policy. Infrastructure resilience and scalability are cited requirements and benefits.
Design and deliver joined-up customer services	Medium–High	The future state is child- and whānau-centred, enabling shared decision-making and partner collaboration. Some partner-facing systems are intentionally sequenced to Tranche 3 to manage delivery and cutover risk relating to interdependent work programmes (e.g. Enabling Communities) and evolving requirements and needs in the partnering landscape.
Treat data as a strategic asset	High	This business case places strong emphasis on data quality, migration, data warehouse integration, analytics, and performance reporting. Data risks are explicitly recognised and intentionally planned to be resourced at the appropriate level, reflecting system-level data stewardship expectations.
Embed security, privacy, and resilience by design	High	Privacy-by-design, NZISM compliance, role-based access, auditability, Privacy Impacts Assessments and tikanga-aligned data handling will be embedded throughout design and delivery. Security and privacy are treated as foundational capabilities.
Adhere to system lead mandates, standards, guidance and rules	High	This business case demonstrates active engagement with GDDA, Treasury, NZ Government Procurement, and Government Enterprise Architecture; and explicitly considers cross-agency reuse, interoperability, and system impacts where able to within the constraint of the legacy system environment, funding and delivery risk considerations.

Table 27: Assessment of alignment to the Digital Government Target State and the Digital Investment and Digital Procurement Principles

In addition, the Digital Government Target State anticipates a key outcome of “a simplified government digital footprint that reduces duplication and is less expensive to maintain”. This business case supports the realisation of this outcome through:

- Deliberate exploration within procurement processes for proven cloud services and cost-effective off-the-shelf systems.
- Architectural decisions and taking a ‘configuration first’ discipline are deliberately structured to reduce lock-in, manage cost, and protect upgrade paths.
- Acknowledgement of the fact that decommissioning legacy systems will be central to long-term sustainability and cost-effectiveness – this is strongly supported by the revised implementation approach to complete Tranche 1-2 together.
- A mature governance model, a best practice ‘lines-of-defence’ assurance model, Gateway reviews, and explicit escalation to Ministers and central agencies enables effective stewardship of this programme as a high-risk digital investment.
- Signalled intent to enable broader system and partner participation –staged with the split of some programme scope into Tranche 3. This approach reflects prudent risk management, given the safety-critical nature of the services delivered by Oranga Tamariki.
- Commitment to share and re-use patterns from elsewhere in the social cluster (where appropriate).

Appendix 3: Multi criteria analysis outcome

The table below sets out the outcome of a multicriteria analysis based on the assessment criteria set out in the previously approved DBC. The focus of the assessment was based largely on the option's ability to meet the objectives and strategic fit.

Red shows where an option does not meet the objective or strategic fit, orange where it partially meets and green where it meets.

	MCA Oranga Tamariki FTSU DBC	Delievering the system			Who is going to implement the technical solution			
		Option 1: Support Services	Option 2 – Partnering focused	Option 3 – Practice led	Oranga Tamariki	Implementation Partner (s)	One implementation / test partner	Mixed model
Investment Objectives	To enable improvements in quality practice to achieve positive outcomes for the safety and oranga (wellbeing) of tamariki at risk of harm or where there are offending behaviours, and their whānau.	No	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	To make it easier for our kaimahi to work productively, spending more time working directly with tamariki, whānau and communities	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	To support a system wide approach to working with tamariki, rangatahi, and whānau (system in this case being Oranga Tamariki and its partners and other government agencies).	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	To be make it easier for kaimahi, partners and children's agencies to access quality information to inform decision-making at all levels	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BBC Critical Success Factors (CSF)	Strategic fit and business needs	Partial	Yes	Yes	Partial	Partial	No	Yes
	Potential value for money	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial	Partial	Yes
	Supplier capacity and capability	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Potential affordability	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Potential achievability	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial	Yes	Partial	Yes
Investment specific CSF	Professional practice	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Tamariki and whānau experience	No	Partial	Yes	Yes	Partial	Partial	Yes
	Technology system performance	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Change impact for Kaimahi	No	Partial	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Scalability	Yes	Yes	Yes	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes
Summary								
Option Progressed to Solution Option Short List		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

Table 28: Outcome of multicriteria analysis

Appendix 4: Comparative risk analysis of delivery pathways

The FTSU Programme have updated the Programme risk profile based on recent due diligence activities and lessons from the Queensland Unify Programme. This review benchmarks our strategic risks against the delivery friction points observed in the reference sites' implementation. The assessment focuses on specific execution challenges. These include:

- Co-existence and integration complexity,
- Data Migration,
- Change & Organisational Readiness,
- System configuration and Vendor Performance, and
- Overall Programme Execution.

The following analysis presents a comparative risk analysis of the two delivery pathways:

Scenario 1: DBC Tranche Delivery Approach

This pathway delivers the Tranche 1 Detailed Business Case (DBC) scope initially. The programme will deliver the remainder of the Programme Business Case (PBC) scope in sequential tranches over a multi-year period.

Scenario 2: Combined Tranche 1 & 2 Delivery

This pathway combines the Tranche 1 Detailed Business Case (DBC) scope with Tranche 2. The Programme will deliver the wider system requirements through a single consolidated implementation phase. This pathway aligns directly with the Programme Business Case Scope.

Key for the below analysis is:



	Risk Title & Current Risk Rating	Risk Description	Scenario 1 Key Risk Driver and Rating		Scenario 2 Key Risk Driver and Rating	
Organisational Readiness, Change, & Authorising Environment						
Political, Governance, & Continued Support	New! **ER1:** Investment Approval	IF the Programme fails to secure the necessary funding approvals to complete the delivery, THEN the rollout of FTSU will stall, RESULTING IN the business being stranded in a costly, highly inefficient operating environment with no clear path to the target state.	• Building and maintaining a complex, costly integration environment. • To achieve an artifice alignment with the Tranche 1 DBC scope.	🔴	• A resequencing of the current PBC funding with a larger upfront funding request • High political capital required despite that the total investment remaining within the PBC threshold.	🔴
	🟠 **R17:** Continued Support for the Programme	IF Oranga Tamariki's operating environment, authorising environment, or government priorities shift significantly (e.g., post-2026 election), THEN active support and sponsorship for the Programme may reduce or cease after Tranche 1 delivery, RESULTING IN stalled momentum, reduced organisational capacity, risk of unapproved re-baselining, and deferral of benefits associated with future tranches.	• High costs associated with coexistence. • Ongoing operational friction and schedule delays.	🔴	• High-stakes single delivery not a preferred option by central agencies.	🔴
	🟡 **R10:** Governance Effectiveness	IF governance and assurance arrangements are not maintained as fit-for-purpose for each programme phase, THEN role clarity, escalation pathways, and accountability mechanisms will degrade, RESULTING IN slow decision-making, duplicated oversight efforts, cost inefficiencies, and potential misalignment with wider organisational priorities and governance expectations	• Constant and ongoing oversight of complex coexistence and fragile integrations. • High decision velocity required.	🔴	• Removes coexistence but requires robust oversight of a high-stakes single transition event.	🔴
	🟠 **R33:** Operational Service Failure During Transition Phase	IF platform choice, coexistence and data migration arrangements, and introduction of AI-enabled functionalities are not fully aligned with the operational realities of social work practice and the organisational context, THEN critical information needed for assessing and responding to child safety concerns may be delayed, inaccurate, incomplete, or inaccessible to frontline kaimahi, RESULTING IN service failure that directly impacts outcomes for Tamariki and whānau, including life altering consequences in extreme cases, alongside erosion of public trust and confidence in Oranga Tamariki's ability to safeguard children.	• Prolonged impacts upon frontline kaimahi from complex Co-existence, integration, and data synchronisation arrangements.	🔴	• High-stakes transition event creates an acute, high magnitude change.	🔴
Change Management and Readiness	🔴 **R15:** Business Change Fatigue	IF business users experience change fatigue and lack adequate readiness and change support, THEN system adoption will be slow and resistance will rise, RESULTING IN sub-optimal service delivery to tamariki and whānau, delayed benefits realisation, and reputational damage.	• Business faces continuous, multi-year disruption. • Kaimahi have to cope with fragmented workflow resulting from co-existence	🔴	• High-stakes transition event requires the business to absorb all changes simultaneously.	🔴
	🔴 **R16:** Capacity to Lead Change	IF our front-line people leaders do not have the capacity or leaders' support to help embed technology changes, THEN FTSU Programme outcomes will be inconsistently realised, RESULTING IN sub-optimal service delivery to tamariki and whānau, system adoption challenges, and deviation from the Practice Approach.	• Continuous, multi-year changes drains frontline leadership capacity.	🟠	• Frontline leaders face an intense burden during a significant transition.	🔴
	🔴 **R26:** Enterprise Change Systems	IF business-as-usual (BAU) teams or other initiatives make uncoordinated changes to the current systems, business processes, or the operating model, THEN the FTSU Programme's baseline requirements, integration points, and data assumptions will be invalidated, RESULTING IN last-minute rework, schedule slippage, budget overrun, and risk of critical functionality being misaligned.	• Less scope initially, which grows larger over a multi-year phased rollout, creating an extended window of vulnerability. • Continuous BAU updates to legacy systems may break integrations.	🔴	• Extended overall delivery window subjects to more BAU changes.	🔴
	New! **ER2:** Post Go-live Exhaustion & Support	IF the operational demand for support following a major system release is not adequately anticipated and resourced, THEN frontline staff and support teams will become exhausted, RESULTING IN high change resistance and delayed adoption of the new system,	• Operating multiple systems and managing ongoing system friction over multiple tranches exhausts kaimahi.	🟠	• High-stakes transition event creates intensive demand for post-go-live support.	🟠
Strategic Asset	🟡 **R23:** Ownership of Programme System Capabilities as a Strategic Asset	IF organisational capabilities, resources, and ongoing product ownership are insufficient to support and maintain the new solutions at scale, THEN the programme outcomes may not be sustained, RESULTING IN performance degradation, service interruptions, increased operational effort, and stakeholder dissatisfaction post-go-live.	• Split focus across multiple active platforms. • Fragmented product ownership. • Managing C&As and system support for multiple platforms drains internal capacity.	🟠	• A significant operating model transition from the legacy systems to a single platform.	🟠

	Risk Title & Current Risk Rating	Risk Description	Scenario 1 Key Risk Driver and Rating		Scenario 2 Key Risk Driver and Rating	
		Technology				
Co-existence and Legacy Environments	**R31:** Managing Co-existence	IF the planned co-existence of the new and legacy platforms extends in duration, scope, or complexity beyond the agreed parameters, THEN architectural, functional, compatibility, and maintenance challenges may exceed current tolerance level, RESULTING IN increased integration complexity and cost pressures that could impact delivery of planned programme outcomes.	• Co-existence complexity significantly increases the administrative burdens, persistent data synchronisation failures, schedule delays, causing unacceptable risks to child safety.	🔴	• Delivering the full, combined scope enables the complete retirement of all main legacy systems. This avoids the need for co-existence.	⊘
	R22: Legacy Failure	IF legacy systems and environments deteriorate significantly prior to new solution implementation, THEN current services may be disrupted without effective fallback, RESULTING IN unexpected service outages, reallocation of programme resources or SMEs, and prioritisation shifts impacting delivery timelines.	• Legacy platforms to operate longer with extended existing integrations.	🟡	• Lengthened wait for system replacement.	🟡
	New! **ER3:** Cutover Risk	IF the technical and operational transition from legacy systems to the new platform is poorly executed during the cutover window, THEN critical workflows or data synchronisation will fail, RESULTING IN severe service outages and compromised casework capabilities.	• Avoids a single substantive cutover but requires constant technical replumbing.	🟠	• Massive simultaneous transition. • Zero margin for error.	🔴
	R29: Regrettable Spend	IF the Programme is forced to invest funding and resources into building interim enhancements, bridging solutions, or throwaway integrations during the transition THEN this work will ultimately be discarded once the final target state is reached, RESULTING IN significant regrettable spend, accumulation of throwaway technical debt, and the diversion of critical funding away from the permanent solution.	• Mandatory build of complex integrations to bridge new and legacy systems over multiple years	🔴	• Direct path to target architecture eliminates the need for co-existence • Interim enhancements required to keep momentum and deliver value to users	🟡
	R25: Decommissioning	IF decommissioning of CYRAS (or its components) is not well planned, phased, and coordinated with delivery progress, THEN functional handover and confidence in the new solution may be undermined, RESULTING IN disrupted operations, stakeholder anxiety, elevated transition costs, and reliance on fallback arrangements with incumbent providers.	• Elevates the complexity of retiring legacy systems completely. • Increased technical overhead.	🟠	• Intense technical bottleneck at cutover.	🟠
Data	**R21:** Data Quality	IF the complexity and effort required to manage the impacts of existing data quality issues on FTSU are unclear or greater than anticipated, THEN dependent workstreams (e.g., data strategy and remediation) and critical decisions on sequencing, data migration and co-existence strategy will stall or rely on unvalidated assumptions, RESULTING IN extended timelines, unbudgeted remediation costs, and erosion of programme value from persistent data-integrity failures.	• Co-existence Introduces persistent reconciliation challenges. • Maintaining data integrity through two-way synchronisation over multiple tranches is technically complex and prone to failure.	🔴	• Single, significant data cleanse and migration.	🟠
	New! **ER4**: Out-of-Scope Enterprise Data and Regulatory Reporting	IF there is a gap in accountability and resourcing between the Programme and the enterprise data teams to update downstream reports, THEN data changes introduced by the new system will break any existing reports that fall outside the Programme's scope and exceed the business's current capacity to fix them, RESULTING IN a loss of critical visibility for Te Riu and breaches of statutory reporting obligations.	• Repeated raw data structure changes requiring replumbing. • Exhaustion of BAU data remediation resources.	🟠	• Entire data structure changed at once. • Overnight breakage of all out-of-scope reports.	🟠
		Solution Fit and Vendor				
Customisation and Configuration	**R1:** Insufficient Solution Fit to Business Requirements	IF the selected platform and the I&S partner's implementation do not sufficiently meet Oranga Tamariki's business requirements, THEN the programme will face unforeseen development complexity, schedule delays, and budget overrun, RESULTING IN elevated post-go-live support and maintenance costs and a failure to realise intended benefits.	• Exacerbated need for custom code due to integration with legacy systems. • Unknown future fit issues – Tranche 1 focus only	🟠	• Larger set of business requirements due to wider scope.	🟠
	New! **ER5:** Design Drift and Customisation Spread	IF the programme fails to exercise strict governance over system configuration, THEN the new platform will suffer from design drift and customisation spread, RESULTING IN heavily modified out-of-the-box functionality, accumulating technical debt, and long-term maintenance and performance challenges.	• Users face side-by-side system comparisons may generate demand to replicate or accommodate legacy workflows.	🟠	• Significant initial build phase requires strict configuration discipline.	🟠
Vendor	**R28:** Vendor Performance	IF contractual provisions and internal capability are insufficient to set, monitor, and enforce vendor performance standards, THEN Oranga Tamariki may be unable to address poor vendor performance effectively, RESULTING in substandard service quality, delays, and inability to achieve the agreed programme outcomes.	• Diluted commercial leverage. • Fragmented integration arrangements & budgets.	🟠	• High reliance on primary suppliers causes concentrated commercial risk.	🟠
	R34: Oranga Tamariki as a System Integrator	IF Oranga Tamariki does not have an operating model with clear accountabilities and sufficient capability and capacity to act as the lead systems integrator, THEN coordination of delivery, end-to-end system integration, testing, and quality management across multiple vendors may become fragmented and misaligned, RESULTING IN critical gaps in the solution, vendor disputes, significant rework, and schedule delays.	• Internal teams forced into complex integrator role. • Fragmented multi-vendor landscape. • Sustained dependency on specialised vendor personnel creates long-term sustainability risks.	🔴	• Heavy reliance on primary suppliers. • Requirement for robust commercial management.	🟠

	Risk Title & Current Risk Rating	Risk Description	Scenario 1 Key Risk Driver and Rating		Scenario 2 Key Risk Driver and Rating	
Costs & Time						
Cost & Affordability	**R08:** Cost Exceeds Approved Funding (Capital)	IF the implementation and ongoing cost of platform licensing and support partner services exceeds baseline estimates, THEN budget overruns will materialise, threatening the affordability and long-term viability of the solution, RESULTING IN funding shortfalls, forced cost-control measures, and stakeholder concern over value for money.	• Tranche 1 unaffordable under current DBC • Co-existence complexity drive significant cost increase	ISSUE	• Requires larger immediate investment drawdown • Total stays within the overall PBC funding envelope (rated GREEN as such)	
	New! **ER6**: Delivery Timeline and Budget Cycle Misalignment (Funding Pipeline)	IF the programme's multi-year delivery timeline and escalating integration costs fall out of sync with rigid government budget cycles, THEN the programme will face critical funding shortfalls between tranches, RESULTING IN costly programme pauses, stranded resources, and delayed benefits realisation.	• Structural budget deficits • Repeated requests across rigid budget cycles		• Requires challenging upfront funding • Removes future budget cycle friction	
	New! **ER7:** Sustained Maintenance Burden (Operational)	IF Oranga Tamariki is forced to operate across fragmented new and legacy platforms for an extended period, THEN the ongoing BAU burden for system maintenance, C&As, dual testing cycles, and upgrades will compound, RESULTING IN severely depleted operational capacity and escalating technical maintenance costs.	• Fragmented technical landscape • Compounding operational maintenance overhead • Risk of extended holding costs		• Focused maintenance and update burden for a single cloud platform	
Time	**R05:** Delivery Delay	IF the current Tranche delivery slips significantly beyond its agreed timeframe, THEN progressing to subsequent tranche will be delayed, RESULTING IN change request(s) in a fiscally constrained environment, delayed benefits, and funding availability in retaining programme resources.	• Underestimating co-existence complexity • Derailing planned milestones across the multi-tranche timeline		• High-stakes transition event heightens risk to benefits realisation timeline and costly extension	
Programme Delivery and Execution						
Complexity and Scope	**R09:** Programme Size & Inherent Complexity	IF the Programme's size and inherent complexity are not proactively managed through phased scoping and decision checkpoints, THEN delivery planning and execution may become fragmented or overloaded, RESULTING IN failure to realise intended benefits in a timely manner, erosion of stakeholder confidence, and introduction of risk into core business functions.	• Highly complex initial release due to co-existence and severely compressed timeframe.		• Extends delivery runway, avoids co-existence, but comes with an extreme high-stakes single cutover	
	New! **ER8**: Scope Creep	IF the programme fails to exercise its scope controls or manage its delivery boundaries against emerging demands, THEN incremental additions will be absorbed into the delivery roadmap without formal scope change, RESULTING IN compounded schedule delays, budget blowouts, and a target solution that becomes ultimately unaffordable to deliver.	• Artificial tranche boundaries create ambiguity, inviting requests to squeeze additional scope into active tranches		• Extended multi-year delivery pipeline • Increased exposure to changing external regulations and shifting enterprise mandates	
Resourcing & Way of Working	**R14:** Cultural Fit and Way-of-Working Misalignment	IF the implementation partner's delivery culture and way of working is misaligned with Oranga Tamariki's environment and operating practices, THEN collaboration and delivery cohesion will be compromised, RESULTING IN diminished effectiveness of Agile practices, tension in joint decision-making, and reduced delivery velocity.	• Heightened complexity causing intense pressure to compressed delivery • Initial operational rhythm alignment		• Extended build and execution phases • Maintaining long-term vendor alignment	
	R12: Loss of Key Personnel	IF key programme staff or governance members exit unexpectedly, THEN strategic continuity, delivery oversight, and decision velocity may degrade, RESULTING IN delays in programme execution, loss of institutional knowledge, and disruption to stakeholder relationships and planning rhythms.	• Securing specialised professionals across tranches • Ongoing rate constraints across tranches		• Extended delivery timeline increases exposure to market rate inflation and team fatigue.	
	R13: Remuneration Misalignment	IF Oranga Tamariki's approved resource rate card is misaligned with current market benchmarks, THEN attracting and retaining skilled professionals at the required levels will be challenging, RESULTING IN programme capability gaps and reduced accuracy in budgeting and forecasting.				
Requirements & Design Discipline	**R02:** Timeliness and Completeness of Business Requirements	IF business requirements or Pre-Establishment Phase artefacts (including current state process documentation) are delayed, incomplete, or lack sufficient detail to inform the Establishment Phase deliverables, THEN the Programme will fail to meet the entry criteria for the Establishment Phase and effectively brief Vendors for solution design and non-negotiable outcomes, RESULTING IN stalled Vendor onboarding, an inability to validate technical scope, friction with commercial partners, and a slippage of Programme milestones.	• Uncertainties due to incomplete enterprise picture • Compressed window to complete requirements		• Extended time required to obtain the complete picture • Stalled technical development pipeline.	
	R19: Requirements Late Emergence	IF Significant additional or conflicting business requirements are identified after the solution has been designed, THEN scope and solution architecture will require reactive adjustments, RESULTING IN scope creep, increased delivery costs, timeline pressure, and reduction in solution coherence or quality.				
	R18: Interdependency Misalignment	IF critical interdependencies with other programmes and projects are not actively managed, THEN misaligned schedules and resource conflicts will emerge, RESULTING IN delivery bottlenecks, compounded delays, and escalated portfolio-level risk.	• Fragmented delivery schedules triggered by complex co-existence and integrations. • Persistent friction with concurrent initiatives.		• Longer, single-stage implementation requires upfront alignment with other initiatives and strict sustained coordination	

Appendix 5: Description of the frontline technology systems

The following table sets out a description of the frontline technology systems.

System	What it does
Care and Protection, Youth Justice, Residential and Adoption Services system (CYRAS)	CYRAS is the primary case management system providing comprehensive case management from the time a concern is raised to when the involvement finishes – this may or may not become a statutory intervention. It provides a 'digital filing cabinet' to record information, actions and responses taken when assessing, engaging and working with children, their families, caregivers and victims of youth offending, young people transitioning from care to adulthood and adoption services. It provides the ability to create, manage and track case activities relating to individual actions. It is also used to undertake some financial management and some vendor management. CYRAS has been in place for over 25 years and has about 4,500 users – both internal and external. To access CYRAS, all users must be set up in the Microsoft Active Directory for Oranga Tamariki and be issued an Oranga Tamariki laptop which makes sharing of information difficult. There has been significant and increasing criticism of CYRAS in multiple reports of its inability to support positive outcomes and the time burden it imposes on practitioners.
Caregiver information system (CGIS)	CGIS is an Oranga Tamariki case and care management system developed to provide a caregiver centric view of the caregiver journey with Oranga Tamariki. It was developed to support the National Care Standards (2019) and is used to manage the recruitment of caregivers from application, vetting, assessments of facilities approval and what care types they are approved for. CGIS is built on a modern cloud-based platform, is integrated with CYRAS, and has about 250 internal users. It was rolled out to all Caregiver Recruitment and Support teams in 2022.
Compliments Complaints and Suggestions (CCS)	Supports Oranga Tamariki to investigate respond and identify service improvements in response to feedback received. It also supports managing claims regards historic mistreatment in care (post April 2017).
Funding and contracting system (FAC)	The Funding and Contracting (FAC) system is a bespoke database and workflow engine developed around 2000, that until late 2022 was owned and managed by MSD. Oranga Tamariki now operates its own instance of FAC. They system provisions contract management, planning, and relationship management functionality for social services contracts, and is comprised of two areas (sub-systems): • The Funding Planning System (FPS) - FPS includes functionality to set up funding allocations for services, with approval and sign off processes. • The Contract Management System (CMS) - CMS provides contract document creation and sign off flows as well as functions for contract management activities, contract payments and reconciliations. This system also has specific integration with the Te Kāhui Kāhu Social Services Accreditation system (RDA). It has 410 users across Oranga Tamariki and is approximately 22 years old.

System	What it does
Te Kete - High and Complex Needs (HCN)	The High and Complex Needs Unit (HCN) is made up of a small team working across the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, and Oranga Tamariki. The unit coordinates intensive services for high and complex needs children[15] to meet service gaps and shortfalls in existing programmes or supplement those programmes that lack the resources and mechanisms to address those needs. High needs children include those whose behaviours constitute a risk to themselves or others: • Whose needs are so complex, or mixed up, that they cannot be effectively addressed by the usual services. • Whose ongoing, persistent and complex unmet needs will take time to address and stabilise. • For whom intensive interventions are required to make improvement. • Whose circumstances place the family or alternative caregivers under extreme stress or severely compromise their ability to provide adequate care. Te Kete is the case management system for these children, for interagency plans, and to support information management and processes for provision of specialised services to children and young people. It is a standalone system with about 20 Oranga Tamariki users. Users from other agencies need to be seconded to Oranga Tamariki and on-boarded as staff in order to gain access to the Te Kete system. It manages an average active caseload of about 200 cases per year. It has been in use since 2014.
Family Start Network (FS Net)	Family Start is an Oranga Tamariki funded early support programme delivered by Partner NGOs. Family Start is a home visiting programme, focused on children and works with their families to improve a child's health, learning and relationships. Providers work alongside other agencies such as Well Child Services, Plunket, Budgeting Advice, and government agencies. Providers have different contracted volumes (80 through to 300+ families). 9,238 families (caseloads) actively participated over the last financial year. FSNet is a web-based reporting system used by Family Start service providers (e.g. community groups). It provides a place where monthly and quarterly provider performance information can be entered, so it can be compared to contract standards and national indicators. It is a standalone system with about 700 external and internal users with an active user base of around 50 providers across most of New Zealand. Currently there are around 500 Family workers who input, edit and retrieve client's personal data, limited to their corresponding site. There are on average 103 logins per day. FSNet has been in place 22 years.
Strengthening Families Reporting Tool (SFRT)	Strengthening Families is a free and voluntary service, supported by 11 key government agencies (Oranga Tamariki, Accident Compensation Corporation, Department of Corrections, Department of Internal Affairs, Te Puni Kōkiri, Housing New Zealand, Inland Revenue, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice, and New Zealand Police). Strengthening Families coordinates support for

[15] High needs children include those whose behaviours constitute a risk to themselves or others • whose needs are so complex, or mixed up, that they cannot be effectively addressed by the usual services • whose ongoing, persistent and complex unmet needs will take time to address and stabilise • for whom intensive interventions are required to make an improvement • whose circumstances place the family or alternative caregivers under extreme stress or severely compromise their ability to provide adequate care

System	What it does
	children, young people and their families showing early signs of need that, if not addressed, might lead to bigger problems later, including potentially care or protection or youth justice interventions. Their clients are vulnerable children or young people and their families who have multiple and complex needs (not at risk of serious harm) and require a coordinated intervention from more than one agency. SFRT is a web-based data collection tool used daily across New Zealand, to record case coordination data and data about services provided to clients. It allows Strengthening Families coordinators, employed by Providers/Agencies to be organised into Local Management Groups (LMG) to enter data. It is a standalone system with about 38 logins per day and has an active user base of 92 external and internal users.

Table 29: Description of the frontline technology systems

Appendix 6: Cost and resource breakdown

This appendix provides the detailed financial information that supports the Financial Case. It is a repository for the underlying model, funding logic and accounting treatment**.** In line with Guidance on Accounting for Software as a Service (SaaS) released by Treasury in February 2022, all costs included in this programme have been determined to be operating costs and therefore no capital is required.

Cash-flow model

The table below outlines the indicative total Cashflow for the full end to end solution (**Tranche 1-3**). The final phasing of investment will be confirmed [redacted] and Approval to Deliver steps.

s9(2)(f)(iv)

[redacted]

The table below outlines the indicative total Cashflow for **Tranche 1-2** implementation. The final phasing of investment will be confirmed [redacted] and Approval to Deliver steps.

s9(2)(f)(iv)

[redacted]

[16] Assumes IPET of $6.5 million from FY 25/26 to FY 27/28 is approved.

Resource Profile

The table below outline the number of FTE's required by financial year to support **Tranche 1-2 implementation**, in addition to the vendor resources.

Roles	Resource Profile - Tranche 1-2 Implementation				
	FTEs per Financial Year				s9(2)(f)(iv)
	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	
Overarching Programme Roles					
Senior Responsible Owner	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.00	
Programme Director	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	
PMO Lead	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	
Procurement Specialist	1.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	
Assurance and Risk Lead	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	
Communication lead	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	
Senior PMO Scheduler	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	
	6.50	**6.00**	**5.50**	**0.00**	
Programme Delivery & Coordination					
Programme Manager	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	
Project Manager / Delivery Manager	4.16	6.00	5.00	1.50	
Implementation / Transition Lead	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.50	
Coordinator	3.00	5.00	5.25	3.00	
	9.16	**13.00**	**12.50**	**7.00**	
Business Product Ownership					
Manager Practice Enablers / Product Manager	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	
Practice SME	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	
Senior Advisors	0.00	0.00	3.50	7.00	

Roles	Resource Profile - Tranche 1-2 Implementation			
	FTEs per Financial Year			
	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30
Business Product Owner	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00
	8.00	**8.00**	**12.50**	**17.00**
Technical Product Ownership				
Technical Product Owner	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Environment/Release Manager	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
System Managers	0.10	0.10	0.60	1.10
System Leads	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
Technical BA	0.00	0.00	1.50	1.50
Technical Integration Analyst	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Release Analyst	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Technology Solution Lead	0.50	1.00	1.00	0.50
	3.70	**4.20**	**6.20**	**6.20**
Business Analysis				
Process Design and Business Analyst Lead	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Lead BA	1.00	1.02	1.02	1.00
Snr BA	12.00	12.00	10.48	5.75
Service Designer	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
UX/UI Advisor	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00
	15.50	**16.02**	**14.50**	**9.75**
Change, Comms, Engagement and Training				
Content Writer	0.50	2.00	2.00	1.00
Change and Organisation Readiness Lead	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.50
Change Manager	3.00	5.00	4.80	3.10
Change Analyst	1.00	3.00	3.50	3.00

s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

Roles	Resource Profile - Tranche 1-2 Implementation			
	FTEs per Financial Year			
	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30
Training Lead	0.00	0.50	1.00	1.00
Trainers	1.00	1.00	3.17	9.51
	6.49	**12.50**	**15.47**	**18.11**
Architecture				
Programme Business Architect	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Programme Architect	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Enterprise Architect	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.75
Solution Architect	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Portfolio Architect	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Integration Architect	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.00
	5.99	**6.00**	**5.50**	**4.75**
Testing				
Programme Test Lead	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00
Programme Test Manager	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Test Analysts	1.08	9.00	8.00	0.00
	2.98	**11.00**	**10.00**	**2.00**
Data				
Data Lead	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Data Portfolio Architect	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Data Architect	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.00
Data Release Engineer	0.50	1.00	1.50	0.00
EDAP Platform Engineer	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00
EDAP Release Manager	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Data Product Owner	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00
Data Engineer	0.50	4.00	4.00	3.00
Snr Data Analyst	2.12	6.00	4.00	2.00

s9(2)(f)(iv) [redacted]

Roles	Resource Profile - Tranche 1-2 Implementation				
	FTEs per Financial Year				s9(2)(f)(iv)
	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	
Reporting Specialist	0.10	6.00	6.00	2.00	
	7.22	**23.00**	**22.00**	**11.00**	
Security & Privacy					
Security Consultant / Architect	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
Privacy Consultant	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.50	
AI Consultant	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.00	
	2.50	**2.50**	**2.50**	**1.50**	
Total	**67.09**	**101.77**	**106.72**	**82.80**	

Table 32: FTEs required by financial year

Appendix 7: A Brief Privacy Analysis (BPA)

Aspect of the FTSU Programme	Rating (L, M or H)	Describe any medium and high risks and how to mitigate them
Level of information handling L – Minimal personal information will be handled M – A moderate amount of personal information (or information that could become personal information) will be handled H – A significant amount of personal information (or information that could become personal information) will be handled	**H**	Moving the entire CYRAS database into a replacement system necessitates the handling of a significant amount of personal information. The new frontline technology systems will thereafter be used to collect and manage a high volume of personal information. Technical security controls will be in place to ensure that personal information remains safe both in transit and once held in the new system.
Sensitivity of the information (e.g. health, financial, race) L – The information will not be sensitive M – The information may be considered to be sensitive H – The information will be highly sensitive	**H**	A significant amount of the personal information that will be transferred into, and thereafter collected into, the new frontline technology systems will be highly sensitive. Technical security controls will be in place to ensure that personal information remains safe both in transit and once held in the new system.
Significance of the changes L – Only minor change to existing functions/activities M – Substantial change to existing functions/activities; or a new initiative H – Major overhaul of existing functions/activities; or a new initiative that's significantly different	**M / H**	The programme will entail a complete system replacement of the existing new frontline technology systems. With added functionality and controls, it is expected that the new frontline technology systems will result in significant changes to operational functions and activities. However, these are anticipated to be privacy- and service-enhancing improvements.
Interaction with others L – No interaction with other agencies M – Interaction with one or two other agencies H – Extensive cross-agency (that is, government) interaction or cross-sectional (non-government and government) interaction	**H**	In most cases, Oranga Tamariki Partners and providers with existing access to the current CMS will be given access to the new CMS, with the intention to onboard additional Partners and providers.
Public impact L – Minimal impact on the organisation and clients M – Some impact on clients is likely due to changes to the handling of personal information; or the changes may raise public concern H – High impact on clients and the wider public, and concerns over aspects of project; or negative media is likely	**M**	Some existing operational processes may change due to changed or improved functionality, and some members of the public may have a general concern around how Oranga Tamariki manages sensitive information held in its new frontline technology systems. However, the programme is not expected to have a high impact on clients or be cause for significant public concern.

Table 33: BPA

Summary of privacy impact

The privacy impact for this programme has been assessed as:	Tick
High – Sensitive personal information is involved, and several medium to high risks have been identified	x
Reduced risk – The FTSU Programme w ill lessen existing privacy risks	x
Not enough information – More information and analysis is needed to fully assess the privacy impact of the FTSU Programme.	x

Table 34: Summary of privacy impact

The privacy impact has been rated high due to the volume of sensitive personal information that will be moved to and managed in the replacement case management system.

However, as the new solution will deliver improved functionality, it is expected to lessen some of the privacy risks associated with operating the current legacy case management system.

Appendix 8: Key supporting documents

The following documents have been developed to inform the content of this DBC for Tranche 1-2.

Planning Documents

- Detailed Costing Model
- Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
- Establishment Phase Scope and Approach

Procurement Documents

- Procurement Plan
- Technology Platform RFP Recommendation Report
- Technology Platform Due Diligence Reports
- Implementation and Support Partner Recommendation Report
- Implementation and Support Partner Due Diligence Reports
- Technology Platform and Implementation and Support Partner Full Solution Recommendation Report

Key Programme Documents

- Investment Logic Mapping
- Benefits Logic Map
- Benefits Realisation Plan
- Programme Management Plan
- Programme Risk Register
- FTSU Programme Assurance Plan
- Communications Plan
- Stakeholder Engagement Plan

Programme Frameworks

- Change Strategy and Framework
- Organisational Readiness Framework
- FTSU Programme Governance and Reporting Framework
- FTSU Programme Risk and Issue Management Framework
- FTSU Programme Quality Management Plan and Standards
- FTSU Programme Lessons Learned Framework
- FTSU Programme Schedule and Dependency Management Framework

Key Business Requirement Documents

- Current State Processes (Level 1&2)
- Current State Architecture
- UX/UI Principles
- High-level Requirements - supplied for procurement
- FTSU Personas and User Journeys
- Enterprise and Solution NFRs
- Capability Map

Organisational Documents

- National Care Standards
- National Residential Regulations